Saturday, March 3, 2007; Volume 03, Number 09
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning from Beautiful Spring Valley in the Midlands of South Carolina. Today is Saturday, March 3rd, 2007. And you are listening to Volume 03, number 09, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
We’re late this week. Sorry for the delay. And next Friday, the 9th, we won’t have a program. Not Podfading, now. Just some traveling getting in the way. But I’ll be back the following week. So stay tuned.
And thanks for dropping in again this week. Whether through iTunes subscription, or through direct download of the audio file to your computer. Or even as a reader of the transcript posted on the Japan Considered Project website.
I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and creator and host of this Podcast. Each week at this time, for the past 60-some weeks, we’ve considered the longer-term significance of events in the news for Japan’s domestic politics and conduct of international relations. You can find audio files and text transcripts for past programs on the Japan Considered website at www.JapanConsidered.com. That’s the address of the in-process website on the commercial server. It’s still incomplete. But there are links to take you to the old site if you’re looking for earlier files.
Again we have tough choices to make today. An incredible amount of news. Both domestic and international. We can’t possibly cover it all. Each week I get e-mails asking why one event or another didn’t “make it” into the previous week’s program. The reason usually is limited time. Though I miss some important ones too, each day going through the English and Japanese language news out of Japan.
Those e-mails are more helpful when they suggest how consideration of the issue would help us to better understand Japan’s domestic politics or international relations. Their broader significance, in other words. Many of them do. So keep them coming! My address is RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I’m still able to read every one of them, and take each one into consideration when planning new programs.
Oh, another thing I’ve forgotten to mention for some time now. In addition to suggestions for podcast themes, e-mail in your suggestions of websites related to the topics we cover here. Those that provide useful information in English. I’ll try to pass the information along on this program. And when time permits, add new ones to the pages of the Japan Considered Project website, with a paragraph or so of assessment. Those pages get a surprising number of visits each day from around the world.
Well, this week we’ll begin with consideration of the Lower House passing the national budget. And what the process can tell us about the current state of Japan’s parliamentary politics. Including difficulties facing the DPJ leadership these days. Then we’ll look briefly at how Japan’s management of relations with Mainland China has changed over the past decade or so. And what that tells us about dealing effectively with Japan in this new environment.
Japan’s FY2007 National Budget Passes the Lower House
Early Saturday morning, April 3rd, the Lower House of Japan’s Diet passed the fiscal year 2007 national budget. The final vote was 337 for and 125 against. Not a bad margin for the winners! This parliamentary battle had been raging now for some time. Weeks or months, really, if you count all the preliminaries. But the final political scenes were performed throughout this week. Especially during the past couple of days. And it’s the politics of the budget process that concerns us here. I’ll leave the economic specifics to those more qualified to comment.
The final budget total was 82.91 trillion yen. This represents an increase of just a bit more than 4 percent over the initial version of the current year’s budget. That’s the first increase in the national budget in two years. But given rising revenues and recognition of improved economic conditions, the Ministry of Finance did a pretty good job of keeping other ministries’ budget requests in check. With help, of course, from the government cutback-minded Abe Administration. All of the government agencies had really hoped for more.
As most everyone listening will know, Japan’s fiscal year ends on March 31st. With the new year beginning the following day, April 1st. So, it’s critical to have the new year’s budget approved and in place by the time government agencies have to begin spending the funds allocated to them. More on timing in a moment.
It’s not impossible to cope with a delayed budget. But as Washington learned in decades past, it makes things pretty uncomfortable. And is likely to bring the wrath of the public down on everybody concerned. Those who opposed the delay as well as the delayers! Responsibility for passage of the national budget in time to avoid that disaster has weighed heavily on the shoulders of all prime ministers. Indeed, had the ruling coalition failed to pass the budget bill through the Lower House this time, the budget story would have been a genuine “man bites dog” topic.
Opposition Parliamentary Tactics
Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, Japan’s opposition parties were able to exercise parliamentary influence well beyond what one would expect, given their minority status, by refusing to agree to vote on the national budget. As we discussed early last month on this program, Japan’s national news media would accuse the majority LDP of “ramming” the budget through the Lower House Budget Committee, or the Lower House plenary session, were the opposition parties unwilling to agree to vote. Suggesting by the term “ramming” that the LDP was guilty of unfair – even undemocratic – parliamentary practice – by voting anyway. Even when the LDP had more than enough votes to pass the bill on their own! Tyranny of the majority, and so on. Most LDP governments found it easier to compromise than to debate the finer points of parliamentary democracy through a hostile press. So they did. Not always, but often.
This year we saw a replay of this scenario. With a twist at the end. The DPJ leadership didn’t boycott this week’s sessions of the Lower House Budget Committee. At least until the very end, and the vote. Perhaps learning from their experience last month with the supplementary budget bill. Their decision to absent themselves from that supplementary bill’s debate and vote did nothing at all to enhance the Party’s standing with Japan’s attentive public. And indeed, earned them sharp criticism from all but the most determined anti-Abe media outlets.
So, the DPJ representatives stayed to debate this time. But it was clear their objective was to prevent, or at least delay, the vote. Hoping to embarrass the Abe Cabinet. They were determined to be seen as confrontational. First in the Lower House Budget Committee. And then in the plenary session. Late Friday afternoon, Japan time, against strenuous Opposition Party resistance, Lower House Budget Committee Chairman Kazuyoshi Kaneko decided to vote out the Budget Bill. The result was favorable, of course.
Some of Japan’s more traditionally-minded media and wire services immediately posted articles describing passage of the Budget Bill out of the Lower House Committee as “ramming,” “railroading,” and “pushing.” All reminiscent of the good old days. They’d done the same for the Opposition during the supplementary budget debate boycott incident early last month. At least initially. But it didn’t seem to help much. It probably won’t this time either.
Lower House plenary session debate on the Budget Bill began at around 10:30 PM Friday night. Again, Japan time. With Opposition members continuing efforts to block another vote. Motions calling for dismissal of Budget Committee Chairman Kaneko for his decision to vote the Bill out of Committee, and then other LDP committee chairmen, were filed, one after another. To be rejected, of course, by the ruling coalition majority.
Rancorous discussion continued on the floor of the Lower House for several hours, late Friday night and early Saturday morning. The Opposition representatives demanded more time to debate. The ruling coalition representatives insisted that plenty of time had been allocated for debate. Talk about “political theater”!
But the result was inevitable. The LDP leadership dug in its heels. Decided to accept the Opposition’s challenge. And finally called for a Lower House vote. The whole thing was over well before Tokyo’s first trains left their stations Saturday morning. The bill was passed by the Lower House, 337 to 125, and sent immediately to the Upper House for debate which will begin on Monday.
Why all the hurry? The current fiscal year doesn’t end for nearly a month. Well, if the Lower House can pass a budget bill a month or more before the end of the fiscal year, that bill will become law even if the Upper House refuses to approve it. No need for a two-thirds Lower House over-ride, as with most other legislation. This according to Article 60 of Japan’s postwar Constitution. So, for budget bills the critical period is the beginning of March each year. The inevitability of the outcome means Upper House deliberation and passage is likely to go more smoothly.
Effect of the Budget Deliberations on the DPJ
It seems to me unlikely that Ichiro Ozawa’s DPJ will much benefit from this recent round of parliamentary budget maneuvering. Any more than they did from the last supplementary budget fracas. Though, at least this time they stayed to be part of the debate. And finally even voted in the plenary session.
But once again, the intense media coverage of the budget bill showed Japan’s attentive public what the DPJ is against, rather than what it’s for! DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa has been wise to insist his Party confront the LDP wherever possible. His admonition to local and prefectural DPJ branches to field their own candidates, and to stop jointly endorsing candidates with the ruling coalition, makes good political sense. We’ve seen in recent gubernatorial elections how the presence of a genuine choice on the ballot helps to raise public interest in elections, and to raise overall voter turnout. That’s a state of affairs that’s bound to work to the DPJ’s advantage!
But, continuing to insist that one’s primary objective is to win elections can carry a party only so far. “Win elections for what?” “Well, to defeat the LDP, of course!” “Okay. But what will the Party do once it’s replaced the LDP?” In other words, what are their basic policies? Their platform!
And it’s here that Ozawa’s DPJ begins to have difficulty. The DPJ seems to find it easier to agree that they should all be re-elected. And that their party should have more members in the Diet. But given the diversity of their membership, they seem to have more difficulty developing a consensus on basic policies. Policies on issues that are of greatest concern to Japan’s voting public. Including particularly sensitive problems in international affairs.
It’s not fair to say the DPJ has never articulated policy objectives. Just last year, as the Party was deciding on its next leader, Ichiro Ozawa presented Party membership with the “Ozawa Vision.” A Vision upon which the Party based its official “administrative policy” later in the year, after Ozawa’s selection as Party President. This “vision” attracted some attention at the time because it partially recognized Japan’s right of collective self defense.
Issues of national defense are especially sensitive for the DPJ members who earlier on were members of Japan’s Socialist Party. And it appears that those former Socialist DPJ members now are particularly important to Ozawa. They maintain close ties with the national labor unions upon which he has decided to rely for support in the upcoming Upper House election. A tried-and-true traditional method of electioneering in Japan. As elsewhere, for that matter.
In addition to a partial recognition of the right of collective self defense, Ozawa’s vision included policies aimed at Japan’s growing economic inequalities. Proposals such as government subsidies for families whose parents live with them. Extension of compulsory education. And a dramatic expansion of government transfer payments to Japan’s farmers. The LDP, of course, immediately charged that implementation of Ozawa’s “vision” would require an enormous increase in government transfer payments. And consequently, an enormous increase in the tax burden. They accused the DPJ of what amounted to insincerity in their proposal, for electoral purposes. Imagine that!
For whatever reason, we’ve heard little about the Ozawa Vision since then. Instead, we hear more about contesting and winning elections. Judging from the regular public opinion polls published by Japan’s news media, this strategy has been of little help in raising the DPJ’s public approval rating. Even as the Abe Cabinet’s public disapproval rating continues to rise. “No Party in Particular” appears to be the only winner. And that’s too bad.
Is it possible for the DPJ to articulate a realistic and coherent alternative to the LDP’s policies? And remain united as a political party with roughly its current parliamentary strength? Perhaps not. But judging from the DPJ’s change in parliamentary tactics, from the early February supplementary budget debate, to the current fiscal year 2007 debate, it appears at least that Ozawa and his Party are able to learn from their mistakes and to adapt. This can only encourage those who believe Japan would be better served by a genuinely competitive political party system than by a system dominated by a single party. So stay tuned.
Recent Developments in Relations with China
It would be hard to over-estimate the importance of relations with Mainland China for Japan. Before the current rash of terrorism came along, I thought the world’s next big challenge would come from Japan and Mainland China sorting out their roles in Asia, and their relationships with each other. Not “relationship.” Rather “relationships.” Economic, diplomatic, military, cultural, and so on.
Both states see themselves as Asia’s logical “leader.” And neither is willing to permit the other to assume that role without serious chafing. Peace and prosperity in Asia depends more than anything else on Japan and Mainland China maintaining a minimum of conflict and maximum of cooperation in th e decades to come. Not an easy thing to do, given the self-images of each party in that relationship.
The Yasukuni Shrine Visit Experience
Japan’s posture toward Mainland China changed significantly during the Koizumi premiership. As characterized in the handling of the “Yasukuni Shrine Visit” fracas we spent so much time considering on this program in 2005 and 2006. Certainly there were changes in other aspects of Japan’s China posture during that time. But the Yasukuni issue was most visible, and can serve to explain the overall change, I think.
Prior to the Koizumi premiership Beijing found threats to openly criticize Japan’s incumbent prime minister and cabinet quite effective when they were having difficulty with Japan over a particular issue. Beijing’s public criticism, when it materialized, was immediately picked up by Japan’s press and presented to the Japanese public as evidence the incumbent prime minister was failing to manage relations with Japan’s largest Asian neighbor. Those threats usually worked.
Until Koizumi! Among Koizumi’s supporters when he assumed the premiership were groups and individuals who believed Japan’s prime minister should openly and officially pay respects to Japan’s war dead by visiting Yasukuni Shrine. This in spite of the latter-day enshrinement of several World War Two leaders who had been convicted as war criminals by the Allied War Crimes Tribunal. Koizumi publicly promised those groups that he would visit Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister. And he did.
China protested. In the bitterest of terms. Foreign Minister Li gave impassioned statements to the Japanese press describing the anguish caused the Chinese people by Koizumi’s visits. When threats of public criticism – then public criticism – failed to deter Koizumi, Beijing decided to refuse to meet with Koizumi until he recanted and showed greater sensitivity to Mainland China’s wishes.
Koizumi had many weaknesses as a chief executive. But he was a master at assessing the moods and inclinations of Japan’s attentive public. Their real moods and inclinations, that is. Not necessarily those reflected in the Japan’s major news media. He coolly rejected Beijing’s Yasukuni demand as inappropriate meddling in Japan’s domestic affairs. And expressed his intention of continuing his visits. Even visited, from time to time! And said he was ready to meet with China’s leadership as soon as they had recovered from their anguish.
Koizumi seems to have realized from the beginning that his refusal to accept Beijing’s demand on an issue such as Yasukuni would damage his reputation only with those who already opposed him. That a majority of Japan’s attentive public would consider his response understandable, even appropriate.
Beijing’s Recognition of the Problem
Beijing, however, was a bit slower to recognize the damage their anti-Yasukuni campaign was doing to China’s image in Japan, and kept it up. Once they did recognize the damage – reportedly at the encouragement of China’s brilliant ambassador to Japan, Wang Yi – the Yasukuni Shrine Visit campaign quieted down. At least the Chinese role in it. Domestic participants in Japan were slower to get the message. So the theme has continued on, even today, in Japan’s political press, if at lower volume.
Beijing grasped the election of a new Japanese prime minister as an opportunity to back off their no-summit-meeting stance. They welcomed Shinzo Abe to Beijing immediately after his arrival in the Kantei. The visit has been judged a success. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is scheduled to visit Tokyo in mid-April as well. Wen’s visit will be the first time a Chinese leader has visited Japan in nearly seven years. Clearly, both China and Japan have been grateful for this opportunity to renew their summit-level bilateral meetings. A most welcome development.
Lessons from the Yasukuni Shrine Visit Experience
The course of the Yasukuni Shrine Visit dust-up illustrates, I think, a significant change in Japan’s conduct of relations with Mainland China. Chinese threats to criticize Japan’s prime ministers publicly are no longer as effective as they once were as a means of forcing concessions from Tokyo during bilateral negotiations. Indeed, when carried too far, they can have negative consequences for China rather than for their intended target.
Further, Japan’s top-level political leaders since Koizumi have been willing to be more publicly frank with their dissatisfactions in the bilateral relationship. Here are a few examples. Earlier last year, the Japanese response to the suicide of a Japanese code clerk in Japan’s Shanghai Embassy.
More recently, official expressions of concern over nearly two decades of double-digit expansion of China’s military budget. Most recently, the surprising 17.8 percent increase announced earlier this month. As well as official dissatisfaction with the “transparency” of China’s military spending and developments.
Japanese expressions of concern over China’s recent successful destruction of one of their own satellites by missile, is another example. That test sent shock waves through Japan second, perhaps, only to North Korea’s recent missile and nuclear weapons adventures.
Tokyo also has been more willing to publicly express dissatisfaction over China’s handling of the exploitation of natural gas deposits in the region of the East China Sea that is under territorial dispute.
Let’s be clear here. I don’t mean to suggest that Japan has suddenly turned antagonistic toward China. It hasn’t. Or that Japan never expressed dissatisfaction with China in the past. Of course, there have been bilateral negotiations during which Japan made its wishes known to the other side. As has China. The difference worth considering now, I think, is Tokyo’s greater willingness to express their dissatisfactions with China publicly. That, and the decline in vulnerability of Japan’s central political executive to public criticism from abroad. From Beijing. Or from Washington, for that matter.
Sooo, both Beijing and Washington would do well to reconsider the good old “Gai-Atsu,” or external pressure, strategy when dealing with Tokyo these days. It still works, if enough pressure is applied. But it seems, at least to me, that the collateral damage such “gai-atsu” causes in Japan has increased considerably these days. That’s worth thinking about.
Well, another week has passed, and that’s all we have time for. Remember, there won’t be a program on Friday, the 9th. But I’ll be back again on the 16th. So stay tuned. And keep sending your comments and suggestions to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com.
Today’s bluegrass clip comes again from the Original Seldom Scene, from their 1972 “Act I” album. A link is in the transcript and the show notes. One of their earliest and their best. Here John Starling and John Duffey team up to sing James Taylor’s unforgettable “Sweet Baby James.” A song Taylor wrote just a few years before that for his namesake nephew. I hope you like it.
[bluegrass]
Goodbye all. ‘Till week after next.
