February 16, 2007; Volume 03, Number 07
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Introduction |
| Launch of Third Surveillance Satellite Postponed |
| The Six-Party Talks Achieve Some Agreement on North Korea’s Nuclear Programs |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning from beautiful Spring Valley in the Midlands of South Carolina. It’s Friday again, February 16, 2007. And you are listening to Volume 03 Number 07 of the Japan Considered Podcast.
I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project. And creator and host of this Podcast. Thanks for tuning in again this week. Lots going on here at the Japan Considered Project. I've been busy on the web, finding commercial services to host the website and podcast files. All at a price that I can afford. This week again, we'll have to make do with some temporary arrangements. But all will be back to normal soon.
A well-known service called LibSyn seems to provide the best arrangements for streaming the audio files. And a firm with the unlikely name of “GoDaddy” will host the website. Both of these services will maintain the older files in archive, as well as the current files.
I've transferred the audio files already to LibSyn, and they’re working. But the website files will take a bit longer. Domain name transfers, it turns out, require at least five days notice. That should be done in a week or two. Bottom line: you’ll soon have more reliable access to the audio and text transcript files for this program. As well as to the other pages of the Japan Considered website. So stay tuned.
Important developments again this week in Tokyo. Much of it of interest for us on this program. Some that should give us a better understanding of Japan’s domestic politics and conduct of international relations.
First, we’ll consider a “non-event,” the decision today not to launch Japan’s surveillance satellite. With focus on the significance of the overall program. And what it can tell us about the evolution of Japan’s attitudes toward defense issues.
Then we’ll look at the outcome of the six-party talks on North Korea's various nuclear programs. This is an important issue for Japan. As well as for the rest of the world. So we’ll consider it from a variety of perspectives. We’ll also consider the relationship between international relations and domestic politics. Especially in liberal democracies like Japan and the United States. Quite a few challenges there.
And as usual, will close with another inspiring clip of bluegrass to brighten your week.
Launch of Third Surveillance Satellite Postponed
To begin, let’s take a moment to consider this week’s “non-event.” Japan’s decision to delay launch of a surveillance satellite. This was to be the last component of the four-satellite surveillance system approved after some debate in late 1998.
According to late Friday news reports from Tokyo, the launch was scrubbed due to bad weather at the Tanegashima Space Center in Kagoshima Prefecture. No sense taking a chance of another failure. Not after the November 2003 loss of two satellites. Delays prolong vulnerability. And cost money too. But not as much as the loss of machinery with price tags in the tens of billions of yen. Or, the inevitable loss of domestic and international credibility for Japan’s Space Agency. The satellite launch business is a competitive industry!
This particular mission was scrubbed. But the event provides us with an opportunity to consider the overall significance of Japan’s reconnaissance satellite program. There’s been a lot of change in Japanese thinking and behavior over the past couple of decades. And satellite surveillance capabilities have become an important item in Japan’s international toolbox.
Japan has been launching and using satellites for some time now. But a 1969 Diet Resolution prohibited the use of satellite technology for military purposes. Thereafter, Japan’s satellite developments were justified only as facilitating civilian objectives. Such as natural disaster prevention or environmental studies.
But Japan’s Defense Agency has long had an understandable interest in acquisition of satellite intelligence. The subject came up repeatedly in the 1970s and early 1980s. Usually during the “trial balloon” public relations campaigns that precede national budget decisions. To the point that, in 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone’s Government felt obliged to issue an official statement on the subject. This policy statement restricted the Self Defense Forces to use of only those satellite images for military defense purposes that were available on the commercial market. That may seem odd today. But I mention it to illustrate just how much Japan’s domestic and political environment has changed since then.
And change it did. With the support and encouragement of Kim Il-sung’s North Korea. By mid-1996, LDP Defense Zoku types has begun pressing for more effective made-in-Japan satellite capabilities. They argued cogently that Japan shouldn’t have to go to the United States to buy satellite photos when Japan’s national security was at stake.
Reaction from Japan’s anti-military media and opinion leaders was immediate. Such a move would most certainly violate the 1969 Diet resolution, they said. And it would run counter to the spirit of the 1985 policy statement limiting the Defense Agency to commercial satellite images. Further, they argued, any move by Japan that might be interpreted as military use of space technology would frighten Japan’s Asian neighbors. Needlessly! The Cabinet recognized the political complications involved in pursuing development, and reined in the LDP Defense Zoku. I don’t recall at the time any public discussion of the substance of the issue. Whether such imagery capability actually was needed or not. But politics carried the day.
That all changed on September 1st, 1998. In fact, that date might well be considered a turning-point in Japan’s post-World War Two conduct of military affairs. When North Korea’s Kim Il-sung, in his infinite wisdom, decided to touch off a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile that over-flew Japanese territory. The effect of this news on Japan’s attentive public was electrifying. For the first time since the end of World War Two, Japan’s public felt genuinely vulnerable to horrific military attack.
The implications of North Korea’s missile launch were undeniable. Both political and public reactions were immediate. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi faced immediate pressure from the Defense Agency, the LDP Defense Zoku, and genuinely concerned public commentators, to “do something.” Those who had long argued Japan should have an independent satellite reconnaissance capability made much of the fact that Japan had to call the United States to find out what the North Koreans had actually done. To ask them for satellite images, in other words. And there were complaints at the time about the quality and timeliness of the information received.
Once again, Akahata, Asahi, and other elements of Japan’s anti-military media, did what they could to prevent change in Japan’s long-held policy. They published editorials and guest columns that accused pro-indigenous satellite commentators of over-reacting to the North Korean test. And of using Kim’s missile launch as justification for getting what they’d wanted all along.
But this time the campaign accomplished little beyond tarnishing the credibility of the campaigners themselves. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and his Cabinet knew what they had to do. In just over two months the Obuchi Cabinet approved creation of the four-satellite surveillance system. And ordered it to be completed by 2002. The satellites were described as multi-purpose, to appease the anti-military contingent. But they clearly included collection of military intelligence in their mandate. Quite a change from 1969, or even 1985. All thanks to Dear Leader Kim. Well, to Kim’s missile adventure, and to the virtual collapse of the Socialists’ parliamentary influence following the premiership of Tomiichi Murayama. Initial estimates of the program’s cost were on the order of 10 billion yen.
Competition within Japan’s government was intense over control over this big-budget item. The Japan Defense Agency had a strong claim. They hoped to fold the whole operation into their defense intelligence headquarters. They lacked, however, the inter-bureaucratic clout to pull it off. And by 2002 the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center had been designated as primary control agency for the program. Deciding collection priorities, and allocating the information “take” to all other government ministry and agency consumers. This decision, I believe, represents an important expansion of the Kantei’s influence in international affairs.
After repeated delays, the first two satellites in the new system were launched in late March 2003. Just before the end of the Japanese government fiscal year. They were boosted into orbit by Japan’s own H2A rocket from the Tanegashima Space Center, rather than as hitchhikers on another nation’s rocket. Resolution reported for the first two satellites was nowhere near as sensitive as those used by the United States. But they did work. And they were Japanese! Though with some American sub-contracting reported.
Disappointment followed this initial success when the next launch effort, in November of 2003, failed. Destroying tens of billions of yen’s-worth of equipment. This failure delayed completion of the project considerably. And it was nearly three years before the third satellite went into orbit. That was in mid-September of last year. That launch alone was reported to have cost nearly as much as the initial 1998 10 billion yen estimate for the whole project. And the satellite another 29 billion yen.
So there you have it. The course of the surveillance satellite program, I think, exemplifies the gradual shift in Japan’s public, political, and governmental attitudes toward national defense. Japan remains eager to avoid frightening, or even offending, its Asian neighbors. Some of Japan’s Left, especially more elderly members, still question Japan’s right to assume responsibility for its own national security with anything related to military capacity. But North Korea’s continued bellicose and unpredictable behavior, combined with Mainland China’s dramatic expansion of its military forces, has pretty much marginalized those positions. And we’re likely to see continuation of this gradual trend in the foreseeable future.
The Six-Party Talks Achieve Some Agreement on North Korea’s Nuclear Programs
After typical last-minute marathon negotiating sessions, delegates to the Six-Party talks in Beijing announced they had reached an agreement. That was on Tuesday this week, the 13th. The announcement was greeted by the incumbent governments of all parties involved, and their supporters, as good news. And questioned by the anti-incumbent political forces in all the democratic parties involved. We discussed this issue in some detail from Tokyo’s perspective last week on this program.
What exactly, again from Tokyo’s perspective, was achieved during the Beijing meetings? And what is the longer-term significance of the agreement reached? This is an enormous subject. Worthy at least of a book and/or reality television series. So we can only cover what appear to be the most immediate implications here in our time remaining.
First, the agreements reached were only “preliminary,” at best. All participants agreed with that. So, this is hardly a final solution to the problem of North Korea’s nuclear-tipped bellicosity. Even were Pyongyang to implement all parts of the agreement faithfully. And that, nearly everyone doubts.
North Korea has agreed to shut down and seal its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. And to allow United Nations inspectors back in to the facilities to check. For this and other promises, the other parties in the talks agreed to provide North Korea with aid equivalent to the value of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.
The six parties also agreed to create an additional five working groups to discuss outstanding issues. One such issue is the state of relations between North Korea and Japan. These working groups are to begin meeting within 60 days.
The United States agreed to begin procedures to remove official designation of North Korea as a sponsor of terrorism. And suspend “Trading with the Enemy Act” designation of North Korea. Also within 60 days.
The other five parties further agreed to provide the North with additional aid equivalent to the value of 950,000 tons of heavy crude oil. Incrementally in response to the North declaring and disabling all of its remaining nuclear programs and demonstrating progress on the commitments agreed upon.
This, again, was only an interim step in the long-running saga of North Korea’s nuclear program and sponsorship of anti-social international activities. Important specific issues remain to be discussed. Such as the North’s uranium enrichment projects, supplies and deployment of conventional weaponry, state-sponsored kidnappings of Japanese citizens during the 1980s, and U.S. law enforcement measures enforced in response to counterfeiting and other North Korean activities.
But it is a first step. News from Beijing’s expectant press corps hitting the wires would have been far different had the delegates returned home on Monday night without an agreement. So, some progress.
Problems do remain, however. Especially for Japan. Arguably the state most immediately concerned, other than South Korea. As we discussed last week, the Abe Government has insisted throughout the negotiations that it will provide no aid to North Korea until “progress” is made on the question of North Korean government agents kidnapping Japanese citizens and forcibly taking them to North Korea. Indeed, Japan has declined to participate in the initial 50,000 tons of heavy crude oil aid package. Because North Korea refuses to discuss the abduction issue.
Predictably, North Korea immediately criticized Tokyo’s refusal to participate in the initial aid package for North Korea. Pyongyang spokesmen have insisted that the agreement just signed required “action for action.” Which, for Pyongyang, means Japan should provide at least some aid.
In a Wednesday interview with a Kyodo News Service reporter in Pyongyang, a North Korean Foreign Ministry staff member accused the Abe Administration of manipulating the abduction issue for “political purposes.” This was an obvious reference to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s often-stated sympathy for the families of the kidnap victims, and insistence that North Korea provide more information. Specifically, exactly how many Japanese people were kidnapped, and what happened to them.
We’ve heard little more of the “Berlin Memorandum,” an international PR operation we discussed last week on this program. But North Korea’s PR campaign in Japan continues. Pursuing the same themes. The day after the agreement was signed, for example, the official newspaper of the pro-North Korea group in Japan published an article by their reporter in Beijing warning Japan that it will be isolated within the international community should it continue to demand progress on the abduction issue. The article was written in Korean. But clearly was intended for dissemination in Japan.
The reporter described the Japanese delegation as isolated during the Beijing conference. Implying that the other representatives, especially China, criticized Japan’s stubbornness on the abduction issue as “irrelevant.” The article also said the United States had abandoned Japan’s position and was more inclined to negotiate with North Korea.
A number of Japan’s newspapers and television stations echoed North Korea’s line. Criticizing Prime Minister Abe for his stubborn refusal to drop, or at least postpone, discussion of the abduction issue in order to make progress in the bilateral negotiations. They too suggested that Abe was demanding progress on the abduction issue for domestic political purposes. Given this continued anti-Abe tone in much of Japan’s press, and even from some anti-Abe members of the LDP, North Korea’s international PR planners must be asking for additional pay this week. They appear to be doing a good job.
It’s hard to say the same for their Japanese counterparts, however. Once again I’m flabbergasted by the lack of counter-punch from Abe’s Kantei to these political attacks. It’s not as though they were facing a particularly difficult task.
The families of North Korean kidnap victims have organized quite an effective association, headed by Shigeru Yokota, father of well-known victim, Megumi Yokota. They held a rally in Tokyo immediately after announcement of the agreement expressing concern that they might be abandoned. A Kantei representative attended, and spoke. But with only limited coverage the following day in Japan’s press. And no follow-up I could find from the Kantei.
U.S. President George Bush arranged a teleconference with Prime Minister Abe on Wednesday. During their fifteen-minute conversation Bush assured Abe that the United States understood Japan’s position on the North Korean issue. And that the kidnapping issue should not be abandoned. This too was reported in Japan’s political press, but only peripherally. Again, with little effort by the Kantei to play up the significance of that call.
Yesterday, both Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Aso responded to DPJ questions about the Six-Party talks clearly and effectively. Abe said Japan would maintain its economic sanctions on North Korea. And Aso even said Japan was “skeptical” of North Korea’s sincerity during the talks. All understandable.
But, as I mentioned last week, “politics ain’t beanbag.” It’s simply not enough to state one’s beliefs and expect the communications media to convey those ideas, and those ideas alone, to Japan’s attentive public. First, none of Japan’s communications media considers themselves obligated to do the Kantei’s bidding. Nor should they! Second, much, if not most, of Japan’s media has opposed Prime Minister Abe’s conservative policies, including his foreign policies, since he entered office. That’s not likely to change. Third, in Japan, as in the United States, foreign policy issues are no longer excluded from efforts to gain domestic political advantage. If they ever were. Politics in Japan certainly doesn’t end at the water’s edge.
Given these obvious points, any prime minister’s administration must be ready to counter the attacks they are bound to receive. No matter what they do. Ideally, beginning before they do it! It’s simply part of the job. It’s almost ironic that a report yesterday from Tokyo included news that Kantei PR expert, Hiroshige Sekou, is being dispatched to Washington on the 19th. He’s supposed to quell anti-Japan sentiment in the U.S. Congress, and to prepare for Prime Minister Abe’s visit. One could reasonably argue that Sekou is more needed now in Tokyo. This issue is not going to disappear. It’s simply too attractive for the Opposition. And Pyongyang will be sure to continue supplying information and sound bytes that support their campaigns.
Oh well, it’s early days. The ink on the six-party agreement has hardly had time to dry. If, indeed, it was signed in ink. We’ll have to see how all of this shakes out for Japan’s domestic politics. But in the meantime, issues of real importance are involved.
That’s all we have time for again this week. Thanks for listening. And, as always, continue to send your comments and suggestions for future programs to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all, and take each one into consideration when planning future programs.
As promised, here is another audio glimpse of a great bluegrass artist. Tony Rice is one of those remarkable musicians whose work appeals to nearly everyone with an interest in music. Here he’s joined by mandolin genius David Grisman, in “I am a Pilgrim.” Pick up a copy here from Tony Rice’s website. Incredible music. Enjoy.
[bluegrass]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
