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Good Morning from the beautiful campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, October 20th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 38, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for dropping in today. Welcome back to you regular listeners. And a hearty South Carolina Welcome to those of you who join us for the first time. I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project. And creator and host of this Podcast. Another beautiful day here in the South Carolina Midlands. Last week I spoke too soon about fall weather arriving in earnest. This morning before daylight it was just 70 degrees, with a slight breeze. Perfect for walking in the neighborhood. And we’re supposed to see at least 78 degrees this afternoon.
Each Friday we select a few items from the week’s news related to Japan, and consider what they may tell us about how Japan manages its domestic politics or international relations. Or, often both! This isn’t a comprehensive news program. Plenty of those available. You can check the Japan Considered Project website for a number of the better ones. Just point your browser at www.JapanConsidered.org, and have a look around.
Speaking of the Japan Considered website, quite a few regular listeners have written to say they find the Interviews section of the website one of its most useful features. So if you’re making your first visit, browse through the interviews section to learn more about Americans who have made significant contributions to the study of Japan in the United States. Those interviews are great fun to do. But they take some time to edit and publish. Right now, there are three in the pipeline, waiting for me to find the time. So, check back often to see what’s up.
Another busy week in political and international Japan. We have a lot to cover. Echoes of North Korea’s nuclear provocation continue to rumble throughout East Asia, inspiring mounds of commentary. Much of it generating at least as much heat as light. I have a short SkypePhone interview with Gregg Rubinstein in Washington, D.C., that should help us make sense of what we hear. I’ll complete this round of discussion of the new Kantei staff with more information about its second-most important official, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshihisa Shiozaki. And just quick mention of the Lower House by-elections scheduled for Sunday in Kanagawa and Osaka. All, if we have time!
Japan’s New Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshihisa Shiozaki
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has selected Lower House Member, Yoshihisa Shiozaki, as his chief cabinet secretary. Many observers were surprised by Shiozaki’s appointment. He is relatively young, for a Japanese politician – though we seem to be on our way to redefining “young” and “old” when discussing Japanese politicians. Shiozaki was an early and strong supporter of Shinzo Abe’s campaign for the LDP presidency and premiership. But he’s hasn’t been especially prominent within the LDP. And – how to phrase this – his name doesn’t often appear in lists of the LDP’s most skilled intra-party “diplomats.” So, why the appointment?
But before commenting further on Shiozaki himself, a couple of thoughts on changes in Japan’s chief cabinet secretaryship that may help to put his role in the Abe Cabinet into better perspective. And help to explain why Abe selected him for the job rather than one of the more experienced, more senior members of the Mori Faction, as many had expected. Several were available. And such an appointment would have been well understood. Indeed, praised, by most of Japan’s political press.
Since creation of Japan’s cabinet-style government in the late 19th century, there’s always been an official responsible for management of the cabinet’s immediately supporting administrative institutions. The position was called “Naikaku Shokikancho,” or Cabinet Chief Clerk, before the war. That unpretentious job title was elevated to the current “Chief Cabinet Secretary” by the Allied Occupation political reformers during the late 1940s. And in 1966 the position was further embellished with cabinet ministerial status. All reflecting its increasingly important role in Japan’s national government. Masaharu Gotoda, I believe it was, described the job as becoming “the prime minister’s political wife,” to illustrate how close the two had to be to make it work.
During the heyday of the “1955 System,” and of Japan’s “balancing” central political executives we discussed last week, the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s most important function was that of intermediary between the incumbent prime minister and the leaders of the LDP’s important factions. A skilled intra-party diplomat was required to identify the critical interests represented within the Party, and to anticipate any dissatisfaction their parliamentary champions might be feeling. The tenure of balancing, factionist prime ministers depended upon keeping as many of those folks happy as possible, all at the same time.
The intra-party communications function undoubtedly remains important for chief cabinet secretaries. But as we’ve often discussed on this program, since Koizumi, at least, Japan’s prime ministers have shifted away from near-exclusive reliance on the approval of LDP faction leaders to achieve and maintain their positions. Now, broader – even public – approval of the “political leadership” they provide Japan has increased in importance as a source of support.
Japan, of course, remains a parliamentary system. A system in which prime ministers are elected by majority vote of the members of the Diet. But, few Diet members can afford to ignore public opinion completely, lest they risk alienating their own bases of support. They too are elected, after all. Especially those Members elected from the new single-member districts. No sensible Diet member wants to stand for election as the candidate of a Party headed by an unpopular Party leader. And no incumbent Diet member, whether single-member district or proportional Party list, wishes to have their Party face a general election with an unpopular leader.
Soooo, Japanese prime ministers today require their chief cabinet secretaries – their “political wives” – to assume broader responsibilities. These include more effective interface with the Kantei Press Corps. And direct oversight of the formulation and implementation of politically sensitive policies. These new expectations have stretched already-busy chief cabinet secretaries to the breaking point. A job description beyond the capability of any single individual. No matter how capable. And it may explain why Prime Minister Abe suggested during his campaign for the LDP presidency that he would bring another official into the Kantei to handle relations with the communications media. In order to free the chief cabinet secretary he would select for these additional duties. Apparently, that person is Hiroshige Sekou, his special adviser for public relations. But we need more information about Sekou and the role he will play.
It’s no exaggeration to describe Japan’s chief cabinet secretary today as second only to the prime minister himself in importance in Japan’s government. During he Koizumi Administration we had the opportunity to observe how both Yasuo Fukuda and Shinzo Abe handled the office. Now, we’ll see how Prime Minister Abe chooses to use his chief cabinet secretary, and how incumbent Yoshihisa Shiozaki performs in the job.
Chief Cabinet Secretary: Yasuhisa Shiozaki
Shiozaki came to the Kantei with impressive credentials. Like many of his LDP colleagues, his father represented his constituency before him, serving eventually as director-general of the Economic Planning Agency. Shiozaki replaced his father in 1993. Though he had to serve one term in the Upper House, beginning in 1995, before he returned to the Lower House in 2000. He’s been re-elected there since.
Since his 1993 arrival in the Diet, Shiozaki has been recognized for his interest in policy Perhaps, as opposed to politics, as it’s been traditionally practiced in the LDP. His decade of service at the Bank of Japan, after graduation from Tokyo University, gave him instant credibility in the field of economic policy. And he capitalized on that credibility from the very beginning. The distinguished Asahi Shimbun correspondent, Yoichi Funabashi, led off a 1998 column on Japan’s “new breed of politicians” with description of Shiozaki as a “policymaker.” Funabashi then described how Shiozaki had publicly criticized an LDP bill intended to reform Japan’s banking system. His own Party’s Bill! And this when he was a very junior member of that Party.
During his Central Bank service, Shiozaki was given time off to earn a masters degree in public administration from Harvard University. He’s said to be comfortable speaking English with foreign reporters and government representatives. But such a level of English language facility these days is no longer enough to make an aspiring Japanese politician stand out.
A glance at Shiozaki’s personal website suggests that he recognizes this. There are only a few pages presented in English. A short bio, and English texts of a dozen or so speeches. The Japanese pages of the website, however, are genuinely impressive. One of the best I’ve come across for any Japanese public figure. Impressive both in terms of the web technology used to create the site. And in terms of the type of content presented. I’ll put a link in the show notes, and in the transcript of this program, to the site. [Click here to visit Shiozaki's personal website.] Those of you able to read Japanese should find it interesting. And even if you can’t read the text, the structure and layout should give you an idea of the amount of effort that’s gone into the project, and the direction it takes.
Most conspicuous throughout the site is its emphasis on government policies and government reforms. Dozens of comments and proposals. Clearly, Shiozaki is what in Washington would be called a “policy wonk.” This, and his long-standing support of LDP reform, must have been what determined Prime Minister Abe to choose him as his chief cabinet secretary. Rather than a more traditional selection, such as the new leader of the Mori Faction, and former foreign minister, Nobutaka Machimura. It will be interesting to watch how Shiozaki performs in office. Including his relationship with what must be an increasingly cranky Kantei press corps. As noted a moment ago, he’s not known as the most diplomatic of Japan’s public servants. We’ll return to Shiozaki, I’m sure, in subsequent programs.
The Two Lower House By-Elections
Discussion of the two Lower House by-election races on Sunday will have to wait until next week. For some time Japan’s political press was describing the races as the first electoral tests of the new Abe administration. The opportunity for the Abe-led LDP to go head-to-head with the Ichiro Ozawa-led Democratic Party of Japan. With the suggestion that LDP losses in both, or even either, of the races would damage Abe’s premiership.
Well, since then there has been very little coverage of either race. Little beyond the names of the candidates, and their prospects victory. That probably means that internal polling indicates that the LDP candidates will win both races. In that case, the by-elections won’t be seen as an important test for the new Abe Administration at all. That’s almost certain. But, should the LDP win both races, it will be interesting to see if the losses will be described as significant for Ichiro Ozawa’s presidency of the DPJ. Tune in next week! Sorry I can’t provide more detail today.
Japan’s Continued Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Provocation
Repercussions of North Korea’s recent nuclear test provocation continue to rumble throughout East Asia, and around the world. So, earlier this week I began to collect notes in preparation for a follow-up discussion on today’s program. Soon I realized, though, that I don’t know much more about the substance of the issues than most of the journalistic commentators. So, why not consult with someone who does.
That brought me to Mr. Gregg Rubinstein in Washington, D.C.. Gregg is an old friend, since long-ago Columbia University graduate school days, in fact. He spent twelve years in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense working on U.S.-Japan security relations. Much of that time in Japan. He now directs his own successful consultancy, GAR Associates, in Washington, D.C. And, most important for us today, he actually knows one end of a missile from another. He was kind enough to join us through a SkypePhone interview day before yesterday from his office in Washington.
RCA: Gregg, I wonder today if you could describe what actually happened in North Korea to create all of this fuss.
GR: Well, I think you have to go back at least four years, to October 2002, when the U.S., in effect, exposed North Korea’s continued program on uranium enrichment, which in letter and substance violated the Framework Agreement on nuclear weapons development that had been signed in 1994, during the Carter Administration. Following this exposure, the U.S. broke off work under that framework program – supplying North Korea with light water reactors. North Korea, in turn, disassociated itself from the Framework, as well as withdrew from the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
All of these things basically set the clock running, from that point to what happened this October 9th. The march of this , to me, has been inexorable. One can almost hear the Greek chorus in the background, wailing out all the measures. I say it’s inevitable given the posture of each of the major actors. North Korea’s reliance on intransigent posturing. Brinksmanship diplomacy, I suppose. Which it’s used very successfully. The attitudes of some regional neighbors, especially China and South Korea, not to impose any sanctions that would significantly damage the North. The U.S. refusal to talk directly to North Korea. And, the lowest-common-denominator solution: the whole so far totally ineffectual Six-Power Talks. There was really nothing that was going to stop North Korea from going the way it has.
RCA: So you see this as the culmination of a long process.
GR: Very much so. And, of course, all of the reaction this week. As if this suddenly fell out of the sky. Of course, it’s a headline event. Detonation of a nuclear device of some sort is going to attract a lot of attention. But really, anybody’s who’s been paying attention at all is bound to have seen this coming. Both this nuclear test on October 9th, as well as the missile launches last July. I don’t think anybody on the inside can really be too surprised.
RCA: What kind of a test was it?
GR: It was an underground test of what now has been confirmed by our own intelligence agencies and announced publicly as a small-scale nuclear device. Information further than that has not been released in public. But contrary to some idle speculation immediately afterwards, we appear satisfied now that it was indeed some sort of nuclear explosion.
RCA: Is this something that the North Koreans could attach to one of their rockets and pop over to Japan?
GR: Well, that’s one of the big questions. It’s one thing to set off a nuclear device of some sort. It’s another to fabricate it in such a manner that it can actually be fitted as a warhead onto a missile, or even a bomb dropped from an aircraft. Or any other kind of actual nuclear weapon. It is not clear whether North Korea has crossed this bridge. Again, opinions seem to vary. But I think there has to be at least a prudent assumption that if they’ve been able to set off a nuclear weapon, and have a certain stockpile of both enriched uranium and plutonium, they have at least been working on warhead technology. Whether it’s ready for a missile or not is not clear. But it’s certainly ready for some other device that could be set off by alternate means.
RCA: How about Japan’s response to all of this?
GR: Well, Japan, as you know, from last July, has been unusually vigorous in its response. Its diplomacy in the U.N.; its own announcements condemning the North Korean actions. I think Japan has taken a much stronger stand than certainly its traditional diplomacy would indicate, or even than most other countries would expect. It’s not an entirely new response. Ever since the North Korean Taepodong missile launch of 1998 that really energized Japan to begin technology research on ballistic missile defense, it has been quite firm in its intent to go on with development of such technologies, to, in effect, raise a shield, to defend against missiles and weapons of mass destruction. You may recall how vigorously the Chinese postured over this Japanese effort for several years. Only to finally walk away from it when it became clear that Japan was not going to be buffaloed.
RCA: That’s an old story. Would you characterize Japan’s response as aggressive, prudent, or how? Are they doing what they should do?
GR: Well, depending on your perspective. Japan’s response has certainly been more vigorous than one would have expected from the passive, peaceful Japan of the general postwar period. Obviously, Japan is moving into another paradigm now. I think it would be hard to describe Japanese actions so far as being particularly “aggressive,” in a rational sense. Certainly they have been more assertive. And I think they have been entirely appropriate.
RCA: Well, that brings up an interesting point. Ever since the nuclear provocation by North Korea, we’ve heard from the Australians, then from Mainland China, and then even from some people in Japan, speculation that the Japanese government would use this test as an opportunity to “go nuclear.” What do you think about that?
GR: Well, I remember the day after these tests taking place getting questions from a couple of people about whether the North Korean test would be the final push to make Japan revise its constitution. That is, amend Article Nine, the pacifist clause of the Constitution. Which were very similar to questions I’d gotten a little earlier about Prime Minister Abe coming into office, and whether that would push Japan into revising Article Nine. What I mean to say is that like Article Nine of the Constitution, this business about “going nuclear” is really something of a red herring. It does not follow at all that suddenly Japan now has an overwhelming incentive to change what is a very deeply rooted policy.
A couple of points here. First of all, the Japanese government has maintained for some time that it could have some sort of nuclear weapons capability, a minimum self-defense capability, under the provisions of its Constitution. But having said that, it’s also said that obviously it’s not Japan’s policy to possess nuclear weapons, both out of concern for the feelings of its own people, as well as potential for regional instability. That has been the policy for decades. And the detonation of this nuclear device by North Korea does not really change this situation.
Again, anybody who’s been following the situation is not surprised that North Korea finally has gone and done this. The Japanese government has had plenty of opportunity to consider its options should this happen. And right now they have a framework for dealing with this North Korean problem.
Part of it is diplomatic. That is, arms control, non-proliferation efforts, building up regional confidence measures through the U.N., etc. Part of it is defensive. That is, ballistic missile defense system, which it now is very much engaged on, and is a good way towards developing, and will soon deploy. And finally, reliance on the U.S. deterrent.
You’ll notice that just on this morning’s news, you heard Secretary of State Rice very forcefully reaffirm the U.S. security commitment to Japan. I think that was well done, and much needed, to make publicly clear what, of course, the U.S. has been saying all along through its more private channels, that the U.S. extended deterrence posture still functions. Japan, I think, has no serious reason to question that. And as long as there’s no serious reason to question that, then there really is no good argument for Japan setting aside its non-nuclear posture to develop nuclear weapons. Very little gain and probably a lot of downside. Much more downside than gain, I would think.
RCA: Thanks, Gregg, for those thoughtful comments, and for your time. We’ll be calling on you again in the future for additional insights, since this issue is not likely to go away. And, let’s get that interview for the Japan Considered website done. Folks will be looking for it now.
Well, once again we’re out of time. Lots more to consider on all of these topics. But it will have to wait until next week. In the meantime, send me your comments and suggestions for future programs at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all and consider each one when preparing future programs.
No time for Bluegrass today. So I’ll have to come up with something really special for next week, in compensation.
Thanks again for listening, and goodbye all. Until next week
