December 22, 2006; Volume 02, Number 45
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning from Beautiful Spring Valley, in the Midlands of South Carolina. Today is Friday, December 22nd, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 45, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Beautiful weather continues to hold here in South Carolina’s Midlands, as we approach the Holidays. Nothing like the snow and cold visited for the past couple of days on listeners in the Western and Midwestern parts of the United States. Though we do have a little rain here. It may last even through Christmas day! Disappointing children, and travelers, I’m sure.
It hardly seems possible that we’re this close to the end of 2006. We only have time left for today’s program, and one more, before Volume Two of the Japan Considered Podcast is zipped up into the Archives.
Speaking of Archives, several listeners have written chiding me for failure to maintain the program archive files properly. Wish I could blame that on my assistant, or on some anonymous Webmaster. But you all know, it just me. So, “I’m a Culpa,” as we used to say OverHome. That is an inconvenience for listeners. So some time during the next week I’ll try to get those archive files of past programs sorted out on the Japan Considered Website. The past program files all are on the server. We just need pages with the appropriate links on the Japan Considered website. Sorry about the delay. Another “Oops Moment,” I guess.
Those of you new to the Podcast may not realize that each program in Volume Two – That is, the whole 2006 calendar year – Is available for download and review from the Japan Considered Project website. Just point your browser at www.JapanConsidered.org, click on the big “podcast” button on the home page, and browse through the material. From there you can access both sound files and transcripts for each program. Well! You will be able to, anyway, as soon as I get those archive pages up and running properly.
Each week at this time we select a few topics in the news from Japan and consider their longer-term significance for Japan’s domestic politics or Japan’s conduct of foreign relations. We’re far from a comprehensive news show here. With no intention of becoming one. Rather, this is the place to come for interpretation of the longer-term significance of what you hear about Japan in the news.
It seems as though the volume of interesting information coming from Japan – even English language information – increases every month. This increase, and the ability to access quite a few Japanese language news sources via the Internet, certainly enriches the life of Japan specialists living outside Japan. But it leaves us with hard choices.
Take this week, for example. An incredible flood of interesting – and useful – information about Japan’s Cabinet, parliamentary maneuvering, political parties, and international relations. Much of it with longer-term significance. Very little of that, of course, gets reported in the American or European news media. Which, I guess, is only natural. For as long as I can remember, when Americans turn their attention to Japan, they’d rather be entertained than informed. And this public proclivity is reflected, naturally, in American media coverage of Japan. I suspect the situation is similar in Europe.
This week, I’ll begin with discussion of developments in the LDP’s factions. Nothing definitive. But it’s well worth mentioning. Then I’ll continue consideration of a topic we began last week. The Abe Kantei’s handling, or mishandling, of its relationship with Japan’s attentive public. Lots of questions remain there. Professor Dennis Yasutomo of Smith College in Massachusetts joins us again to provide some additional information and interpretation. And finally, I have a fine bluegrass clip at the very end for you to look forward to.
Foreign Minister Taro Aso Forms His Own LDP Faction, and Tsutomu Takebe Creates an “Anti-Faction Faction”
First, a quick note on LDP factions. We’ve talked a lot about LDP factions on this program, and their significance in Japan’s political processes. Our coverage has included the decline in the factions’ influence under the anti-Faction premiership of Koizumi, and presumably Abe.
Well, as had been rumored for some time now, Foreign Minister Taro Aso announced creation of his own faction this Tuesday, the 19th. He calls it the “Iko-kai,” and it attracted twelve other members of the Lower House and two from the Upper House. Eleven of those fourteen came directly from the faction headed by Yohei Kono, which was disbanded on the same day. This number is considerably short of what had been anticipated during discussions in Japan’s political media during the past few weeks.
“What’s going on here,” it’s reasonable to ask. Why would a person as prominent in Japan’s national politics, and as experienced as Taro Aso, decide to create his own faction? And, why now? The second question, of timing, may prove to be more interesting than the first.
Based upon Japanese political news reports and commentary, it appears that Aso was motivated by the most traditional of LDP faction leader motivations. He hoped to assemble a reliable group of at least twenty LDP Diet members who could be relied upon to support his candidacy for the LDP presidency. When the time came. Listeners to this program will recall that he had some difficulty achieving that number last time around. At least, in the beginning. Along the same lines, Aso likely assumes he will be taken more seriously as an LDP presidential candidate if he heads his own faction. Probably so. And, though I’ve seen nothing about this in the Japanese press, it’s possible he believes it will be easier to solicit financial support as the head of a faction, than otherwise.
In addition to all of this, the Japanese political press for some years has reported on efforts to “Recreate the Grand Kochikai.” Which means reunification of three splinter factions that formally belonged to the “Kochikai,” created by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, and once headed by Kiichi Miyazawa, when it collapsed several years ago. Aso described his creation of the new faction as an effort to accomplish that objective. It seems unlikely, however, given the intense personal animosities involved, that Aso’s move will realize that ambitious aspiration.
All we can do at this point is speculate on motive, while watching what the new group does. But even more murky is the question of timing. Why now? LDP factions hardly enjoy intense public approval, or support, it seems, in Japan today. Quite the contrary. So, what’s the hurry? Aso’s plans have been rumored for some time now, so there’s no element of surprise to consider. Could it be that he fears the LDP may be facing its next presidential election earlier than expected, and that he wants to be ready? Hard to say. But, whatever his motivation, and his timing, Aso’s actions certainly don’t inspire a “Well, of course!” response. At least, not for me. I’m a little puzzled.
Also, while we’re on the topic of LDP factions, the following day, Wednesday the 20th, the Secretary General of the LDP under Koizumi, Tsutomu Takebe, announced formation of what might be described as an “anti-faction faction.” He named it “Atarashii Kaze,” or “New Wind.” Takebe’s effort was a bit more successful than Aso’s in terms of LDP members attracted. Takebe ended up with 23 other, mostly young, LDP Diet Members, most of them first-termers who had refrained from joining factions. Takebe, of course, described his new organization as an effort to continue the reforms started under Prime Minister Koizumi. Given his encouragement of fundamental LDP reform during his time as Secretary General, he certainly has some credibility in that area.
Soooo, what does all of this tell us about the future role of factions within the LDP? Does the Aso traditionalist initiative mean LDP factions are roaring back to their earlier prominence within the Party? That Koizumi’s efforts to weaken faction leaders’ influence had only temporary effect? And that we’re returning to politics-as-usual in Japan? That we can all dust off our old lecture notes for next semester’s Japan Politics courses?
Probably not. Taro Aso is far from the first choice to succeed Shinzo Abe as LDP president and prime minister. His chances are slim, at the very best. And he’s never been considered a trend-setter within the Party. “Very much an acquired taste,” is how a Japanese political journalist described him to me a few years ago in Tokyo. He didn’t get as many fellow LDP members to join his new group as had been expected. And we can be all but certain the intense personal animosities that have prevented the splinter factions of the “Kochikai” from reforming, will work against Aso. Now with renewed energy.
But then, similar things could be said of Tsutomu Takebe’s “New Wind” effort. He attracted only 23 like-minded LDP members to join his reform promotion effort. That’s only a fraction of the LDP members newly elected in 2005, described collectively as the “Koizumi Children.” Given Takebe’s prominence and past record, he should have been able to bring in more. So, like most of the topics we consider on this program, we’ll just have to wait and watch. I’ll keep you posted.
The Abe Kantei and Japan’s Attentive Public
What in the world is going on in Nagatacho these days? Last week I briefly mentioned the unexpectedly sharp decline in the Abe Administration’s public approval polls, and said we would give the topic more attention this week.
Well, that trend seems to continue. At least, as far as I can tell. All week I’ve scoured the websites in Japan of those institutions that regularly report public opinion polls, looking for reports of any credible survey taken after passage of the Defense and Education bills through the Diet. But to no avail. I couldn’t find a single report. Not even one of those bogus “internet survey” type offerings that I mentioned last week. This is the first time I can recall not being able to find the results of at least one public opinion survey. And it seems odd, given the importance of public approval for the credibility of the Abe Cabinet, and the widespread media attention now being devoted to the subject.
However, even without more recent specific opinion polling support, Japan’s political media continued throughout the week to comment on the significance of Prime Minister Abe’s sharp decline in public approval. Favored adjectives describing Abe included “Beleaguered,” “Struggling,” and “Besieged.” Not good!
I’m not suggesting that the Japanese political media reports are wrong. Rather, I’m mystified by the lack of effective response from the current Kantei team to the criticism. Especially given the importance of public approval for the credibility and influence of the Abe Cabinet.
Consider this. Last Friday, the Abe Cabinet presided over passage of two controversial bills that have stymied LDP cabinets for decades. And that includes the Koizumi Cabinets. Many of our listeners, especially older listeners, consider both of these legislative initiatives ill-advised. Further evidence Japan is turning away from its post-World War Two pacifist principles.
But regardless of what we think of the advisability of the Education and Defense bills, we all must admit that their passage represents a significant political achievement. And, in addition to these two high-visibility bills, the remainder of the Ruling Coalition’s legislative agenda was passed during this session as well. Some of it quite significant.
So, beginning last Saturday, I closely monitored news reports from Japan. Newspapers, wire services, television station websites, and anything else I could find. Looking for evidence that the Abe Kantei would use those high-profile legislative successes to explain their accomplishments to Japan’s attentive public. In ways that would reverse the Cabinet’s approval ratings. They had, after all, something to boast about!
However, Sunday’s influential political television talk shows were, without exception, dominated by Abe Administration critics. Emphasis was on the dangers posed by passage of the defense and education bills. Guests on those widely watched shows defending the Administration did their best to present the other side. But one got the clear impression that they’d been selected for their unsuitability for the task. Then, many of Japan’s political journalists at the beginning of the week, as usual, took their initial cues from that weekend coverage, and the dismal assessments of the Abe Kantei continued.
The Kantei has even proved unable to cope with the awkward resignation of Abe’s new Tax Commission Chairman, Professor Masaaki Homma. Over reports he was living in public housing with a woman other than his wife. At an artificially low level of rent. Abe recently selected Homma to head the Tax Commission because he judged Homma more in tune with his own economic policies. So Homma’s vulnerability to eventual media attack was highly predictable.
As of today, though, the Kantei has yet to effectively distance the Prime Minister from the media’s shock upon learning of Homma’s indiscretion. Article after article throughout the week in Japan’s more influential political media featured a potent combination of the details of Homma’s marital problems with the writer’s judgment that this incident will further weaken the Abe Cabinet’s public approval ratings. Which it certainly will, if the Kantei continues to allow its opponents to determine the media agenda.
All of this might be dismissed as a failure of the Abe Cabinet’s public relations officials to fine-tune their message. A somewhat minor PR spin challenge, in other words. But it’s possible the problem is more serious than that. The core officials of the Abe Kantei, including the Prime Minister himself, may not understand the political significance of their relationship with Japan’s attentive public. Understand the degree to which their tenure in office, and their effectiveness during that tenure, depend upon the approval of Japan’s attentive public. Given the way Shinzo Abe was selected as president of the LDP, and eventually as prime minister. Or, as the Prime Minister himself has suggested, that they believe their accomplishments eventually will speak for themselves, without the need for additional explanation.
Where, in all of this, is Hiroshige Sekou, Prime Minister Abe’s special adviser on public relations? I profiled him and his office on this program soon after his appointment. Sekou is about as good as it gets in Japan as a political public relations man. He has an impressive track record. And it’s hard to imagine that he would find a PR problem as inconsequential as that of Professor Homma’s indiscretion much of a challenge. Sekou understands Japan’s political press. He understands the importance of the Cabinet maintaining high public approval within this new political environment. And he also understands that nothing sells itself! Not even the most impressive of political accomplishments.
I’ve heard little of Sekou for some time now. Indeed, the only Japanese press mention of him recently has been in articles describing how little influence that he and the other four special prime ministerial advisers have had since their appointment. One article even reported that Sekou’s responsibilities have been limited to management of the international press.
This raises the question of how the Abe Kantei is being managed. How responsibilities are being assigned to Kantei staff. Or, Not being assigned to Kantei staff. And Hiroshige Sekou isn’t the only special adviser to the prime minister to drop from sight. Prime Minister Abe’s special adviser on national security, Yuriko Koike, has maintained an unnaturally low public profile since soon after her appointment, and her visit to Washington, D.C., where she met with Bush Administration National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley.
On December 1st, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yasuhisa Shiozaki, announced Koike was about to depart on a ten-day tour of Middle Eastern countries. But during and after that trip, I found more information about Koike’s activities on the websites of the BBC and the Libyan English language news service than on any of Japan’s print or electronic media sites. Koike has been present, but hardly featured, in media coverage of the committee charged with creating a Kantei-based national security council. The primary task of her office. Shiozaki himself does those briefings.
Conflicts and tensions among the highly competitive and ambitious individuals required to create effective central political executive teams are inevitable in any political system. The U.S. White House staff provides a fine and celebrated example of such tensions. That said, the chief executive him or herself is responsible for recognizing those conflicts once they become dysfunctional, and demanding their correction. The effectiveness and even survival of the Administration depends upon it. Should they prove uncorrectable, the chief executive must make the key personnel changes required to keep the machine operating smoothly. It will be interesting to see if Prime Minister Shinzo Abe takes a serious look at the operation of his “Team Abe” in the next couple of weeks. And if he does, what he does to improve its operations.
Comments by Professor Dennis Yasutomo of Smith College on Some More Successful Kantei Initiatives
During the past few minutes I’ve been a little critical of the Abe Kantei’s handling of their relationship with the Japanese public. But Professor Dennis Yasutomo of Smith College has just joined us to talk about some other issues as well.
Good morning, Dennis, and thanks for joining us on the program today. How do you see the Abe Kantei handling these issues?
DY: Good morning, Bob. It’s nice to talk to you again. I think most of the attention in the Kantei now seems to be paid to the National Security Adviser’s Office and the Public Relations Special Advisers Office, because of what, I think, appears to be either some slow going, or other problems. However, what I find interesting is that the Economic Policy Special Advisers Office seems to be doing quite well. Perhaps under the radar.
For example, among its projects is this Asia Gateway concept that Prime Minister Abe introduced in his policy speech. The planning for that seems to be going quite well.
RCA: What is the Asia Gateway Project?
DY: I think the Asia Gateway concept is part of the Abe Cabinet’s way of responding to the criticism of Japan’s policy toward Asia that flared up under Prime Minister Koizumi. And the concept, which has not been fully developed yet, looks fairly interesting. Because I think it’s going to try to address relations with Asia more broadly than just East Asia. I think it will include Southeast Asia, and I think you could even see South Asia in there.
While it’s fairly comprehensive in its scope. I think it’s also fairly nicely focused on some key pillars that appear to me to be evidence of seeking out some non-controversial common ground with Asian countries. These range from the expected economic and financial pillars, that we see in almost every Asia policy. But also this one seems to reach out to pop culture and things of that nature. It also seems to spell out how Japan must change in general ways to accommodate Asia.
Of course, it’s still an outline that needs to be filled in over the next couple of months. But it might prove to be an interesting comparison with the Fukuda Doctrine which both Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe have referred to.
So, in this sense, at least in this area, the Kantei seems to be chugging along fairly smoothly. I wouldn’t be too surprised if this becomes perhaps the first major policy pronouncement, or even doctrine, under Abe.
RCA: What do you think accounts for the success with Asia Gateway, and other things under Nemoto, when we see so many problems in national security and other areas.
DY: That’s a good question. I’m not really sure, not being there on the ground. But the Gateway Council members and the staff were put together fairly quickly. They’ve been meeting on a regular basis. They have taken the substance, I think, and have discussed in places like Singapore.
And also, I think, Asia is a priority policy area for this Cabinet. As we know, Prime Minister Abe’s first overseas trip was to Asia rather than to the U.S. So we know that the Prime Minister is very much focused on Asia. So perhaps that has had something to do with it. It is a priority for the Cabinet.
RCA: Well, that’s helpful. And, as usual, you’ve provided some balance to these programs. And I thank you very much for that.
DY: Not at all. Of course, you always say how wrong I am. So, I’m happy to be of help.
Again, that was Professor Dennis Yasutomo of Smith College. We’ve known each other since graduate school at Columbia, waay back in the early seventies. As Dennis said, we rarely agree on political issues. But over the years, I’ve learned to be very careful when confronting him directly. He’s not only remarkably well informed. He’s also a serious scholar, whose analysis and predictions are far more often right than wrong. He’s also a valued friend and adviser, whose support and counsel were critical during the creation of this Japan Considered Project.
Last week we didn’t have time for our traditional bluegrass clip. So I promised you something special this week in compensation. Well, here it is. A few weeks ago I introduced you to the Nashville-based “Infamous Stringdusters.” These six young musicians produce an incredible sound! According to the Sugar Hill website, their long-anticipated album, “Fork in the Road,” will be available in early February 2007. [Click the link for the site] I’ve got an order in already, and look forward to hearing all of their sounds. In the meantime, we have to make do with what they’ve generously provided on their MySpace site in streaming format. So, have a listen to this from their “My Destination”!
[bluegrass clip]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
