October 27, 2006; Volume 02, Number 39
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning from the cool, cloudy, even a little rainy campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, October 27th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 39, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Back to fall weather here in the Midlands of South Carolina. And even a little rain to boot! Not everyone’s first choice for weather. Or even second choice! Thanks for joining me today, though. Each week on this program we discuss the longer-term significance of recent events in the news for Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. We don’t pretend to have a comprehensive news show here. This isn’t where you should look to find out “what just happened” in Japan. Rather, it’s where you can find out if “what just happened” actually matters, and if so, how it matters. Or, at least, one interpretation of that.
Lots of e-mail response to last week’s program. Thanks to all who took the time to write with your suggestions and opinions. I read them all, and each is appreciated. Continue to send them to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. Quite a few of last week’s e-mailed comments were about the profile of Prime Minister Abe’s new chief cabinet secretary, Yoshihisa Shiozaki. And about the description of changes in the role of Japan’s chief cabinet secretaryship over the past half-decade, or so. One long-time listener even wrote to suggest I include a personal profile of a prominent Japanese political figure in each program. I’m not sure I can keep that commitment. But this week I’ll follow the profile of Shiozaki with one of Hiroshige Sekou, one of the five prime ministerial advisers Shinzo Abe brought into the Kantei. Sekou is responsible for the Kantei’s “public relations.” Whatever that means.
Following the brief look at Sekou’s role in the Abe Kantei, we’ll follow up Gregg Rubenstein’s excellent commentary on the significance of the North Korean nuclear test provocation with consideration of the eruption of concern abroad, and even in Japan, about the possibility of Japan “going nuclear.” Where did all of this come from, and what does it really mean?
The Kanagawa and Osaka By-Elections
Before all that, though, let’s turn to consideration of the two Lower House by-elections held last Sunday in Kanagawa and Osaka. And see what they have to tell us about the current state of domestic politics in Japan.
[audio clip]
Those were short clips from the standard stump speeches of the LDP and DPJ candidates in the Osaka 9th District race. The first voice was that of Kenji Harada, the LDP candidate. And the second was Nobumori Otani, the DPJ candidate. More on each of them in a moment.
I’d hoped last week to provide you with all of the necessary background for the race. Which was scheduled for last Sunday. Then all we’d need to cover this week would be who won, and why. That didn’t work out, though. Japanese political news reporting on the two races pretty much dried up once it became likely that the LDP would take both seats. So, naturally, since it was no longer as much of a real horse race, Japan’s political journalists turned their attention to more pressing matters. Intensive coverage of local races is hard anyway. At the best of times. Since it’s necessary to leave the comforts of Tokyo for the provinces …. Well … that may be a little harsh … Especially since one of the “provinces” in this case was in Osaka!
As expected, the LDP retained both seats. This was hardly a surprise in Kanagawa’s 16th District. It’s been an LDP stronghold for some time. And the eldest son of the incumbent was running to replace his recently deceased father. The 35-year-old Zentaro Kamei ran an effective campaign and won around 109,500 votes. His main opponent, former METI bureaucrat, Yuichi Goto, also did his best for the DPJ. But he was able to attract only around 80,500 votes. Leaving fewer than 10,000 votes for a Communist Party candidate. This was a very comfortable win for Kamei, in a single-seat district. Nearly 55%. But it was hardly unexpected. The DPJ put up a brave front. It would have been news indeed had Goto been able to wrestle the seat from LDP hands for the DPJ. As with most by-elections, voter turnout was relatively low, well under 50%, which was described as contributing to the LDP victory.
The Osaka 9th District race was the real focus of attention for Japan’s political journalists. And rightfully so. It’s a heavily urban district that has the potential, at least, of throwing up a fairly large percentage of undecided, or floating, voters. Voters most easily persuaded to go to the polls out of dissatisfaction with the ruling LDP. Also, the DPJ had a good record of performance in Osaka’s 9th District. In fact, their candidate in Sunday’s by-election held the seat until the LDP blowout in the September 11th, 2005 General Election.
Nobumori Otani, at 43, was a young, attractive candidate, well established in the constituency. As a former Diet Member, he arrived with high name recognition. And no stains on his record. None reported, at least. And we can be pretty sure such stains would be reported, were they known! Japanese national electoral politics is not that much different from American politics. In that regard, anyway. “Gotcha Politics” is played differently in Japan than it is in the United States. But it certainly is played. And skillfully.
Otani appeared to run a good campaign. But he ended up attracting only about 92,500 votes for the DPJ. His LDP opponent, Kenji Harada, beat him decisively with just over 111,000 votes. This was just over 50% of the total votes cast, since the Communist candidate in this election received nearly 18,000 votes. And not as impressive vote percentage-wise as Kamei’s win in Kanagawa. But still, for Osaka’s 9th District, an impressive win for an LDP candidate.
Kenji Harada too was relatively well known in the district. He had served ably as a Member of the Osaka Prefectural Assembly prior to his run for the Lower House seat. At 58 years old, he was no longer able to describe himself as a “youthful” candidate. But, as I hope the voice clip I played a moment ago suggests, he was a vigorous and effective campaigner who was no stranger to the political stump.
Since the election, much has been made in the Japanese political press of the low level of voter turn-out in both races. Just over 47 percent in Kanagawa, and just over 52 percent in Osaka. Realistically, though, hardly more could be expected from either district for a by-election.
According to the exit polls conducted by major news media organizations in both districts, the real decline in voter participation was found in the undecided, or unaffiliated, voters. That is, voters who decline to identify themselves with any particular party. What used to be called the “floating” voter. Exit poll results may be even less reliable in Japan than in the United States – if possible. But all of those I could find reported around 15 percent for Kanagawa and less than 20 percent for Osaka. Far below the usual levels of unaffiliated voter totals.
This failure of the unaffiliated voters to go to the polls was thought to benefit the better-organized LDP candidates and to hurt the DPJ in both races. Which undoubtedly is true. But it also indicates the absence of the sort of public dissatisfaction with the new Abe Cabinet that might be expected to bring out “protest” votes against an LDP candidate.
Significance of the Two By-Election Outcomes
So, what can we take away from the outcomes of these two races? Perhaps first, we have credible evidence of a lack of popular dissatisfaction with the new Abe Cabinet’s general direction. At least in these two characteristic electoral districts. Or, at least, not enough popular dissatisfaction to stimulate potential swing, unaffiliated voters to turn out in numbers large enough to swamp the LDP’s candidates. Most general public opinion polls confirm that conclusion as well.
Second, as nearly all of Japan’s political press has suggested, the failure to win at least the Osaka seat back for the DPJ creates even more serious problems for DPJ president, Ichiro Ozawa. Ozawa was placed in the DPJ presidency – I still doubt that he really wanted the job, were he given a choice – with the expectation that he would be able to apply his long experience as a political maneuverer to the winning of elections. He has heightened those expectations himself by insisting that all of his efforts will be applied to the winning of elections. That he is willing to cooperate with anyone, regardless of their ideology or political stands, as long as they will join him in his fight to unseat the LDP. No serious observer believes that Ozawa was selected as the DPJ’s president for his personal charm or public appeal. He just doesn’t have a lot of that. Or, at best, he’s very much an acquired taste.
Well … the DPJ’s disappointing loss in Osaka’s 9th District – a district that many observers thought the DPJ had a good chance of winning – is bound to provide Ozawa’s critics within the DPJ with ammunition to use against him. Both openly, or more likely, covertly. And, more important, against the approach to Party management that he has imposed since his selection. Why, those critics are bound to ask, was the Party unable to mobilize more of the unaffiliated vote in the Osaka race? Is, as one non-political Japanese observer commented to me a few days ago, Ozawa simply a man of the past? Ill-equipped to compete in the current rapidly changing Japanese electoral environment?
I think it would be foolish to count Ozawa out on the basis of these two elections. Or, more accurately, the result of the Osaka 9th race. He’s an incredibly talented political operative. But there must be some members of the DPJ who are giving serious thought to the future of their Party. How it should present itself to Japan’s attentive public. How it should compete with an LDP energized by a young and obviously popular prime minister who seems to understand the importance of public relations in today’s politics?
Until their bungling of the Nagata bogus e-mail disaster earlier this year, the DPJ seemed to be on a somewhat different path, under younger, more appealing leadership. Granted, Seiji Maehara’s presidency didn’t really last long enough to tell. But it was different. Are there other Maeharas waiting just behind the curtain in the DPJ? Professor Len Schoppa mentioned a number of younger DPJ leaders during his recent comments on this program. Party Members who began their Diet careers as DPJ Members, rather than as transplants. Perhaps we’ll see one of them take the DPJ stage with different ideas. Different approaches to competition with the LDP. It certainly would be refreshing. And, as I’ve insisted before on this program, in the long-run, good for the LDP as well.
One other point should be mentioned before we leave consideration of these two by-elections. That is the role of the New Komeito in both races. The New Komeito rivals the Japan Communist Party in the effectiveness of its Party discipline. The cell-like neighborhood organization of Soka Gakkai, the primary source of New Komeito votes, gives New Komeito promises of electoral support high reliability. And New Komeito came through – perhaps decisively – in these two by-elections.
With 295 seats in the Lower House, the LDP might be forgiven for treating its ruling coalition junior partner with condescension. There seems less likelihood of that now, however, after Sunday’s votes. New Komeito leadership can boast of significant contribution to the ruling coalition’s position. And, more important, insist that its views on key policy issues be given greater consideration by the LDP. Especially given the 2007 Upper House election looming in the near future. This surely will serve as a check on the possibility of a “run-away LDP” that has been raised by some of Japan’s political media, given that Party’s remarkable success with Japan’s voters and attentive public. We’ll have to look more carefully at the New Komeito Party in the near future on this program.
Prime Minister Abe’s New Public Relations Adviser, Hiroshige Sekou
Last week’s discussion of Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihisa Shiozaki’s background, and the evolving functions of his office, seems to have been well received. Judging by the number of e-mailed messages I received concerning just that segment of the program. So, today I’ll continue to consider key Abe Kantei personnel with a look at Prime Minister Abe’s new public relations adviser, Hiroshige Sekou.
Sekou is one of the five prime ministerial advisers we’ve discussed on the past few programs. Like the other special advisers, his duties seem to be only vaguely defined. Or, at least, if they are specifically defined, we have yet to hear the definition. According to Kantei statements at the time of his appointment, Abe expects Sekou to advise him and the rest of the Kantei staff on dissemination of information from the Kantei to the general public. PR, in other words. Though, judging from Sekou’s background and experience in the LDP, I suspect that his activities will expand somewhat beyond that as time goes on. More about Sekou’s position and its significance in a moment. But first, some personal background.
Hiroshige Sekou’s Background and Training for Kantei Service
Upon graduating from Waseda University, Sekou joined NTT, where he worked in public affairs. He must have shown aptitude for the work. NTT sent him to Boston University for a couple of years where he earned a graduate degree in corporate public relations. He was made chief of NTT’s public affairs section upon his return, and worked there until his first run for public office in 1998. He stood at the age of 36 for the Upper House from Wakayama in a by-election called upon the death of his uncle, Masataka Sekou. He’s been re-elected from there since.
Not long after his arrival in the Upper House, Sekou made a name for himself as a prominent member of the Young Turks within the Mori Faction. Supporting the LDP presidential candidacy of Junichiro Koizumi, together with others such as Yasuhisa Shiozaki and Shinzo Abe, for example. And urging the Party to modernize itself by making better use of the new communications technologies emerging in Japan at the time. This includes the internet and web-based communications in campaigning and dissemination of their messages to the attentive Japanese public.
Working with LDP Upper House Firebrand and tireless self-promoter, Ichita Yamamoto, for example, Sekou helped create the LDP’s first mock Virtual Party presidential election. Campaigning and voting took place exclusively via Internet technology. Candidates all were young LDP members, such as Tokyo Mayor Shintaro Ishihara’s son, Nobuteru, Lower House Speaker Yohei Kono’s son, Taro, Yasuhisa Shiozaki, Prime Minister Abe’s current Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Shinzo Abe himself. Shiozaki, by the way, was the winner! A victory he may rather forget just at the moment. The Virtual Party presidential election promoters hoped the publicity surrounding their effort would encourage the LDP and LDP members to adapt new communications technology in their campaigns and other interaction with Japan’s potential voters.
Sekou also was an early and strong supporter of the “I-Mode political donation system.” Hiroshi Kumagai is said to be the first Diet Member to establish a system that allowed him to receive political donations via credit card. That was in August of 2000. Then in 2001, Sekou and others used the credit-card payment system in their campaign to promote Junichiro Koizumi’s bid for the LDP presidency. This they did in part to make use of new technologies. But also in response to public denunciation of repeated scandals over illegal political donations from big donors. An old story in Japanese politics. And one the LDP has found particularly troublesome. The “I-Mode” initiative was successful in both respects. Press reports at the time said Koizumi’s LDP presidency campaign quickly earned 1.2 million yen this way, and that the total had been contributed by 250 donors. Not a huge amount. But the effort showed that Koizumi, Sekou, and other LDP “young leaders” were trying to find ways around relying on big donors for their political funds.
That same year, Sekou was responsible for devising and implementing what he called the “IT Club.” This was an internet-based system through which regular e-mails were sent to potential voters. Membership was by subscription. It’s unlikely that published numbers were very accurate. But the effort clearly illustrates Sekou’s interest in applying up-to-date communications technology to political purposes. As reward, perhaps, the LDP leadership made Sekou head of its new Multimedia Department in 2001, and charged him with developing an overall Internet strategy for the Party.
Sekou’s reputation as a political communications technology and public relations whiz kid grew rapidly within the LDP. And in late 2004 he was involved in the LDP’s decision to retain a professional public relations firm, PRAP, as it turned out, to advise them on campaigning and political communications. The LDP wasn’t the first of Japan’s political parties to retain professional public relations counsel. The DPJ had done so the year before, hiring the Tokyo office of the American firm, Fleishman-Hilliard. Sekou and the LDP at the time made a big fuss about their decision to retain a Japanese firm, rather than a foreign firm, an obvious swipe at the DPJ.
Sekou’s public relations and new media talents were put to good use by the LDP in the campaign preceding the September 11, 2005 election. Sekou himself held daily strategy meetings that brought together LDP staff responsible for public relations and representatives of the PRAP public relations firm mentioned a moment ago. He ordered that the drab press conference room in the LDP Headquarters building be remodeled, and that appropriate images be placed on the wall behind any LDP official speaking to televised press conferences. That way, Japan’s TV stations could not avoid televising the LDP’s campaign messages if they wanted to use press conference footage. Sekou’s success was recognized in the harsh criticism subsequently heaped on the LDP, and on Prime Minister Koizumi, for running a media-based campaign that lacked substance. Just image. Well, putting the substance question aside, that media-based campaign was largely the creation of Hiroshige Sekou. Sekou later described the September 2005 election as Japan’s first “internet election,” and concluded modern communications technology played an important part in the LDP’s astounding success.
So what? You may well ask. Why do we need to know all of this about a relatively obscure new official in the Prime Minister’s Office. Well, Sekou’s appointment, I think, tells us something important about how Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is likely to run the Kantei during his premiership.
First, Sekou clearly was selected as one of Abe’s five prime ministerial advisers for his personal expertise. In this case, public relations, and use of the new communications media for political purposes. Not for his personal connections in either the Japanese communications media world or the LDP. Sekou is a genuine political public relations expert. He could make a very good living at it, were he not in the Diet.
Second, and probably more important, Hiroshige Sekou’s appointment, and the vague mandate he’s received, suggests that Prime Minister Abe recognizes the importance of more effective communications between the government and Japan’s attentive public. This fits in nicely with my idea that Abe has become a non-Factionist prime minister for Japan. That Abe recognizes the importance of public, or popular, support for his premiership. And that he is determined to take steps to maintain that support.
Also, Sekou has worked closely with Prime Minister Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki for a long time. Sekou, I imagine, retains easy personal access to both officials when he needs their ear. As important, everyone in Japan’s government and even the media will recognize that Sekou has such access, giving him far more clout than he would have were he just an outsider professional PR gunslinger brought in to do the job.
So, Sekou is a force in the Kantei to be reckoned with. It’s almost certain that he will be resented bitterly by the prickly Kantei Press Corps. They already are upset with Prime Minister Abe’s decision to restrict informal questioning within the Kantei and a couple of other issues. Sekou will be suspected by working journalists of trying to manipulate their reporting of the news. Rightfully suspected! And that won’t increase his popularity at the Press Club bar.
Finally, some of Japan’s media have described Prime Minister Abe as shifting toward a more centrist position since assuming office, from the sharply conservative posture that characterized him in the past. Well, I’m a bit skeptical of that characterization. Surely Abe’s behavior since becoming prime minister is not as extreme right-wing as he was described by much of Japan’s political press during the competition to succeed Koizumi. But that image was created more to weaken his chances of selection than to describe him accurately to the public.
Abe, for better AND for worse, appears to me to remain committed to quite a conservative policy agenda for Japan. Both in key domestic political issues and in foreign relations. This conservative orientation will make him even less popular with much, if not most, of Japan’s political media. And most of Japan’s academics who serve as media commentators. And that means his chief public relations adviser, Hiroshige Sekou, will have his work cut out for him. How can modern communications media technology be mobilized to provide Japan’s attentive public with what the Kantei would consider a “fair” and accurate description of their policies and efforts to achieve those policies? That appears to be Sekou’s mandate. And the Abe Cabinet’s success or failure, as a decidedly non-Factionist central political executive, depends significantly on his effort.
Well, we’re out of time already. Way over time, in fact. Apologies for not being more disciplined about all this. That’s what you get when your trained as an academic rather than as a journalist! Advantages to both, I guess. But disadvantages as well. Comments on the real significance of recent speculation on Japan’s nuclear weapons capabilities will have to wait until next week.
Last week we didn’t have time for a concluding bluegrass clip. But I promised you something special for this week in compensation. Well, we don’t have time this week either! But to avoid the avalanche of protesting e-mail that two weeks’ absence would be sure to trigger, here’s something that’s indeed special. You may recall the North Carolina Wind Riders from earlier Japan Considered Podcasts. Well, they’re going strong! Named the best bluegrass band at the Foothills Showcase Bluegrass Band Competition back in May! Now, if it’s bluegrass, and it’s North Carolina, that’s Some competition! And, rumor has it, they’re about to release their first CD in the very near future. In the meantime, just give a listen to this!
[bluegrass]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
