November 10, 2006; Volume 02, Number 40
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Introduction |
| Is Japan Going to Develop Nuclear Weapons? |
| Japan’s Reaction to the U.S. Midterm Elections |
| Koizumi’s “Town Meetings” Rigged With Planted Questions |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning from sunny and cool Spring Valley, in the Midlands of South Carolina. Today is Friday, November 10th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 40, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for joining me again today for another edition of the Japan Considered Podcast. It’s already mid-November, 2006. Almost a year since the beginning of the program. Hardly seems possible! We’ll have to talk more about that next week, on our Official First Anniversary. No program last Friday. Just too much going on here.
You may notice a slight difference in the sound this week. Hopefully, it’s an improvement. I assembled a new computer to record and edit the audio files. It seems to be working well. No smoke rising from the case, anyway. Or sparks. Computer technology is a constant race between improvements in software and hardware, I guess. More sophisticated software programs require machines with greater horsepower. This Adobe Audition 2.0 is a wonderful program. But it sure likes hardware resources.
Oh, I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project. And creator and host of this Podcast. Each week on this program we select a few recent events from the news and consider just what they tell us about how Japan manages its domestic politics and international relations. With all of the change Japan’s recently experienced in those two areas, it keeps us busy. Hard to keep up.
E-mail has been quite heavy for the couple of weeks. Much of it in response to the profile of Prime Minister Abe’s public relations adviser, Hiroshige Sekou. Several of you asked about the spelling of his name. Apparently after reading the program transcript on the Japan Considered website. I’ve been using s-e-k-o-u, rather than s-e-k-o. But, truth be told, I don’t know which Mr. Sekou himself uses in English. The additional “u” at the end of the name indicates that the “ko” is a long, rather than a short sound. That’s all. So, until we find out which one Mr. Sekou himself prefers, I’ll go with the long K-O-U in the program transcripts.
This week, we’ll consider briefly Japan’s reaction to the U.S. midterm elections, and the significance of eruption earlier this week of a scandal concerning the Town Meetings that former Prime Minister Koizumi inaugurated in 2001 to improve communications between Japan’s public and the government. If we have time, we’ll at least begin the profile of Prime Minister Abe’s new special adviser on international relations, Yuriko Koike.
Is Japan Going to Develop Nuclear Weapons?
First, though, we’d hoped during the last program to consider the debate that erupted in the wake of North Korea’s recent nuclear weapons test over whether Japan should discuss its nuclear weapons policies. Or, discuss nuclear weapons at all. The week before, Gregg Rubinstein joined us via SkypePhone to offer his thoughts on what actually happened in North Korea, and what those events would mean for Japan. Gregg concluded that as long as the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence posture still functions, Japan really has no need to develop nuclear weapons of its own. “Very little gain and probably a lot of downside,” was how he put it.
In December 1967, as part of the effort to regain control over Okinawa from the United States, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced that Japan would abide by three non-nuclear principles. They were that Japan would neither manufacture nuclear weapons, nor possess them. And that they would forbid introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory. These three principles were adopted, first by Cabinet Order, and then in 1971 as a Diet resolution, with the understanding that Japan’s ultimate national security would be guaranteed by the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence that Gregg Rubinstein mentioned in his comments.
Gregg’s assessment makes sense. Most everyone who know anything about the issue, both in Japan and abroad, agrees with him. Few informed observers believe there’s any possibility that Japan actually will announce plans to develop its own nuclear weapons. Given that situation – and the broad recognition of that situation – why then are Japanese government leaders now being asked repeatedly if they intend to make Japan a nuclear weapons state?
To understand the current nuclear arms “discussion discussion,” and what it means for Japan’s foreign relations, we have to begin by sorting out the participants in the current fracas, and by assessing their motives and objectives. There seem to be several types of participants.
First, there are, and always have been, individuals in Japan who believe that Japan not only has the right to possess nuclear weapons, but that Japan should possess them, and deploy them defensively. They believe Japan would be more secure as a credible member of the world’s exclusive nuclear club than it is as a principled nuclear club outsider that relies on the United States and the United Nations for its ultimate national security. They oppose both the letter and the spirit of Eisaku Sato’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles. And have, since he announced them. This group is very small and has little or no influence on government policy, or behavior. They get a lot of media attention, though. Well beyond what their numbers and political influence would justify. For reasons we’ll suggest below.
Second, there are those who believe that it’s now time for Japan to have a public discussion of the issue of nuclear weaponry. Members of this group are not proposing that Japan begin to develop its own nuclear weapons. Instead, they argue that Japan’s international environment has changed. Most recently, North Korea has joined Mainland China in possessing nuclear weapons. North Korea’s government is unpredictable, to say the least. And appears to be unstable. Hardly the ideal nuclear weapons trustee. The United States too has changed, these promoters of nuclear discussion argue. Both in terms of motivation, and in terms of military capabilities and deployment. The global environment is more complex than it was during the bipolar tensions that characterized the Cold War. So, given Japan’s heavy reliance on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent, the issue at least requires discussion. Some members of this group also believe Japanese public discussion of nuclear weaponry will “send a message” to North Korea, and even to Mainland China, about Japan’s military potential. Making it less likely that those two states, and perhaps others, will attempt to blackmail Japan with nuclear weapons in the future.
A third group, well organized, with long experience, and quite vocal, opposes Japan’s involvement with nuclear weapons in any form. And further opposes even public discussion of nuclear weaponry issues. Out of fear, perhaps, that such discussion will open the door a crack to eventual adoption of nuclear weapons for Japan. As with those supporting discussion of nuclear weaponry, this anti-discussion group includes a sub-category of traditional internationalists concerned with foreign perceptions of Japan. They fear that public discussion of nuclear weaponry in Japan will damage Japan’s international reputation as a pacifist nation. A reputation they consider essential for Japan’s overall diplomacy, and even national security.
In addition to the above three types of participants in the nuclear weapons “discussion discussion,” we must add one more category. Some of its membership overlaps those of the first three. Not a mutually exclusive category, in other words. The members of this group are more focused on immediate political expediency. They participate in the nuclear weapons “discussion discussion” primarily to discredit the incumbent conservative Abe Premiership. They hope by continuing to raise the question of nuclear weapons to plant doubts in the minds of the attentive public about the Administration’s real intentions in foreign relations. To some extent, this nuclear weapons issue seems to have replaced the Yasukuni Shrine visit theme we heard so often during most of the Koizumi premiership.
Sooo, what are we to make of all this? Most important, I believe, at least for international observers, is to maintain our perspective and good judgment. And not be carried away or misled by partisan political posturing in Japan. As Gregg Rubinstein summarized for us on this program week before last, there’s really no chance of Japan actually developing its own nuclear weapons capability, as long as the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence remains credible. And Washington recently has made high-level efforts to confirm that commitment. Given Japan’s current domestic political configuration, it’s likely we will continue to hear more of this nuclear weapons “discussion discussion” from Japan. But, like the Yasukuni Shrine visit theme of some months past, we should recognize it for what it is.
It will be interesting to see how Hiroshige Sekou and other Kantei staff members responsible for public relations will try to handle this issue. They have a real challenge. Senior figures in the Cabinet and Party have insisted that Japan should at least discuss nuclear weapons issues. Those in the second category of participant I mentioned a moment ago. They include Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Shoichi Nakagawa, Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council. Both have political clout adequate to make it near impossible just to “shush” them into silence, even if the Kantei wished to do so. Prime Minister Abe, during Diet debate day before yesterday with DPJ Chairman Ichiro Ozawa, said that his government continues to support the three non-nuclear principles described a moment ago. But he added that he would not stifle discussion of the issue, and defended the right of Aso and Nakagawa to express their opinions. We’re bound to hear more about this in the future.
Japan’s Reaction to the U.S. Midterm Elections
It appears that Tuesday’s U.S. midterm elections were watched from Japan almost as closely as they were from around the United States! Japan’s political press since Tuesday has been full of reporting and analysis of the “thumpin’” the Republicans received at the hands of the American voters. Naturally, most of the coverage has been on the effect – or lack of effect – the election results will have on Japan, and the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Predictably too, the U.S. election results have become entangled in Japan’s national political rhetoric. Anti-Abe forces opine that the shift to Democratic control of the Senate and House will adversely affect Abe’s foreign policy direction. And advise him to change direction immediately, in anticipation. Official Abe Cabinet spokesmen and pro-Abe commentators, on the other hand, insist that nothing has changed. They both exaggerate wildly, of course, in pursuit of political advantage. Take servings from both sides with at least one grain of salt.
Japan’s detailed reporting on the U.S. election results – far more comprehensive than that available in the regional U.S. press – illustrates the significance of the U.S. security guarantee for Japan. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation has been covered in remarkable detail, for example, in Tokyo’s press. And you can learn more than you ever wanted to know about former CIA Director, Robert Gates, who’s been nominated to replace him, just by reading Japan’s newspaper columns.
Will U.S. Iraq policy change? Yes, almost certainly. And how will those changes affect Japan, arguably the staunchest international supporter of the Bush Administration’s activities there? What about U.S. relations with Mainland China? Older Japanese observers must recall Washington during the 1970s springing an unsettling surprise on Tokyo concerning relations with China. Not to mention the problem of North Korea. Democrats and Republicans have differed in the past on how best to cope with the Pyongyang regime. Will this election result in a change in Washington’s posture there? A change that could affect Japan quite immediately? Of course, it’s too early to tell. But that doesn’t stop commentators for speculating, or from commenting.
U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Thomas Schieffer, made a point yesterday to assure Japan through media interviews that the U.S. midterm election results would not affect U.S. relations with Japan. He mentioned the security treaty, and assured his interviewers that the U.S. would continue to honor it. He also said that Pentagon plans to realign American military forces in Japan, and to deploy a more capable missile defense system, would continue even after Secretary Rumsfeld’s departure. Schieffer is known in Japan to be a close friend of President Bush, which undoubtedly gave his assurances more weight. We can only hope that official U.S. representatives will continue to assure Japan of this continuity, and of the importance of the relationship to Washington.
One positive note related to the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. Or, what I think is positive, anyway. That is the little public attention that’s been given to the fact that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has yet to visit the United States, or to meet U.S. President Bush since his election as prime minister. There may be other ways to interpret this. But to me, this is evidence of significant progress in the bilateral relationship. For as long as I can remember, it’s been customary for incoming Japanese prime ministers to visit Washington for greetings and consultation soon after their election. Evidence of a strong personal relationship with the U.S. president was essential for any Japanese prime minister. To the point that much was made in the Japanese press of some Japanese prime ministers and U.S. presidents calling each other by their first names! Incredible, when you think about it. Japanese opponents of the U.S.-Japan security relationship were even heard in the past to compare this practice to Imperial China’s tribute system.
Well, Shinzo Abe decided long before his election as prime minister to make his first trip abroad to Mainland China and South Korea. Indeed, he’s yet to visit Washington. And he’s scheduled to hold his first meeting with President Bush on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Hanoi. Over lunch on November 18th. Virtually no mention of the delayed meeting in Japan’s press. No suggestion that Prime Minister Abe will have difficulty getting along with President Bush. Just matter-of-fact reporting. At least, so far. And that, to me, is a good thing.
Koizumi’s “Town Meetings” Rigged With Planted Questions
We’ve paid special attention to the growing importance of public support for Japan’s prime ministers and cabinets on this program since the beginning. The shift we’ve observed from “factionist” to “non-factionist,” or “populist,” premierships has been an important aspect of that change. I’ve described this as a positive development in national-level politics in Japan. And still think it is. Broadening effective participation within the LDP, and reducing the influence of LDP factions and faction leaders, is a positive development, all else constant. Or, so it seems to me.
But central political executive reliance on public approval inevitably results in greater efforts to influence – or even manipulate – public approval of Kantei policies and actions. Or more immediately, perceptions of that public approval. Clearly, the Abe Administration, and the Koizumi Administration, before it, recognized the potential of public approval of the Central Political Executive, and have done their best to take advantage of it. Appointment of LDP political public relations and technology whiz kid, Hiroshige Sekou, to advise Prime Minister Abe on public relations, provides evidence of exactly that.
“Public relations efforts,” however, “called public relations, are public relations failed.” I used to keep a small sign that said just that on my desk in Washington, back when I was in the business. That is, while efforts to influence public opinions and public approval are inevitable, discovery of such efforts results in disastrous consequences. Practitioners must always consider the flap potential of their efforts, if discovered. Japan’s Kantei is in the midst of such a PR disaster at the moment.
Last month, a local branch of the national teachers union received information that Japan’s Cabinet Office had coached questioners at Town Meetings held in September to discuss revision of Japan’s basic education law. Union officials held a press conference in Aomori Prefecture to announce their discovery. Perhaps because Japan’s Left-leaning teachers union is a well-known opponent of basic education law revision – especially the inclusion of patriotism education requirements – there was little immediate reaction to their revelation.
Before long, however, news of the Kantei’s efforts to manipulate the Town Meetings began to receive more attention. Kantei spokesmen on Tuesday, the 7th, admitted the planting of questions at meetings in September, and apologized for their actions. They also reported it to the Lower House special committee established to oversee revision of the basic education law. Fingers then naturally pointed in every direction. Who was responsible? Overzealous local officials? The Ministry of Education? The Kantei? The Chief Cabinet Secretary? (Who, at the time, happened to be incumbent prime minister, Shinzo Abe!) Or the system itself?
By today, justifiable criticism of the effort to manipulate public opinion of a key aspect of the Abe Administration’s policy agenda spread throughout Japan’s political press. Editorials in all papers condemned the Kantei’s actions and demanded a thorough investigation. How many questioners at the Town Meetings were actually government plants? Who approved their performance? How long has this been going on? And so on. This issue seems likely to affect the government’s efforts to pass a revision of the basic education law during this Diet session, as planned. Which, of course, was precisely the objective of those who disclosed the information in the first place.
Well, so what? You may reasonable ask. Everyone knows governments try to put the best light on their policies and actions, including public relations efforts that sometimes border on the ‘unethical.” Not really important. Ten years ago, or even five years ago I might have agreed. But not now. Not when the effectiveness of the Central Political Executive depends so significantly on public approval.
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi established the “Town Meeting” system soon after he assumed office in 2001. The objective of the meetings, as he described it, was to improve communication between the government and the public. During his Administration over 170 such meetings were held, often with significant press coverage. The effort was well received. Yesterday, the Kantei estimated that at least 68,000 people had attended these Town Meetings. And that each cost an average of over 10 million yen. No small undertaking. Town Meetings became symbolic of the Kantei’s effort to listen to what the public had to say about important policy issues. So, evidence that the Kantei had been rigging the process is bound to complicate their relationship with the public.
Yesterday Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihisa Shiozaki announced suspension of the Town Meetings, and promised a thorough investigation of question planting. This is only the beginning. We’re likely to hear more about this issue when Diet deliberations over the revision of the basic education law resume next week. Shiozaki and Hiroshige Sekou have their work cut out for them.
Well, that’s all we have time for this week. Thanks again for tuning in. I hope all of you will be back next week for our First Anniversary Broadcast. In the meantime, continue to send your comments and suggestions for the program to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all, and consider each one when preparing subsequent programs. And, while you’re at it, have a look through the Japan Considered Project website at www.JapanConsidered.org. Lots of additional information there on Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. All for just the “clicking.”
Last week I mentioned that North Carolina’s Wind Riders would soon have their first CD available for purchase. Well, they’ve gone ‘n done it, as we’d say OverHome. I placed my order on-line last week and received the CD in two days. They seem to have focused their time on creation of the music rather than on CD title creation. Since it’s just called “The Wind Riders.” But the music is terrific. Eleven great vocal and instrumental cuts. You can order one for yourself at a site called “CD Baby.” Darndest name I ever heard. But my son tells me everybody else in the world already knows about it, and orders CDs from there. Just type http://cdbaby.com/cd/windriders into your browser window and you’ll see their ad.
Here’s a short clip from track 8 of that album, an old Flat & Scruggs tune, “Gonna Settle Down.” Enjoy!
[bluegrass clip]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
