December 8, 2006; Volume 02, Number 43
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning from downright chilly Spring Valley, in Columbia, South Carolina. Today is Friday, December 8th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 43, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for dropping in again, to you long-time listeners. And a hearty South Carolina Welcome to those of you who just found the program. I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project. And creator and host of this program.
Each week at this time we select a few items of interest from Japan’s news, and consider their longer-term significance for Japan’s domestic politics or conduct of international relations. Items for consideration are selected not for their immediate importance. But for their potential to help us understand underlying themes and trends in Japanese politics and foreign relations.
So, this isn’t a news program. Even a Japanese politics news program. There are plenty of those available already. Rather, it’s turned into something like a cross between a university course lecture, and a longish media OpEd article. Hopefully not too academic, in the negative sense of that term. Yet, not just a descriptive presentation of events and facts, either.
Anyway, I hope you find these weekly programs useful. You can access transcripts of each one on the Japan Considered Project website, at www.JapanConsidered.org. Just click on the big podcast icon on the home page and select the program that interests you. All free for the clicking, of course.
Last week again, my day job got in the way of completing a Podcast. End-of-semester paper reading, and the like. Those of you who teach for a living will understand. Just can’t be helped. The lament of the regular Podcaster, I guess.
E-Mail and Questions about the DPJ
Each week the volume of e-mail comments and suggestions seems to increase. Thanks to those of you who take the time to send along your thoughts. Please continue to send them to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read each one, and take them into consideration when preparing subsequent programs.
This last week there were quite a few e-mails asking about the future of the Democratic Party of Japan. I wish I could tell you more about the DPJ. It’s a very important subject. But my contacts there are quite limited. This week we’ll consider a couple of points related directly to the DPJ and its future as Japan’s main Opposition party. But I’ll be the first to admit that my commentary in that area is superficial. At best.
Certainly, as we anticipated, the outcome of the Okinawa gubernatorial election was a jolt for the DPJ. Ichiro Ozawa and the Party leadership went all-out to win. Making expensive compromises at the national and prefectural level. But they still lost, leaving them in the end with just the political costs of those compromises to contend with. Japan’s political media since has been full of speculation about the effect that loss will have on Ozawa, and on the Party as a whole. But without more reliable information, it seems to me too early to draw any definitive conclusions.
Ichiro Ozawa, as I said last week, is an experienced and highly skilled political tactician. Even strategist. And therefore, I’m reluctant to count him out. He’s demonstrated remarkable flexibility in the past, and may do so again. Learning from his mistakes and changing his campaign tactics.
Of course, there’s also the possibility that he’ll tire of the whole business and allow someone else to take over as Party leader. If that could be done in a way that would maintain his reputation and personal dignity. But he’s re-invented himself more than once before, and may well do so again.
One thing to keep in mind, though, when considering Ichiro Ozawa’s role in Japan’s national political world, is his relationship with the Japanese political press. It’s best described, I think, as “delicate.” Many of the reporters covering the DPJ hope to see “their” Party become more successful in the national political competition. That’s only natural. Especially if they represent one of the more blatantly anti-Abe media conglomerates. So, they do their best while providing effective, professional journalistic coverage, not to embarrass Ozawa. Since now the DPJ is really the only alternative to Abe’s conservative line.
But Ichiro Ozawa is a difficult politician for Japan’s political journalists to cover. He’s been an important public figure for many decades. And throughout that time he’s become notorious for giving Japanese journalists a hard time, humiliating some of them before their peers. Or, even refusing to meet the press at all, at times. Most senior Japanese politicians are more careful in their dealings with political journalists. Realizing the mutually dependent nature of the relationship they have. And fearing payback.
Because of this, I suspect that Ichiro Ozawa will have a difficult time of it with Japan’s political journalists should it begin to appear that he’s losing support within the Party. Or if he is openly accused by other DPJ members of making strategic errors that have damaged the Party’s interests. That is, Ozawa, perhaps more than most other senior Japanese elected officials, enjoys little “margin” in his relationship with the political press. And this could well hasten his decline, IF he should appear to falter. But we’ll just have to wait to see.
Concern Over Abe Decision to Re-Admit Eleven “Postal Rebels” to LDP Membership
“Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown,” Shakespeare told us some time ago. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe probably would agree these days, even though he’s able to leave those wearisome crown-wearing responsibilities up to somebody else.
As we’ve discussed on this program for some time now, Japan’s “non-factionist” prime ministers, such as Junichiro Koizumi and incumbent Shinzo Abe, rely more heavily on widespread perceptions of high public approval ratings to maintain their influence, than did their predecessors. And ultimately, to keep their jobs!
According to all the recent polls, Prime Minister Abe’s public approval rating has taken a serious hit during the past couple of weeks. Even a Sankei poll, taken on the last day of November and first day of December, recorded a drop of just over 16 percent in public approval of his Cabinet from the time of his inauguration. It’s now at 47.7 percent, they said.
All Japanese political media analysis I’ve seen to date attributes most of this sharp drop in public approval to uneasiness over the Abe Administration’s decision to allow eleven “Postal Rebels” to return to full Party membership.
Now, all of this might be dismissed as a predictable tempest in a teapot, and unworthy of our attention here. A predictable effort by those already opposed to the Abe Cabinet, or to the conservative Abe policy line, to generate negative press. And, of course, there’s something to that. Those same polls, for example, showed that LDP supporters were considerably less critical of the return of the Eleven than were supporters of the DPJ and of other parties. That’s natural. The hope was that Ichiro Ozawa could coax some or all of the “Postal Rebels” over into the DPJ ranks. That doesn’t seem to be working.
If that was all there was to it, we really needn’t bother. Party competition in genuinely democratic political systems is bound to generate efforts to create negative press for the other side. But, I think there’s more to this issue than just conventional political spin.
Judging from a wide range of poll results, a significant portion of Japan’s attentive public appears to be genuinely concerned about the LDP “reverting” to its old Factionist ways. Abandoning Prime Minister Koizumi’s progress toward genuine and meaningful political reform. Should incumbent Prime Minister Abe begin to go down that road, conciliating the Party Factionists and interest groups who support them, he’ll quickly lose the public support his Administration depends upon for its success, and even survival. So, we should give this issue more thought.
Just what has happened? And where is all of this going? Those of you who follow Japan’s electoral politics closely will recall that the whole Postal Rebel business began last year when Japan’s Upper House refused to pass then Prime Minister Koizumi’s long-cherished Postal Reform Bill. In retaliation, Koizumi dissolved the Lower House and called a general election. Koizumi denied LDP endorsement to those incumbent Lower House Members who refused to endorse his postal reform, forcing them to run as independents. Well, 27 did. With the LDP running their celebrated “assassin” candidates against many of them.
Popular expectations of meaningful political change gave the Liberal Democratic Party an astounding victory in that September 2005 general election. Winning 296 of the Lower House’s 480 total seats. Of the 27 former LDP “Postal Rebels” who ran as independents, 13 managed to win re-election anyway. One of the thirteen joined the tiny People’s New Party, leaving 12 former LDP “Postal Rebel Independents” in the Diet.
These twelve “Postal Rebels” this year petitioned the LDP to readmit them to full membership. After considerable to-ing and fro-ing, the LDP Ethics Committee agreed to their readmission. But only if they would sign written pledges to support postal privatization, to abide by Party discipline, and to support the Abe Cabinet’s overall policy agenda.
Eleven of the twelve agreed. Former MITI Minister, Takeo Hiranuma, a blue-blooded senior LDP Member, if there ever was one, refused to sign the pledge and his application for membership was rejected. This Monday the LDP Party Ethics Committee, with Prime Minister Abe’s approval, agreed to their return to the LDP. It’s this agreement that has cast a shadow of doubt across Prime Minister Abe’s reformist credentials, and has dragged down his public approval ratings.
What can we expect from this issue in the near- and medium-term future? Is its effect on public perceptions of the Abe Cabinet and the new LDP enduring? Or only temporary, as the Abe Cabinet and LDP obviously hope?
I suspect that the elements of Japan’s political media most unsympathetic to Prime Minister Abe’s administration and policies will continue to cover the issue, and to continue to poll the public specifically on this topic, and to headline the results, for some time. As least until a more effective issue emerges to replace it. Much as we saw with the Town Meeting manipulation fiasco of a few weeks back that the Return of the Eleven appears to have replaced.
I also expect the more neutral and pro-Abe political media soon to tire of the issue, and even to begin to counter the efforts of the opposition with alternative interpretations of the return of the eleven. So Japan’s attentive public will have a more balanced view of the issue. And, perhaps most important of all, this sharp drop in the Abe Cabinet’s public approval rating should alert Kantei officials to the volatility of their public support. And serve as an important warning, as they take up even more sensitive issues in the future.
But, however all that turns out, we really should take a break from our political cheerleading, step back, and recognize just how much things have changed in Japan’s electoral politics. Here we have the Liberal Democratic Party – until a few years ago, perhaps the Weberian Ideal Type of “Big Tent” pragmatic political parties – demanding that candidates for Party membership sign oaths of agreement to the Party’s reform agenda before they are granted admission. And not just any aspiring electoral candidate. But sitting members of the Lower House who were until last year LDP members. Some of them, very high profile LDP members!
Quite a change, I think. Even Japan’s more ideological parties of the Left should be impressed! So even if this decision to re-admit the Eleven Postal Rebels represents reversion toward the LDP’s Factionist past, considering this, they’ve got quite a ways to revert. They are, after all, a political party, and not an organized religion of some kind. We’ll just have to watch to see how the Abe Cabinet and LDP respond to the adverse public reaction this recent decision has kicked up. That will be important.
With our attention focused on the mechanics of domestic electoral politics, we risk missing the output of the legislative process. Considerable progress has been made on important bills during the past couple weeks. So, let’s take a look at two of them that we’ve discussed on this program for some time now. First, the Education Reform Bill, and then legislation that will elevate Japan’s Defense Agency to full ministerial status. Prime Minister Abe inherited both of these bills from his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. And, they’ve both been discussed, in on-again, off-again fashion, for as long as I can remember. So, the substantive significance of their passage aside, both of these bills are of considerable political importance. And therefore, consideration of their passage should give us insight into the legislative side of current Japanese domestic politics.
Reform of Japan’s Fundamental Education Law of 1947
Let’s begin with the efforts to revise or amend Japan’s Fundamental Education Law. This brief eleven-article document was written in early 1947 by Japan’s Allied Occupiers. Not long after they wrote Japan’s post-WWII Constitution. Revision of which also is under consideration these days. In a sense, this general statement of educational principles was intended to replace the Imperial Rescript on Education that set the tone for prewar educational practices throughout Japan.
As might be expected, given its authorship and the time it was written, emphasis throughout is on creating a peace-loving “democratic and cultural state,” as the preamble notes. The individual clauses encourage inculcation of values such as individuality, equal opportunity, and gender equality. While prohibiting state-sponsored religious and political education.
The most controversial aspect of the Government’s amendment proposal concerns the notion that Japan’s public education also should instill patriotism, or love of country, as well as other objectives. Japan’s powerful Nikkyoso, or National Teachers Union, has long opposed the idea. They’re sponsoring protest demonstrations around the nation in an effort to prevent passage of the legislation.
As what appears to have been part of its overall strategy to win the November 19th Okinawa gubernatorial election, the Democratic Party of Japan decided to boycott Lower House Committee and Plenary Session debate over the proposed legislation. This boycott tactic may have encouraged labor union support for the DPJ’s candidate in the Okinawa election. But it also deprived Party officials of the opportunity to question Government spokesmen about the recently reported efforts of the Kantei to manipulate Town Meetings held to publicly debate the education bill revision. I mentioned this during discussion of the significance of the Okinawa election a couple of weeks ago. The Lower House special committee passed the education bill without Opposition Party members present. And then the Lower House did the same. Sending it to the Upper House where it’s being debated now.
The boycotting DPJ must have expected an outburst of media protest over the Ruling Coalition’s decision to proceed without them. But that didn’t happen. They lost the Okinawa election. The bill sailed through the Committee and Lower House plenary session. And, perhaps most significant of all, the Opposition parties lost a made-in-heaven opportunity to hold the Ruling Coalition’s feet to the fire concerning the Town Meeting jiggering fiasco. An issue that, if handled properly, could have seriously interfered with the Kantei’s legislative agenda.
The DPJ and other opposition parties immediately recognized their error and resumed participation in Diet debate two days after the Okinawa election. After introduction to the Upper House plenary session on the 22nd, the revision Bill was sent to the Upper House ad hoc Committee, where it’s been debated since.
The Ruling Coalition had planned to vote the Bill out of Committee today for a final vote of the Plenary Upper House next week. But yesterday, Thursday, the 7th, the Committee leadership announced that the Opposition parties have demanded another meeting, on Tuesday, the 12th, at which they will be able to further question Prime Minister Abe and other Cabinet members. The Town Meeting fiasco is bound to come up there. So, it’s possible the Government will fail to pass the Bill during this Diet session. Even if the session is extended beyond the current December 15th deadline. That Tuesday Committee hearing should be worth watching.
The Defense Agency Upgrade Legislation
Passage this Diet session of legislation to upgrade the Defense Agency to full ministerial status seems a bit more likely. But who knows? This too has been a cherished objective of conservative LDP governments for as long as I can remember. With the issue waxing and waning in public discussion, depending upon Japan’s perceptions of its domestic and international environments.
Most recently, the Koizumi Administration added ministerial upgrade to the LDP’s Party platform ahead of the September 11th, 2005 general election. The agreement of ruling coalition partner, New Komeito, and that election’s surprising outcome for the LDP, made passage of the upgrade early in 2006 seem likely. Japan’s domestic politics, however, is one surprise after another. Nearly a year later, the Bill is still being debated. Chances for passage again seem bright. But the whole situation could change suddenly with a more skillful parliamentary performance by the DPJ during next week’s Upper House committee hearings.
Opposition to the Defense Agency upgrade roughly parallels opposition to inclusion of a patriotism education requirement in the basic education law. Organizations and individuals who oppose these changes see them as evidence that Japan is moving away from its early post-World War Two commitment to peaceful resolution of international conflict. Apparent public acceptance of the changes – if not outright public support – concerns them even more. Much of this opposition comes from the organized Left, with labor unions and affiliated civic organizations providing street- and neighborhood-level support. Anti-war, and anti-U.S. Security Treaty, themes have long been more important to these organizations than the fundamental economic issues one might expect them to emphasize. These really are their “hot-button” concerns.
This has created critical problems for leaders of the Democratic Party of Japan. In several ways. First, there’s the problem we’ve often considered on this program of the diverse DPJ membership. Everything from quite intense former members of Japan’s Socialist Party to more pragmatic, even conservative, younger graduates of the Matsushita Seikei Juku, such as former Party President, Seiji Maehara. In good “big tent” pragmatic politics fashion, current DPJ leader, Ichiro Ozawa, has tried to keep them all content enough at least to remain within the Party, and hopefully to contribute to its electoral success. This broad spectrum of opinion – even intense opinion – on national security affairs has made it difficult for the Party to cope with these issues once they bubble to the surface. As we’ll see in a moment.
At another level, the DJP finds labor unions’ and associated civic organizations’ very attractive when it comes time to build electoral support organizations for their candidates. And to attract endorsements of those candidates by other non-ruling coalition parties. That support isn’t given for free, of course. DJP opposition to measures offensive to those groups, such as inclusion of patriotism education requirements in the education law revision, and elevation of the Defense Agency to ministerial status, is an important DJP “quid” for their electoral support “quo.” That’s undoubtedly what we saw at work during the November run-up to the Okinawa gubernatorial election. And it appears that the DJP has paid, and is paying, a pretty heavy “quid.”
Prior to the Okinawa election, the DJP opposed bringing the Defense Agency bills to a vote. After losing the Okinawa election, they changed course and agreed to the November 30th Lower House vote that passed the bills. They even joining the Ruling Coalition in supporting the bills! However, Lower House Vice Speaker, Takahiro Yokomichi, the acknowledged leader of the DJP’s Left flank, broke Party discipline and voted against the bill. And at least four other DJP Members absented themselves from the vote.
After Lower House passage, the Upper House took up the Bills on December 5th, with the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee beginning debate the following day, this Wednesday. The Abe Administration hopes the Upper House will pass the bills by the 12th, next Tuesday. Which would make the Defense Agency into a full Ministry at the beginning of next year.
What would a change from Agency to Ministry actually mean for the Boeicho? Is it purely symbolic? Well, perhaps the symbolic significance is most important, as many of the bills’ critics charge. But there are a few substantive changes. Under the new legislation, the Boeicho’s director general would become a full minister. As such, he or she would have the authority to ask that a cabinet meeting be held, like other full ministers. A defense minister also would have full authority to submit the ministry’s budget request directly to the Finance Ministry, rather than as part of the Sorifu budget. And a defense minister would be empowered to propose new legislation. It’s possible that these substantive changes might become important under certain political conditions. But it appears clear that, at least for now, the symbolic significance of the change is most important to all concerned. We’ll see what happens next week. And especially, what effect this will have on the Democratic Party of Japan.
Well, we’re well over time again this week. Thanks again for tuning in, and for listening to the end. As always, continue to send your comments and suggestions to me via e-mail at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. And visit the Japan Considered Project website for transcripts of this and earlier programs, as well as other Japan domestic politics and international resources.
So, with no time for bluegrass today, goodbye all. Until next week.
