January 19, 2007; Volume 03, Number 03
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning! From Beautiful Spring Valley in the Midlands of South Carolina. Today is Friday, January 19th, 2007. And you are listening to Volume 03, Number 03, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for dropping in. Each week on this program, we consider the longer-term significance of events in Japan’s news for Japan’s domestic politics or Japan’s conduct of international relations. We’re not a comprehensive news program, and have no aspirations in that direction. Rather, our objective here is to provide you with the background necessary to make sense of what you read about in the regular media. Place it in context, in other words. While avoiding too “academic” an approach, in the negative sense of that term.
Podcasting technology, or “narrow-casting,” allows you to tune in at your convenience. Just go to the Japan Considered Project website, at www.JapanConsidered.org, click on the big podcast button on the home page, and download whatever you want. All free of charge. You also can find text transcripts of each program there, for those of you who would rather read than listen. And, of course, those of you with iTunes installed on your computer can just punch “Japan Considered” into the iTunes store page search window and subscribe directly. That’s really the most convenient method.
The Nashville AAS Meeting Last Weekend
Well, I’m sounding like quite an Expert on communications technology here! Very impressive. But, it seems, reality is somewhat less impressive. Last week I mentioned the round-table discussion planned for the regional meeting of the Association of Asian Studies in Nashville, Tennessee. A stellar cast. Lots of very valuable information. Well, everyone showed up. Everyone provided even better information than expected. And I botched the effort to record the audio! Talk about the “Mother of All Oops Moments!” I tested the system successfully at least a dozen times before the event. Even that morning! But at the critical moment, No Joy! A technological competence deficit on the part of the operator, it seems … Live and learn. Always have a backup …
The material presented, though was just too valuable to waste. The participants have kindly agreed to re-record their presentations via SkypePhone. So, we’ll still have an audio version with text transcription up on the Japan Considered Project website before very long. Maybe it’ll be even better second time around! I’ll keep you posted, and tell you how to access it.
One good thing did come out of the Nashville Oops Moment, however. Dr. James Auer, director of Vanderbilt University’s Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation, chaired our round-table in Nashville. When I called him today to re-record his opening remarks, he kindly agreed to do a fifteen-minute interview for this week’s Podcast. Excellent material on Japan’s diplo-military affairs. And from a person with high-level U.S. government responsibility in that area for many years. Thanks, Jim, for your understanding and time.
Before we go to Jim Auer’s interview, however, an update on the recent political funding report revelations and their significance. And we’ll close today with an absolutely incredible bluegrass clip, that will brighten your whole day.
“Sloppy Bookkeeping” Revelations Broaden to Non-LDP Politicians
For the past few weeks on this program we’ve been following the successive revelations off political funding impropriety on the part of senior LDP Diet Members, and even incumbent members of the Cabinet. These revelations of “sloppy,” – or, more accurately, “skillful” bookkeeping – were first reported by Shimbun Akahata, the official newspaper of the Japan Communist Party. But they were quickly picked up by Asahi Shimbun and other newspapers and television stations. Giving the issue much more visibility.
I was at first encouraged by the reports of political funding impropriety, hoping it was further evidence of significant change in the attitudes of Japan’s attentive, and voting, public toward their elected representatives. And described this development positively on the program. Quite a number of you wrote in to disagree, though. Countering that this was only pre-election politics-as-usual in Japan. Reminding me that we’ve seen such revelations many times before. Concluding it was just another effort of anti-Abe Administration elements of the Japanese media.
Hoping to salvage my position, I suggested on the next program that this more cynical interpretation may prove correct. But that if the revelations continued, and if they included non-LDP Diet Members, then my more optimistic interpretation may have at least some credibility.
Well! Last Saturday, the 13th, Sankei Shimbun, Japan’s most conservative national newspaper, published a front-page article in which they reported that DJP President Ichiro Ozawa himself had declared 415 million yen for office expenses on his 2005 political expenditures report. That was more than ten times the amount they reported the previous year. A few days later, Yomiuri Shimbun revealed office expenditure report problems for DJP Policy Chief, Takeaki Matsumoto, and even for Upper House Vice President, Giichi Tsunoda, of the DJP. Asahi and the other Japanese news media soon reported these infractions as well.
So, we have at least one of the requirements fulfilled. Now, the political funding practices of both LDP and DJP politicians are being scrutinized. Giving the revelations more credibility. Or, so I think. So, maybe there is hope that these disclosures do represent a change in public attitudes toward flagrant violations of political campaign funding laws. That certainly would make it more difficult to collect and disperse the enormous amounts of money required to keep the traditional “Factionist” style of electoral politics going in Japan. And benefit anti-Factionist, or “populist,” candidates. Let’s see if it lasts. Or if the involvement of DJP members “nulls” the topic out of the news, so to speak.
It does seem to me that Japan’s attentive public, those most likely too vote in parliamentary elections, are paying more attention to the behavior of their elected representatives. Especially those voters not tied to a particular candidate through traditional Koenkai membership. And, the increasingly numerous “floating voters.” According to all opinion poll reports I’ve seen, public support for the LDP – the LDP, not the Abe Cabinet, here – is flat or declining. But, public support for the DJP is dropping even more steeply. That’s a bad sign. Since the only winner here is “no party in particular.”
This means, neither major party is doing a very good job of communicating their message to their potential supporters. Many of Japan’s political commentators conclude that the parties’ failure to respond effectively to the “sloppy bookkeeping” reports has reduced public support. Especially for the LDP. And that the DJP’s expressed intention to do everything they can to defeat the LDP in the Upper House election doesn’t make up for their obvious difficulty in articulating coherent policies on important issues like national defense. Perhaps in both cases, the problem lies in the behavior of the top party leaders. Prime Minister Abe and DJP President Ozawa. Perhaps looking back, we’ll conclude that both party leaders were relying on the traditional electoral strategies that had worked so well for the LDP until the mid-1990s. Well, this is a new decade. Indeed, a new century. We can only hope that both parties recognize their problems, and adapt to their new environment.
An Excellent English Language Source From Japan’s Political Left
Review of reports from Shimbun Akahata, the official newspaper of Japan’s Communist Party, reminded me of an excellent English language source of political news from Japan’s political left. True, much of Japan’s national press is quite Left-leaning these days. Even more, it seems, than in the past. But Akahata and the Japan Communist Party publishes a far more reliable and comprehensive source of Left political news and commentary, entitled the “Japan Press Weekly.”
I’ll put a link to this useful site in the show notes. Or, you can click on the “Japan Press Weekly” link provided on the Japan Communist Party website. “Japan Press Weekly” provides an enormous amount of useful information on-line. Much of it in PDF format. In addition to daily news reports, they include transcripts of Party officials’ speeches, explanations of JCP policy positions, analysis of government policy proposals, domestic and foreign, and translations of Akahata editorials. Their selection of topics and their analysis all reflect the JCP policy line, of course. But they make no hollow claim to journalistic objectivity. Lots of useful information here for the serious analyst. Even in English!
Comments from Dr. James Auer on Diplo-Military Issues
Let’s shift now to comments from Dr. James Auer, director of Vanderbilt University’s Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation. Jim joins us today from his office in Nashville, via the SkypePhone.
RCA: Thanks for joining us, Jim, on the Japan Considered Podcast.
JA: Pleased to be here.
RCA: A few questions about the diplo-military aspects of the bilateral U.S.-Japan relationship. since you were involved with that for so long. How long were you in the Pentagon?
JA: I was there for just a little over ten years. I came near the end of the Carter Administration, in April of 1979, and stayed until almost the end of the Reagan Administration, September of 1988.
RCA: And before that you were involved with Japan for a good long while, as well.
JA: Well, I had fifteen years in the Navy when I came to the Pentagon. I spent my last five years in the Navy, and another five years as a political appointee of the Reagan Administration. So, for a total of ten years there. But in the previous fifteen years I was in the Navy, I did sort of normal things that Naval Officers do, except that four of the five ships I served on were based in Japan rather than in the U.S. And then while a student at Fletcher, to which I was sent by the Navy, I wrote my dissertation on the postwar Japanese Navy, the Maritime Self Defense Force. And then I was the first American Naval officer to attend the Maritime Self Defense Force Staff College, equivalent of the U.S. Naval War College.
RCA: Last week, a mutual friend of ours, Gregg Rubinstein, was kind enough to come on the program to make a few comments about the significance of the change from Cho to Sho, or Agency to Ministry, in Defense. He concluded that there really isn’t much of an effect on our bilateral relations. I wonder if you have any thoughts on that, and also if you can think of any other factors that we should be considering now.
JA: I would agree with Gregg that the change from Defense Agency to Defense Ministry does not have much effect on the overall U.S.-Japan relationship at all. There are some changes within the Japanese bureaucracy. A ministry, as I understand it, has more authority to initiate legislation directly. Whereas an Agency has to go through the Cabinet Secretariat, or whatever, in order to do things that ministries can do. So, even within Japan I’m not sure the change is all that substantive. Rather, symbolic. But on U.S.-Japan defense relations, I don’t think it makes too much difference at all.
Significance of the Collective Self Defense Issue
It’s not an immediate issue. But one I think is far more serious, is that Japan still continues to maintain what I consider to be an extremely unrealistic policy on collective self defense. Some people mistakenly think this is a constitutional issue. But this issue really did not come up until the early 1970s. The Opposition, ordinarily, used to attack the budget process, and abstain from voting on the budget, maintaining the Self Defense Forces were illegal under the Constitution. And as Okazaki Hisahiko has most poignantly pointed out, the LDP would not ever say, or even come close to saying, the Self Defense Forces were illegal. But they would allow the Opposition to score what were considered to be minor victories.
The one [the Opposition] achieved in the early 1970s was to get the Government, through the Cabinet Legislative Office, to make this really terribly illogical statement that Japan had the right of collective self defense, but could not exercise that right. At the time, in the 1970s, even though the Defense Agency had been in existence for almost twenty years at that point, they did not have the real capability. So, the fact that Japan could not exercise collective self defense didn’t mean very much.
But, in fact, in the 1980s, and since that time, the Japanese Self Defense Forces, particularly its Maritime and Air arms, do have significant capabilities. And if they were really to exercise that policy – that they would not exercise collective self defense unless they were directly attacked – that could have meant, for example, if the Soviet Union had attacked a Japanese submarine, the Japanese would have fully expected the United States to deal with that, together with the Japanese Navy. But if a U.S. submarine was attacked, Japan could do nothing. Because Japan itself had not been attacked. And therefore, it couldn’t act “collectively.” Even with its partner, the United States.
Very few Americans understand that. Fortunately, for deterrence, the Soviets didn’t believe it. The grandfather of Mr. Abe, the current Prime Minister, [Nobusuke] Kishi, had made it quite clear in 1960 that Japan did have the right of collective self defense. And Mr. Abe has said on occasions that he feels he would like to follow the policy of his grandfather. But so far, as prime minister, Abe has said “Well, rather than change the policy completely, we might want to discuss specific scenarios. For example, if North Korea launches a missile, then clearly that’s something that might be very serious for us.”
But if Japan is going to deal with specifics only, that could cause a problem in the future. First of all, when crises do happen, it’s very unusual that it follows an exact pattern. “Oh, that’s Case Number 27. And we approved Case Number 27.” So that when Case Number 25 happens, if the Japanese reaction were to be, “Well, let’s study that, and see if this is one of the approved scenarios. We better check with Komeito and see if it’s okay with them. There’s an election coming up next year. Will this affect the election?” That kind of process is going to take far too much time when there’s a necessary response to a crisis such as a missile launching from North Korea. That kind of unrealistic policy could really seriously affect U.S.-Japan relations.
RCA: You recently had a piece in the Japanese language Yomiuri in which you discussed some of this. Quite a frank piece, wasn’t it.
JA: Well, it was. I think Yomiuri interviewed me because I helped them edit the English version of a book they published on Japan’s war responsibility. But we got into this issue of collective self defense. And at one point I used the rather simplistic example, one I’ve said to Japanese Self Defense Force officers before. If you’re walking down the street with your wife or your daughter, and your wife or your daughter were attacked by a mad dog, or by a crazy man, would you defend your wife or your daughter? And, of course, they always say, “yes.” But I then said, according to the logic of the Naikaku Housei Kyoku, the Cabinet Legislative Office, you can’t do that. You have to be attacked yourself. That would be acting collectively, to protect your wife or your daughter. That’s really the logic.
Koizumi raised this issue, actually, several days before he became prime minister, during a debate with all the candidates – Hashimoto and others – on NHK. He said, “This is ridiculous, isn’t it? That the United States has forces in Japan to help defend Japan, but we can’t help the United States if something happens outside Japan, even if those U.S. forces which are there to protect Japan come under attack.” He then said, “I think we ought to study this.
Koizumi wasn’t elected based on that statement. I did think it was somewhat positive that he wasn’t prevented from being elected by making that statement. Then Ambassador Okazaki went to see him, and said, “Mr. Koizumi, you are exactly correct, and you should follow up on that.”
As I understand it, the head of the Cabinet Legislative Office also approached Mr. Koizumi, and said, “Mr. Koizumi, if you change that policy, it would embarrass my predecessors.” Not that it was right or wrong, but that it would be embarrassing.
RCA: That’s rich. It’s too bad that piece is available only in Japanese in Yomiuri. I wish they would put an English language version out.
JA: I should check. It’s possible that the Daily Yomiuri picked that up. But I haven’t heard so, and I’ve been too lazy to check it myself.
RCA: I haven’t seen it in the English Yomiuri. I just love English language material on Japan. So I watch them both.
JA: I think the Daily Yomiuri has become the best English language daily paper. But it’s still far from as comprehensive as the vernacular editions.
RCA: That’s the problem. I don’t know about you. But for me, it takes twice as long to read the Japanese than the English.
Japan’s Perceptions of Mainland China
Another point, shifting gears here a bit. One thing that puzzles me about Japan’s defense and military affairs is their response to Mainland China. We all know that Mainland China has made incredible increases each year for over a decade in their defense budget. And also, it appears to me, in their military capabilities. And I don’t see much of a response from Japan to this. Is this accurate? Or am I off base?
JA: I think a little bit off base. At the end of the Cold War, Reagan had said as president that he as president was going to raise defense spending to 7 percent of GNP. It had fallen somewhere in the 5 percent level under Jimmy Carter. And Reagan never quite got there. It was, I think, 6.9 percent at the end of his Administration. And, of course, the Cold War ended not too long after that. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has reduced, under George H. W. Bush, Bush 41, we reduced to less than 4 percent. And Bill Clinton reduced it to under 3 percent. And only the War in Iraq has pushed it back up a little.
The Japanese, of course, were at a much lower level. Only about 1 percent. But the Japanese didn’t reduce nearly as much percentage-wise as we did initially at the end of the Cold War. The reason is that despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union. And that was significant certainly as well. But to Japan, at that point, and still very much today, there are two very great defense concerns.
The first one is North Korea. And that has only strengthened. And that’s an immediate concern of the Japanese. I’ve had many Japanese tell me recently that the concern they have about North Korea today is stronger than the concern they had about the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. Even though that had become increasingly high with the Soviets putting a division in the Happo Ryoudo, the Northern Territories, and putting two small aircraft carries in Vladivostok.
But, that fear of North Korea is very high. And, medium- to long-term, the Japanese definitely do worry about that military build-up in China. And, even though the Japanese defense budget has not grown, its reduction has been fairly minimal. And, I would say, the reason it has maintained its level is because of these two worries about North Korea and China.
And, there’s one sector of the defense budget that has increased. That is the budget on a joint missile defense program with the United States. That has not only increased in size, but in the speed of its funding. That is definitely with the North Korean and Chinese threats in mind.
RCA: So the bilateral negotiations and preparations for this missile defense are really significant, then?
JA: Absolutely. In the Japanese mind. Very much so. And should be, realistically.
Japan’s Concerns Over North Korea and China
The other thing I meant to say, those two concerns – the immediate one of North Korea, and the medium- to long-term one to China – are much higher in the Japanese mind than the fear of a terrorist attack in Japan. They do consider that there is some possibility. But I very much believe that Koizumi sent the Ground Self Defense Force to Iraq, and still has the Maritime Self Defense Force in the Indian Ocean, and the Air Self Defense Force flying logistic missions in Iraq and the neighboring Middle East Countries, is because of trying very much to keep the United States convinced Japan is a very good partner. And that Japan needs support vis-à-vis North Korea and China, rather than worrying about Japan’s interests in the Middle East.
RCA: For so many years we on the American side have assumed that Japan’s strategic objectives were totally congruent with American strategic objectives. Logically, we know that’s not true. But it’s a little hard to adjust to that. We have to consider Japan as a more independent actor these days.
JA: Well, yes and no. What you have just said is the common wisdom: that Japan’s interests are not totally congruent. And I would say that myself. On the other hand, there is still, Bob, the factor that I think we both realize is that Japan and the United States, two nations whose combined population is less than half a billion people – 7 percent of the world’s population, controlling 40 percent of the world’s wealth. The U.S. and Japan simply are the two richest countries in the world.
So, therefore, to maintain that level of prosperity, the United States and Japan do have one very congruent interest. Keeping as much of the world, and particularly its oceans, peaceful, in order to continue that high level of economic prosperity that both the United States and Japan enjoy.
RCA: This has been very helpful. And I certainly thank you for your time this afternoon. I know you are busy there, Jim, and I appreciate you coming on the program.
JA: Surely. My pleasure.
Well, that’s all we have time for today. I promised you an “absolutely incredible” bluegrass clip at the end of the program. And here it is. John Starling, a member of the Original Seldom Scene, has one of the finest voices in music. Any kind of music. Here, from their 1972 album, Act I, recorded by Rebel, is a short clip from “Raised by the Railroad Line.” Drop by the Rebel website, or even the iTunes store, and pick up the album. If this song doesn’t make you feel sorry for city-raised children, nothing will.
[bluegrass clip]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
