January 11, 2007; Volume 03, Number 02
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Introduction |
| Kantei Streaming Video TV Site |
| Prime Minister Abe’s European Tour |
| Interview with Gregg Rubinstein on the Elevation of the JDA to Ministerial Status |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning! From beautiful Spring Valley in the Midlands of South Carolina. Today is Thursday, January 11th, 2007. And you are listening to Volume 03, Number 02 – that’s right, Number 02 – of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for dropping in again today to you long-time listeners. And a hearty South Carolina welcome to those of you who have found us for the first time this week. Last week, as quite a few of you noticed, I described the program as Number 02 of Volume 03. A number of you wrote in to ask about that. Well, it was just another of those “Oops” moments, I guess. No, you didn’t miss a program. I just made a mistake with the numbering. Sorry about that. And thanks to those of you who wrote to ask about it.
This week I’m a day early with the program. Normally, Friday is Podcast production day. But early this Friday I have to leave to attend a conference. A number of us are getting together at the regional AAS conference for a round-table discussion of the application of newer communications technologies to Japan studies in the United States. I’m planning to record the discussion. And hope to gather audio and transcript materials for presentation on the web. So, stay tuned. I’ll tell you next week how it all comes out.
Kantei Streaming Video TV Site
From time to time on these programs I introduce a website that appears to be useful to those of us interested in Japan’s domestic politics or conduct of international relations. Most of those sites present English language information. Since many of you don’t work in Japanese.
But there’s one Japanese language site that I think all of you would find interesting, even if you have difficulty understanding the Japanese. It’s the “Government Internet Television” site sponsored by the Kantei. You can access it free of charge via the Kantei website. I’ll post the link in the show notes and the transcript. [http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/index.html].
Here you’ll find streaming video broadcasts of press conferences by the Prime Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Also statements by Kantei personnel on timely topics. I even found newly appointed Administrative Reform Minister, Yoshimi Watanabe’s, first press conference. So, go have a look. Just click on the various channel buttons and enjoy. Even if the Japanese is difficult to understand you’ll get a sense of the individual presenting, and the environment in which it was presented. Well worth your time.
AND, at the very bottom of the channel list, Channel 61 is labeled “Cool Japan.” The videos presented on Channel 61 are in English! Some interesting and entertaining. But be sure to click through the other channels as well, to get a better feel for this Kantei.
Prime Minister Abe’s European Tour
The vacation period is over in Japan. And real political news is beginning to fill the airwaves from Tokyo. This includes continued revelations of “sloppy bookkeeping” on the part of LDP politicians. Some of them quite senior politicians. Last week I suggested that the real test of the motivations behind these press stories would be inclusion of politicians unaffiliated with the LDP. I still think that’s true. But so far, I’ve yet to come across a single non-LDP figure. Maybe the cynics were right. This is just the usual pre-election Gotcha Politics we’ve always seen in Japan, the United States, and all other genuinely democratic political systems around the world. And not indicative of a more significant change in the attitudes of Japan’s attentive public. I’m still hoping and watching, however.
More significant for us, Prime Minister Abe left Japan on the 9th for a five-day tour of European countries, and a visit to NATO Headquarters. He will visit Britain, Germany, Belgium, and France during the trip. According to Japan’s press reports, Abe hopes to strengthen European support for Japan’s North Korea policies, and discourage the European Union from relaxing its restrictions on arms shipments to Mainland China. He also will discuss Japan’s aspirations for permanent membership status at the United Nations Security Council.
Everyone knows that such visits by national chief executives are largely symbolic. Subordinates have been planning and negotiating the agendas for months. Every move is planned down to the minute. But even if they are largely symbolic, such visits are still important, and worth considering. First, announced visit times set deadlines for negotiators and their negotiations. Which otherwise might go on endlessly. Failure to reach agreement also must be announced. Causing embarrassment all around.
Second, there probably is something to the idea that face-to-face meetings between chief executives can help to build personal relationships of trust, or even friendship. The best-known example of that, I suppose is the legendary “Ron-Yasu” relationship between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. I poo-pooed it at the time. But since have learned it was genuinely important. Perhaps Prime Minister Abe can develop such relationships in Europe. Many observers describe him as more charming and persuasive in person than via the television camera lens.
And a possible third significance of such meetings is the inevitable media attention they attract. Large numbers of journalists are bound to accompany a prime minister traveling abroad. If only to be there should he make some disastrous mistake! The preparations and meetings are certain to provide good photo opportunities, and television footage. All of which will focus the attention of Japan’s attentive public for at least a moment on international relations. We’ll talk next week about how the trip went. And, more important, how Japan’s political media explained how it went.
Interview with Gregg Rubinstein on the Elevation of the JDA to Ministerial Status
There’s much more to consider in this week’s news from Tokyo. But time is running short, if this program is to air before I leave for Nashville. So, let’s get right to an interview with Mr. Gregg Rubinstein, Director of GAR Associates in Washington, D.C. I called Gregg out of the blue via the SkypePhone yesterday morning. And he was gracious enough to make a few comments. Gregg has a most unusual academic, government, and consulting background. Making him one of the most reliable commentators in Washington on U.S.-Japan defense and military relations.
RCA: Good Morning, Gregg. Thanks for joining us this morning on the Japan Considered Podcast.
GAR: Good Morning, Bob.
RCA: This is your second appearance, I think.
GAR: It is.
RCA: How’s your weather up there in Washington, D.C. today?
GAR: Well, after an unexpected bout of spring we’re having a couple days of what might approach actual winter. I understand it’s going to become spring-like again by the weekend.
RCA: Well, you can stay optimistic. I won’t say anything about our weather here. I don’t want to make you feel bad….
GAR: I’m going to the West Coast in a couple of days. I’ll be quite content there.
RCA: That’s good. I called this morning, Gregg, to ask you about the legislation that was passed last year to upgrade Japan’s Defense Agency to ministry status. What’s most significant, in your view, about that legislation?
GAR: It is true, as many people point out, that there’s a lot of symbolism in what has, for decades, been a mere “agency” in the government now becoming a full-fledged ministry. And that this re-titlement to ministry is simply acknowledging what has gradually been developing over a number of years in terms of Agency strength and influence within the Government of Japan.
There are several specific things that this elevation to ministry allows. For one thing, a real minister of defense, as opposed to a minister of state or a director-general for JDA, can request the convening of cabinet meetings. And this would facilitate, perhaps, response to emergencies, such as approval of mobilization measures.
A minister can submit legislation directly to the Diet, whereas JDA had to submit bills through the prime minister’s office. And, it’s certainly true that as a ministry of defense there will be more control over the defense budget process. Including direct submission of proposals to the Ministry of Finance. Again, before, JDA had to get clearance from the Cabinet Office for its budget submissions. And somewhat more discretion on how the defense funds are spent. So, those are some tangible issues.
RCA: Does this upgrade reduce the level or effectiveness of civilian control of Japan’s military?
GAR: No. it really has no effect on that whatever. There is no military in any significant country that remains more firmly under the thumb of its civilian masters than do the Japan Self Defense Forces. The civilian bureaucrats in JDA, now MOD, are very determined to keep it that way.
RCA: Then, why is there all the fuss in Japan’s media about this? This morning Asahi Shimbun, for example, ran a cartoon of a very aggressive-looking tank labeled “Ministry,” that was looking for something to attack. What explains all this fuss in the media?
GAR: There is no rational basis for all of this reaction. You can only explain it only in terms of the traditional positions of portions of the Japanese media, especially the Asahi Shimbun, that looks with great suspicion on anything suggesting an increase in strength of the Defense Agency or the Self Defense Forces. Or implying the adoption of a more aggressive defense posture, etc., etc. We have seen this for decades. And this is just the latest symbol. Asahi is going to make the worst case out of any such development. As will some abroad as well. Particularly in China and Korea.
RCA: That’s another point worth hearing your opinion about. How will this change affect relations between Japan and Mainland China or other Asian countries. What do you think?
GAR: In substance, it will have very little impact. In terms of perception, of course, I think there already have been statements coming out of China and both Koreas. Expressing concern over further steps toward militarism and more aggressive policies, etc., etc. Again, it’s the same thing we’ve been hearing for many years. They’re going to take a worst-case interpretation of what, in fact, is a very incremental move. But as far as the substance of the relationship? I think things driving that are elsewhere. Certainly, handling of the Yasukuni situation, Abe’s attempts to reestablish a more constructive dialogue. And concern over the North Korea problem.
RCA: How about in relations with the United States? Will this change affect Japan’s military relationship with the United States?
GAR: Here you get into an issue where you have the Defense Agency, or now the Japan Ministry of Defense, versus other bureaucratic players on the Japan side. Especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although, to some extent, METI, Economy, Trade, and Industry, and Finance as well. MOFA already has made it very clear that they’re not yielding any bureaucratic turf, in terms of managing the security relationship with the U.S.
RCA: That’s the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
GAR: That’s correct. They’re the ones who’ve always taken the lead on the Government of Japan side. And they expect to continue doing so. I think JDA’s, now the Japan Ministry of Defense, influence relative to MOFA has been increasing steadily over the years, and will continue to, incrementally. That’s inevitable. But you can count on Foreign Ministry bureaucrats to fight it every inch of the way.
RCA: Which leads directly to the final question for you this morning. Do you believe this upgrade will improve, or intensify, the efforts to more effectively coordinate conduct of Japan’s foreign relations? Among the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Finance, METI, Kantei. All of those people.
GAR: Well, again. There is an element of bureaucratic struggle among all of these agencies, where JDA has slowly been expanding its one-time very passive and subordinate position, and trying to take a more assertive role in policymaking. The other ministries, obviously, are going to be very reluctant to give that up. Part of that, though, depends on internal developments in JDA.
If I can go back to your first question about the real effects of becoming a ministry. We talked about tangible effects. But the intangible ones may be more important. One of them we just talked about. The increase of internal JDA influence relative to the rest of the government of Japan process, in terms of formulating defense policies, and managing defense cooperation with the U.S.
As a real ministry with a more legitimized national security mission, I think it clear that a Japan MOD would be more competitive in terms of improving the quality of its personnel, and in getting more top university graduates. This always has been an issue in the past. That in itself is going to somewhat affect their competitiveness relative to the rest of the bureaucracies, and their influence on them.
Having said all of that, I think a lot of things won’t change very much at all because of this Cho to Sho, agency to ministry, transition. When I look at the issues JDA, or now Ministry of Defense, are facing, they’re still pretty much the same ones after January 9th as before. Limited budget. Very constrained acquisition process. Fierce competition, not only with bureaucrats in other ministries. But also within the Defense Agency itself.
Relations with the uniformed services remain tense. JDA civilians are very determined to keep the uniformed services under firm control. And keep them at arm’s length from any serious policymaking. While we take for granted the placement of senior U.S. military officers in all sorts of national security positions, you notice that does not happen at all in Japan. There’s no evidence that’s going to change in the near future. And, of course, as far as key issues with the U.S. This says nothing about continuing hang-ups over collective defense. Or other issues such as how far Japan can go in joint operations with the U.S. All of that remains to be determined.
RCA: If you have just another minute or so, do you have any comments on this effort within the Kantei to create a National Security Council? You may remember that Yuriko Koike was appointed as a prime ministerial adviser.
GAR: Yes.
RCA: Then we didn’t hear too much about it. And then, sometimes we do. What’s that all about? And will this change to a ministry affect all that?
GAR: Well, as you know, Bob, there’s been movement for some time to expand capability and influence within the prime minister’s office on more effective coordination of national security issues. This was an issue even before Koizumi came into office. But it certainly evolved more quickly under him.
I think the intent obviously is there. To create some coordination mechanism along the lines of the National Security Council. To actually implement such an organization that’s going to have anywhere near the influence the NSC has come to have over the last 30-35 years or so. That’s going to be a very long process. And again, there’ll be every bit of resistance from entrenched bureaucracies in terms of giving any ground.
There seems to be a two-pronged response to this. One we just said is resistance to any efforts by appointed Kantei officials to push on the bureaucracies. The other is for the bureaucracies to get as many of their own secondees into this organization as they can, and co-opt them. And, of course, many key operatives within the Kantei coordination offices are from the bureaucracies already.
So I don’t know how much of a change in balance of power there’s going to be. And, as far as hearing on-and-off again about Ms. Koike. That’s entirely predictable. So, in summary, I think it’s a move a predictable, and generally constructive direction. But it’s going to take a much longer time to implement.
RCA: Thanks, Gregg, for your time this morning. I know you’re busy. And, as always, I appreciate your balanced commentary and assessment.
GAR: It’s my pleasure. I hope it’s been helpful.
RCA: It certainly has.
That was Gregg Rubinstein from Washington, D.C., talking to us about the significance of the legislation passed late year that upgraded the JDA to the Ministry of Defense.
It’s always a treat to hear Gregg’s views on relations with Japan. His is a quiet, but highly authoritative voice. And he speaks from decades of experience in this field.
I’ve mentioned the Seldom Scene bluegrass band at least once before on this program. Well … Maybe a few times. But, as I’m sure you’ll agree, they really do deserve the attention. A few weeks ago I gave you a quick glimpse of a John Starling vocal from the Original Seldom Scene. This week, I found an instrumental clip I hope you enjoy. This one illustrates John Duffey’s genius with the mandolin. Now, the mandolin isn’t a very big instrument. And it can be easily overlooked, or misunderstood, if not played with skill. But I don’t think anybody ever overlooked Duffey’s playing of it. And they certainly wouldn’t have during this clip from “Pickaway.” Go on over to Rebel Records and order up a copy of “Live at the Cellar Door.” It’s still available, and even fresher now with today’s modern technology than it was in the 70s when recorded. Enjoy.
[bluegrass clip]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
