August 3, 2007; Volume 03, Number 27

of the

Japan Considered Podcast

[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]

Clink Links Below for Today's Topics

Introduction
Results of the Upper House Election
The Wages of Ruling Coalition Membership for New Komeito
The Significance of Voter Turnout
The Difference Between Positive and Negative Voting
Prime Minister Abe’s Reaction to the Election
Demands for Abe’s Resignation
Concluding Comments

Good Morning from the mountains of beautiful Southwest Virginia. Today is Friday, August 3rd, 2007. And you are listening to Volume 03, Number 27, of the Japan Considered Podcast.

Introduction

Coming to you again from the Japan Considered Project Mobile Studio. This time parked at Natural Tunnel State Park, near Duffield, in the southwest corner of Virginia. Another of Virginia’s beautiful state parks. Of which the state is rightfully proud. Campground hosts, Mike and Teresa Hopkins, really know how things should be done. They and their colleagues at other campgrounds are the real heroes of this glorious pastime.

These Virginia mountains are dazzling. Every horizon offers an awe-inspiring view. The Great Northern Sojourn continues. Now on the homeward leg. Expected there next Tuesday. If all goes according to plan. Then things will be back to normal for a while. Until classes start at the University, at least.

WiFi access has been a little better these past few days in this part of Virginia. And it’s a good thing! Finally, the Upper House election is over. And the political news streamed from Japan once again is more interesting. I’ve been able to access most of it. Fortunately, WiFi connection reliability doesn’t affect Japanese language text any more than it does English language text. Though it does make on-line viewing of video news broadcasts more of a challenge! Still, some got through.

A lot was going on in Japan this week. Including some important developments in international relations. A few of which we’ll consider later on, if time permits. But today our focus has to be the outcome of this important Upper House election. Now, that we’ve actually seen it. The long period of speculation, and efforts of the media and punditocracy to influence its outcome, is over at last.

So, the news streaming in from Japan, in Japanese and English, has become a bit more reliable. Allowing us now to take a cooler, more sober, look the actual election results. Of course, political spin hasn’t completely ended. Political PR operatives, and their lesser-paid helpers in the media, punditocracy, and tenurate, still have to promote interpretation of the results of the election in support of their clients’ interests.

But we too can consider what happened. What didn’t happen! Why what happened, happened. And the longer-term significance of those important developments. Both for Japan’s domestic political scene and for the conduct of international relations. Lots to consider today, so let’s get at it.

Results of the Upper House Election

Well, “they’ve gone ‘n done it,” as the expression goes. As predicted in every poll and pre-election assessment I could find prior to Sunday. The Liberal Democratic Party headed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and its hapless ruling coalition partner, New Komeito, suffered a numbing defeat in the July 29th Upper House election.

With half of the Upper House’s 252 seats up for election, the LDP was able to win only 37 seats. Far lower than even the more pessimistic prognosticators had expected. Adding the seats they already held that weren’t up for election, the LDP now has only 83 seats in the Upper House.

Ichiro Ozawa’s DPJ was the primary beneficiary of the LDP’s loss. It came away from the election with 60 seats. Giving the DPJ a total of 109 seats, after adding the 49 seats they already held that weren’t up for election. This makes the DPJ the largest party in the Upper House. Largest by quite a healthy margin!  

This is the first time the LDP has lost its status as the largest party. In either the Upper or the Lower House. Even after the defection of Ozawa and his supporters in 1993. Following Ozawa’s failure to gain control of the Takeshita Faction. The event that made possible an anti-LDP coalition in the Lower House. That coalition selected Morihiro Hosokawa as prime minister. And later, even the leader of the Japan Socialist Party’s Left Wing, Tomiichi Murayama, was allowed to occupy the big chair. But throughout, the LDP remained the largest single party in both Houses of the Diet.

The Wages of Ruling Coalition Membership for New Komeito

The results on Sunday for New Komeito were as bad. New Komeito won just 9 of their contests. Giving them only 20 seats now in the Upper House. This after most knowledgeable prognosticators had predicted them to win at least 13. New Komeito candidates are supported by Soka Gakkai members. And the cell-like neighborhood organization of the Gakkai greatly simplifies election campaigning for New Komeito. Like one huge, religion-disciplined, Koenkai. This has made the results of most elections for New Komeito quite predictable.

This time, things were different. New Komeito leaders must attribute their loss on Sunday to close association with the LDP. They since have announced plans to remain in the coalition. Undoubtedly because of the more favorable situation in the Lower House. But they can’t be pleased with the result. Or, with the current LDP leadership. This is bound to complicate relations between the two parties. Fortifying New Komeito’s voice in ruling coalition councils. When it comes to parliamentary agenda-setting. And even specific policies.

It appears to me that abandonment of the ruling coalition now would do more harm to the LDP than to New Komeito. Something that both the LDP and New Komeito leadership must recognize. They’d surely lose their cabinet position. But first things first. And for political parties, the first thing is maintenance of public support. I no longer have good sources of information within the New Komeito leadership. But it would be interesting to have a frank off-the-record discussion of their feelings after Sunday’s electoral smash-up. They must feel like a party-goer who foolishly accepted a ride home with a drunk driver! A ride that ended very badly.  

The LDP’s fall from largest Party status in either House of the Diet is an event we observers of Japanese politics have waited to see for more than fifty years. It’s exciting, and will help us to better understand and interpret political Japan. Of course, we have to remember that this is the Upper House, and not the more influential Lower House. But it’s still important. and very interesting.

Ichiro Ozawa and his supporters already have begun to claim publicly after the LDP’s loss that the Upper House is as important as the Lower House in Japan’s parliamentary system. We all know that isn’t true, of course. It’s just a good example of post-election spin. Intended to make the most of the LDP loss for the DPJ. But still, the results of Sunday’s Upper House election are important. And will remain important for some time to come. Who would have predicted such an outcome in late 2005? Or most any time during the past decade, for that matter?

The Significance of Voter Turnout

Voter turnout for the Sunday election was neither high nor low. Compared with the past few Upper House elections. In the end, around 56.44 percent of Japan’s eligible voters went to the polls. The press did report an increase in absentee votes cast. And votes cast earlier than usual this time around. Making earlier media projections of voter turnout on Sunday more optimistic. But in the end, turnout was just about what it had been in the last couple of elections.

Now, this is interesting to me. Given the level of public frustration with the current LDP leadership’s management of governmental affairs. Why wasn’t voter turnout higher than normal? I certainly expected it to be. Didn’t “predict” it, now. Just expected. A number of factors could explain it, I guess. Postponement of the election for a week. Cutting into Japan’s peak vacation period. Inclement weather in some places. Or fear of it. And so on. The usual explanations.

Still, though. If the LDP and DPJ were able to bring out their most reliable voters. And the attentive public was furious over the Abe Kantei’s failure to respond effectively to publicity concerning SIA’s lost pension records. That should have brought more of the floating, or unaffiliated, voters to the polls on Sunday. And even people who don’t normally vote. All to vote against the LDP. Which would raise voter turnout, wouldn’t it? Seems to me it should. Well, it didn’t!  

Could it be that during this election different people than “normal” voted? That is, that a large number of LDP reliable voters just decided to stay home. Out of disgust with the Abe Kantei performance, and with the campaign. And that those voters were replaced this time by unaffiliated, or “floating,” voters? Or by people who don’t normally vote? Who came out just this time to vote against the LDP?

I’ve scoured the political news from Japan since the election for some reliable explanation. But haven’t found one. There are a few exit polls. But exit polls don’t inspire deep confidence. Especially in Japan. At least, I wouldn’t stake a mortgage payment on one.

This seems to me an important question. Just who was it who voted against the LDP? If it was unaffiliated voters or people who don’t normally vote, that’s one thing. If, on the other hand, it was reliable LDP voters, that’s quite another. Were I responsible for LDP election campaign strategy, I’d sure make some effort to learn the answer to that question.   

As we’ve discussed on past programs, the Upper House election system combines prefectural constituencies that return one or more representatives, and national proportional representation. This system resulted from compromises made to avoid total destruction of Japan’s minor parties, such as the JCP or the Socialists, when the electoral system was reformed. It’s done that. But it requires Japan’s voters to cast two ballots in each election. One for a particular prefectural electoral district candidate. And the other for either a party, or for a particular candidate endorsed by a political party in the PR ballot.

The overall outcome of Sunday’s election is undeniably visible in the proportional representation part of the vote. According to mid-week news reports, the LDP received only 16.54 million proportional representation votes. Giving them 16 PR Upper House seats. While the DPJ received 23.25 million proportional representation votes. Gaining them 20 seats. Clearly, many of Japan’s voters are unhappy with the way the LDP under Shinzo Abe has been conducting itself. And they’ve expressed that dissatisfaction by voting against the LDP and its candidates in this election. In large numbers.

The Difference Between Positive and Negative Voting

You’ve probably noticed by now that I haven’t described Sunday’s election as a victory for Ozawa’s Democratic Party of Japan. That’s intentional. I simply don’t think it was. The DPJ didn’t “win” this election. Shinzo Abe’s LDP “lost” it. That is, large numbers of Japan’s voters on Sunday went to the polls to cast their ballots against the LDP. And most of those votes cast against the LDP went to DPJ candidates.

Politically insensitive observers might not recognize the difference in positive and negative voting. Since the results of the election itself are the same in either case. “Votes received are votes received! Whether out of frustration with the other party’s policies or behavior. Or in support of the receiving party’s policies or behavior! The results are the same! One party declares victory, and the other party admits defeat!”

Well, that may be true on election day. But once the votes have been counted, and the crowing and moaning has quieted to a murmur. It’s just not that simple. Especially after an election like we saw last Sunday in Japan. When a party long in minority suddenly benefits from voter anger with the party long in majority.

The key difference is found in attentive public expectations following the election. Public expectations for both parties. When most of the votes received by the winning party actually were votes cast against the party that lost, that winning party hasn’t really received a public “mandate” for their policies. Nor have they received an expression of public confidence in their ability to do a better job of managing the government. It’s likely the DPJ would have received nearly as many votes as they actually received on Sunday with the guarantee of a “chicken in every pot” as their whole election manifesto. Or even the promise to make Japan a “beautiful country.” Hang on! That one’s already taken. Oh well ….

Now, some of the DPJ’s commitments to redistribute resources to special interests, such as agriculture, may have won them positive votes. Votes in addition to those provided by their usual constituency. Especially in depressed rural prefectures. But that’s hardly a majority of the Japanese electorate. And, like adoption of Rengo’s labor policy programs as the price for Rengo mobilizing trade union electoral support, it may well have cost the DPJ as many votes as it attracted. More on that point too in a moment.

Rather, I believe the post-election expectations of Japan’s attentive public will remain directed toward the LDP. And the Abe Kantei. Hoping for evidence that the Party leadership understands the message they were sent during the election on Sunday. Sunday’s vote clearly was a vote of protest against the way the LDP and the Abe Kantei have been discharging their governmental responsibilities. Not even opposition to the Abe Kantei’s policies. But resentment over their ineffectual response to the political problems they’ve faced. Especially the SIA missing pension record flap. And disclosures of political funds management indiscretions. As we discussed last week.

In the coming weeks we’re likely to hear claims from the DPJ leadership that they have a “mandate” to govern. A mandate to implement the policies listed in their election campaign “manifesto.” Many of them inspired by Rengo. What else can they say, for heaven’s sake? Of course, long-standing media and punditocracy opponents of the LDP, and of the Abe Administration’s policies, will support the DPJ leadership’s argument. That doesn’t make it true, however. And I suspect that everyone involved knows it.

Rather, those of us more interested in understanding what actually happened than in trying to influence Japan’s policy processes, should look beyond that predictable hype. And keep our eyes on the effect the election will have on the LDP. Especially on the Abe Kantei.    

Prime Minister Abe’s Reaction to the Election

Well, Prime Minister Abe has stated unequivocally he has no intention of resigning his position as LDP Party leader and prime minister. Here is where discussion of the results of Sunday’s election becomes more difficult. And, it’s the most important feature of the whole event! How the Abe Kantei and LDP will respond! As noted a moment ago, this election wasn’t a contest for public approval of either the LDP’s or the DPJ’s policy agenda. That was the plan earlier this year. At least the LDP’s plan. Rather, it turned out to be a sharp public protest against the way the government, headed by the Abe Kantei, has been handling its job.

Given that, one would expect to see some dramatic response from the LDP, or the Abe Kantei. Something designed to assure the disaffected public that the message had been received, and that things would be done differently hereafter. Most prognosticators were reluctant to come right out and predict that Prime Minister Abe would resign. Should the LDP fail to win fewer than forty or forty-five seats on Sunday. But most everyone expected that to happen. Well, he didn’t! Sunday night, well after 10:00 PM. When it was certain the LDP was going to suffer an election defeat even worse than the pessimists had predicted. Abe told the Japanese political press that he had no intention of resigning. No matter how grim the election results! Hmmm. Hardly “stiff upper lip,” “show of determination” sort of thing to have happen at 10:30 on the night of the election.

And, he meant it! Abe then told the LDP Press Club during a Monday formal press conference that he had no intention of resigning. In response to a reporter’s question, Abe said he took the result of the election very seriously. That he accepted the very negative public assessment of the work of his Party. And that he personally assumed full responsibility for the election’s outcome. Indeed!

But in spite of all that, in response to a later question, he said would not resign. Or run away, as he put it. That he would stay in office to implement the reform measures he had been pursuing. The LDP Press Club members were polite. But it seemed to me that they expected something different. Something a bit more dramatic. In response to the LDP’s incredible loss. Not just, “We screwed up. I screwed up. But I’ll try harder in the future.”

Well, that’s unfair to Prime Minister Abe. He said much more than that. He admitted that more attention needs to be given to the effect of administrative reform on poorer prefectures. That the LDP needs to reconsider legislation to make political funds management more transparent. And that he needs to do a better job of communicating his reform objectives to the Japanese public. He also noted that his Administration needs to see that the education reform bills and the anti-Amakudari bills passed in the last session are actually implemented. So, it wasn’t just a simple “kore kara gambarimasu” sort of statement.

Demands for Abe’s Resignation

Of course, the DPJ, and the anti-Abe media, since the election have been demanding Abe’s resignation. The anti-Abe media commentators may actually mean it. I question, though, the sincerity of the DPJ. Without sounding cynical, I suspect Ichiro Ozawa and the DPJ see Shinzo Abe in the role of prime minister as a major political asset for the DPJ!  

He has provided irrefutable evidence of his inability to communicate effectively with Japan’s attentive public. He took office as a popular successor to Junichiro Koizumi. Not as a traditional LDP factionist compromise candidate. It appears that he assumed office with the hope of avoiding at least some of the conflict between the Kantei and the LDP’s traditional Factionist/Zokuist senior leaders. At least no unprovoked “finger in their eye” approach that characterized Koizumi’s incumbency.

Well, it’s clear now that if Abe actually did believe he could moderate the hostility between the Kantei and the LDP’s traditional leaders, he was wrong. In order to maintain the confidence of Japan’s attentive public, a prime minister who depends heavily on public approval rather than LDP Factionist/Zokuist acceptance, must pursue a genuine political and administrative reform agenda. AND, explain effectively both the objectives, and their efforts to implement that agenda. Should such public explanations ruffle LDP Factionist/Zokuist feathers, so be it! Indeed, handled skillfully, complaints from the primary targets of such reform might well be turned to the reformer’s advantage! As Koizumi did repeatedly. Serve as evidence that the reform efforts actually are working. Whereas, the appearance that the “reformist” prime minister is trying to get along with everyone makes the public rightfully suspicious. Makes sense!

There’s one other thing worth mentioning about Abe’s decision to remain in office. At least so far. That is the failure of the LDP’s traditional leaders to force him to step down. If the DPJ may be secretly pleased to see Abe continue on as LDP president and prime minister, the LDP’s leadership certainly should be displeased. There are plenty of candidates to succeed Abe within the Party. Both the old traditionalist types and the new popular or populist types.

I won’t bother to provide a list here. Their names are unimportant. The key point is that commentators who argue Abe has been able to remain in power because there’s nobody to succeed him are simply overlooking prominent members of the LDP! No, the traditional LDP leadership didn’t remove Abe because they couldn’t do it! Which says something about changes in the structure of power within the LDP. A topic we’ve discussed in detail on this program from the beginning.

The day after the election a rumor floated through Japan’s political press that LDP Secretary General, Hidenao Nakagawa, former prime minister, Yoshiro Mori, and Upper House LDP leader, Mikio Aoki, met Sunday night in a Tokyo hotel and decided Abe had to go. For the sake of the Party. And go immediately! That Nakagawa was dispatched to the Kantei to tell him so. But that Abe refused. Abe and those involved denied all this a few days later. Did it actually happen? Who knows! B ut certainly we can conclude that many more LDP leaders than those three have been hoping – and are hoping – that Abe will do “the right thing.” Well, at least by the time this program is being created on Friday, he hasn’t. Hmmm.

One footnote to this puzzle of puzzles. That comes from one of those exit polls taken for Asahi Shimbun on the day of the election. As the headline of the article on Tuesday indicated, well over half of the voters polled wanted Abe to resign. 56 percent, in fact. And that’s the point Asahi obviously wanted to make. BUT – and for me this is the interesting part – when broken down by party supported, only 17 percent of LDP supporters said they wanted Abe to resign.

Now, this surprising result could well be the result of exit polls’ unreliability. Or, it could be that the LDP supporters polled felt defensive, and thought they had to support “their guy” under the circumstances. Hard to tell. Exit poll takers don’t give their subjects truth serum before asking their questions. But it puzzles me that LDP supporters would want to encourage continuation of obviously discredited Party leadership. Hmmm.     

Concluding Comments

Well, we’re way over time this week. And we’ve only just begun to tackle this complex subject. Consideration of the effect of all this on Japan’s domestic politics and conduct of international relations will have to wait until next week. As well as the puzzling issue of delay in cabinet reorganization. Even this long-anticipated measure appears to be taking a long time. Far too long to have its intended effect, once done. Not a good sign. But who knows? Next week we may have a completely different situation to discuss.

Again this week, no bluegrass. Apologies for that. I simply don’t have the hardware and software with me necessary to put the clip into the program. And this while traveling through a part of the country where you can hear beautiful bluegrass music resonate in the fillings of your teeth just by raising a finger high above your head!

So, goodbye all. Until next time.