February 9, 2007; Volume 03, Number 06
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Introduction |
| Tokyo’s View of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea in Beijing |
| Abe Cabinet Approval and Sunday’s Local Elections |
| Opposition’s Diet Boycott |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning from Beautiful Spring Valley in the Midlands of South Carolina. Today is Friday, February 9th, 2007. And you are listening to Volume 03, Number 06, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for dropping by again today. Another beautiful, if chilly, day here in South Carolina. Sunny, but definitely cool. Though we’re unlikely to get any sympathy from much of the United States at this time. Where the weather’s been genuinely miserable.
I'm Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and creator and host of this Podcast. Each week at this time we consider events in the news that seemed likely to tell us more about long-term prospects for Japan's domestic politics and conduct of international relations. We often include interviews with other specialists on Japan's domestic politics or international relations. A number of folks around the country have been kind enough to come on the program and provide their views. This week, however, there are so many things on the agenda that we just won't have time for that.
First, although negotiations are still ongoing in Beijing, we have to mention Japan's reactions to the six-party talks on denuclearization of North Korea. Keep in mind, our focus here will be Japan's perspective, or perspectives, on these talks. Not a multinational, or comprehensive, view.
Second, we’ll consider the Abe Administration’s struggle to overcome the decline in public approval ratings. Including, the significance of the gubernatorial and mayoral elections held last Sunday. One in Aichi and the other in Kitakyushu. Both appear to have sent a real wake-up call to LDP election campaign headquarters. Now, whether that alarm was loud enough to awaken the whole Party or not, remains to be seen.
And finally, if time permits, we'll consider the effects of the Opposition’s decision to boycott Lower House Diet hearings on the 2007 supplementary budget. In protest over an offensive comment by Cabinet Minister Yanagisawa. They returned to Diet debate day before yesterday. But I believe the incident and its outcome has longer-term significance for overall parliamentary politics in Japan.
An ambitious agenda this week. We may not get through it all before the curtain comes down. These weekly programs have become too long, according to a number of e-mails I've been getting. Well over the intended twenty minutes or so. I'll do my best to exercise more self-restraint.
Tokyo’s View of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea in Beijing
The six-party negotiations intended to persuade North Korea to suspend its various nuclear programs got underway in earnest on Thursday in Beijing. Mainland China is hosting this series of talks, and appears to be anxious to achieve something they can describe as a breakthrough. Representatives of China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the United States are trying to persuade the North Korean regime to suspend its nuclear development programs. This time with North Korean representatives participating in the negotiations.
This isn’t the place for a comprehensive review of such complex negotiations. That’s well beyond my expertise, and our time limitations on this program. But since this topic has dominated Japan’s political and international news for most of the past week, we need, at least, to consider Japan's reactions and interpretations of the negotiations.
In a nutshell, observers in Japan fear that the six-party negotiations will lead to Japan’s “isolation.” Fear of isolation has been an important theme in Japan’s post-World War Two international relations. The fear of being abandoned by important allies, and of being blamed for the failure of international negotiations. An understandable concern.
In this case, perhaps even more understandable. China obviously is vexed with North Korea’s recent behavior, especially its nuclear posturing. Beijing would welcome an international settlement that would end, or at least postpone, Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development. They also would welcome an arrangement that would diversify responsibility for providing the North Korean people with food and fuel. So, Beijing now may be willing to settle for less from the North Koreans during the negotiations if they could claim they’d led those negotiations to a success.
The United States up to now has firmly supported Japan’s North Korea policies. That includes Japan’s recent tough economic sanctions. And even the demand for progress on the “abduction” issue. An issue that Prime Minister Abe has made a condition for progress toward better relations with North Korea. And one thought to be important for his domestic political credibility.
But that may be changing, some observers in Japan fear. They frequently describe the Bush Administration as preoccupied with problems in Iraq. And describe the recent U.S. mid-term elections as evidence Washington may be more eager now to get the North Korean problem settled and off the table. And to accomplish that, may be willing to settle for less in the way of concessions from North Korea. That “less,” some observers in Tokyo suspect, may not include progress on the abduction issue. Should Japan’s negotiators in Beijing be left demanding that North Korea make “progress” on the abduction issue before agreeing to a settlement, while all other representatives are willing to settle with only commitments to seal the North’s nuclear reactors, Japan would indeed be isolated.
After a series of intense bilateral meetings among the various parties most of this week, the representatives of all six nations met for formal negotiations on Thursday, the eighth. That's yesterday. And then again today for another six-party formal session. China is said to have circulated a draft document that became the focus of formal negotiations yesterday and today. But, as of Friday evening, Beijing time, nothing is final, or certain, beyond the fact the meetings and side-meetings have been held. And that they’re expected to continue during the weekend. Little reliable information is available on what’s actually happening.
As you might expect, news media reports emanating from Beijing hit the wires at a very high rpm. Each delegation represented considers their public statements an important element of their overall negotiating strategy. As a result, coherence, or agreement, among the formal and informal statements reported is little short of coincidental. And we’ve some time to wait before finding out what actually happened. If we ever do!
Here’s one example of the problem. Yesterday morning, February 8th, Asahi Shimbun published an article from Beijing reporting that the United States and North Korea had signed a memorandum of agreement during their bilateral meeting last month in Berlin. Asahi described the source of the information as someone close to the US-North Korean negotiations.
The same day, Yomiuri Shimbun published an article, again from Beijing, that also reported the U.S. and North Korea had signed a memorandum in Berlin last month. But the Yomiuri article added that the information came from a source close to North Korea. Yomiuri also included in the same article the flat denial of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Hill, that he had signed any memorandum in Berlin.
By today, Friday, the "signed memorandum" issue had pretty much died away. But the damage had been done. The report was a shock to Japan’s attentive public. Which, of course, was the source’s intention. The objective was to sew seeds of doubt in Japan about the reliability of their chief ally in these delicate negotiations with North Korea. To take advantage of Japan’s fear of “isolation” in the global community. To intensify domestic political pressure on the Abe Administration to make greater concessions. And it worked! At least for a time. And, at least, to intensify the pressure on the Abe Administration. Government officials, of course, knew the difference. But that's not the point.
The U.S.-North Korean memorandum incident may endure only as an embarrassment to certain Japanese journalists and editors. But Japan’s concern over international “isolation” remains a very real issue.
Domestic critics of the Abe Administration are able to use it to accuse Abe of pursuing too hard a line in his dealings with North Korea. Of insisting on inclusion of the “abduction” issue only for domestic political purposes. They believe a more conciliatory posture may be appropriate now. Those critics therefore were ready to believe North Korea’s claim that the United States had already abandoned Japan during bilateral negotiations in Berlin!
Supporters of the Abe Administration were alarmed by the Berlin Memorandum report, fearing that continuing to demand progress on the “abduction” issue would lead to Japan’s isolation during the international negotiations. Or, as bad, fearing that Japan might be forced to abandon the “abduction” progress demand to avoid being blamed for failure of the international negotiations. A change in policy that would erode the overall credibility of the Abe Administration with important constituencies at home. Japan’s chief representative at the six-party talks, Kenichi Sasae, continues in statements to the press to insist that Japan’s position has not changed. And he has been consistently reported to be the most pessimistic of the negotiators at the meetings. We’ll just have to wait until next week to see what happens. In the meantime, consider seriously the sources of the media information you receive, and their political orientations. They often matter.
Abe Cabinet Approval and Sunday’s Local Elections
Last Sunday Japan held two important local elections. A gubernatorial election in Aichi Prefecture, and a mayoral election in the large Northern Kyushu city of Kitakyushu. As expected, the LDP and Komeito-backed candidate, Masaaki Kanda, was re-elected to his third four-year term as governor of Aichi Prefecture. But only narrowly. With voter turnout over 52 percent, Kanda ended up winning by only 60,000 or so votes. Out of a total of nearly 3 million cast. Kanda has been a fairly popular governor. And he was expected to win far more easily than he did. The difference, according to exit polls and subsequent discussion of the election in Japan’s political press, was his failure to appeal to unaffiliated voters. And the decline in support from female voters following the flap over Abe Cabinet Member Hakuo Yanagisawa’s embarrassing description of women as ‘birthing machines.’
Unaffiliated voters are estimated to constitute about 25 percent of the total electorate in Aichi. In past elections they have been quite kind to Kanda, who has received as much as 65 percent of the total floating vote. This time, his DPJ-supported challenger, Yoshihiro Ishida, received over half of that unaffiliated vote. And Kanda only 36 percent.
So, although the Aichi governorship remains in the LDP camp, analysis of the elections results must provide more encouragement to Ichiro Ozawa’s DPJ than to the LDP as they move toward this summer’s Upper House elections.
The Kitakyushu mayoral race offered LDP election planners even clearer evidence that something must be done to staunch the loss of unaffiliated voter support for LDP candidates before the critical Upper House elections.
The LDP endorsed the campaign of a recently retired Ministry of Land career official, Takahiro Shibata. Shibata, again, represented the ideal Traditional LDP candidate. At 57, he was articulate, dignified, scandal-free, and enjoyed the support of Land Ministry-related private associations. The sorts of organizations that can be relied upon to provide the kinds of support needed by traditional LDP candidates.
But Shibata electoral performance had to be a disappointment for the LDP. Especially for those elements of the LDP who hope to return to the more predictable patterns of traditional politics. Shibata, again, according to exit polls and subsequent discussion of the race in Japan’s political press, received less than a quarter of the unaffiliated vote in this election. And, perhaps as important, only 36 percent of the female vote. In fact, he was able to attract only just over 60 percent of voters affiliated with the LDP. Not good. Not good at all.
Shibata’s opponent, the victorious Kenji Kitahashi, was endorsed by the DPJ, and received 84 percent of DPJ votes cast. But he was able to attract 55 percent of the unaffiliated vote, and nearly half of the female vote, according to the results of exit polling. To be fair, he was the more experienced candidate, having served already as a member of the Lower House for the DPJ.
What are we to make of these local election results? And, more important, what effect are they likely to have on the electoral strategies of the LDP and the DPJ? First, it should be clear that Ichiro Ozawa’s decision to challenge LDP candidates with DPJ-endorsed candidates wherever possible is resulting in greater voter interest in the elections.
Voter turnout in the last Kitakyushu mayoral election rose to just over 56 percent, up from 38 percent four years ago. This increase in voter turnout was nearly as great in the Aichi gubernatorial race, up from 39 percent in the last election four years ago to over 52 percent this time around. Meaningful alternatives, it seems, attracts the attention of more potential voters in Japan, just like everywhere else in the world! At least in this respect, Ozawa’s strategy of electoral confrontation is working.
It’s also likely that a good portion of those who voted in the last election who didn’t vote in 2003 fall into the “unaffiliated voter” category. So, if the LDP wishes to continue its electoral successes, Party Election Headquarters officials had better spend some time considering the outcomes of these elections. Unaffiliated voters contributed mightily to the LDP’s stunning success in the last Lower House election in late 2005. They may as easily contribute mightily to the defeat of LDP candidates in this summer’s Upper House election.
DPJ election strategists too must be poring over the results of these two elections. As well as the surprising outcome of the Miyazaki gubernatorial race the week before. As they learned in the 2005 General Election, there is no guarantee that Japan’s unaffiliated voters will favor their candidates automatically. So the DPJ too must identify candidates and issues that will appeal to these fickle voters. And do so without alienating the traditionally organized voters mobilized by national trade unions and other organizations traditionally providing election support to anti-LDP candidates.
It’s far too early to predict what will happen in the Upper House elections, or what effects the results of those elections will have on Japan’s national politics. But so far, it appears that incumbent Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Administration have done little to support the work of the LDP’s election strategists. They can take some comfort from the disappointing public approval ratings of the DPJ. But that could change in enough electoral districts to make the Upper House a far less comfortable place for the LDP after the July elections.
One final domestic politics development I think worth considering this week is the outcome of Ichiro Ozawa’s decision last week for the DPJ and three other Opposition parties to boycott Lower House debate over the 2007 supplementary budget. The Diet walk-out was inspired by Health Minister Hakuo Yanagisawa’s offensive characterization of women as “birthing machines.” And by Prime Minister Abe’s refusal to sack him for the comment after Yanagisawa refused to resign.
The Opposition parties returned to the Diet on Wednesday, day before yesterday. But not before the LDP and Komeito had passed the budget bill through both Houses of the Diet. Without Opposition Party input into the debate.
This, I think, is more than petty politics. The Japan Socialist Party functioned during much of the post-World War Two era as Japan’s major Opposition party. It never challenged the LDP’s parliamentary majority during that period. But it was able to prevent debate and majority-vote passage of legislation by boycotting Diet sessions.
A sympathetic Japanese press then described the situation as an “Empty Diet,” even though a majority of Members were present. And efforts of the LDP majority to pass legislation without the boycotting DPJ as “ramming legislation through” the Diet. Implying it somehow was “undemocratic.” Something the LDP did under only the most extreme circumstances. Rather, under-the-table negotiations between LDP and DPJ representatives resulted in legislative compromises, and perhaps other arrangements, that persuaded the Socialists to return to the Diet. As the Socialist Party’s political fortunes waned, so did the sympathy of Japan’s political press with the boycott tactic. And by the 1990s it was rarely seen.
However, upon becoming leader of Japan’s current major opposition Party, the DPJ, Ichiro Ozawa decided to resurrect the practice. Apparently in the hope of embarrassing the LDP into “ramming legislation through” the Diet without the Opposition’s presence. He did this last year, prior to the Okinawa gubernatorial election. A point we considered on this program at the time. However, the LDP candidate still won, and Ozawa was openly criticized by other DPJ members for pursuing the tactic.
Well, he did it again just last week. This time in protest of Minister Yanagisawa’s comment. It appears that the boycott tactic has been a net negative for the DPJ and other Opposition parties. Ozawa undoubtedly hoped again to embarrass the LDP and appeal to more female voters with the boycott. And gambled that a frustrated political press would be more sympathetic. There were a few “ramming through” headlines in Japan’s political press. But far more characterization of the decision as a blatant political ploy. One that sacrificed any substantive Opposition input into the important budget bill. And again, other members of the DPJ are criticizing the tactic as earning the Party more criticism than praise or sympathy.
It seems unlikely that we’ll see much more of this very traditional political strategy from the Opposition in the near- or medium-term future. Japan’s political environment has changed. Minority Party boycotts of Diet debate no longer work the way their sponsors have intended. And, all told, that’s probably a positive development for parliamentary democracy in Japan.
Well, we’re just a bit over again this week. But we do have time for a short bluegrass clip to brighten your week. Here again are the Original Seldom Scene, this time from their 1975 “Live at the Cellar Door” album, which, I believe, was their third. A short clip from the enchanting “Dark Hollow.” Go on over to the Rebel sales website and get you a copy. Listen to these harmonies!
[bluegrass]
Goodbye all. Until Next week.
