October 13, 2006; Volume 02, Number 37
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning from the beautiful campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, October 13th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 37, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Another beautiful day here in the South Carolina midlands. Even cool enough before daylight for a sweater during my exercise walk. Soon, shorts and tee-shirts here on campus will be replaced with sweaters and slacks. A nice change of seasons overall.
But enough of bragging about South Carolina’s climate, and on to our weekly consideration of what recent events in the news tell us about Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. We have a lot to consider this week. More, really, than we can handle comfortably in the time available. So, you’ll have to go to the comprehensive news sources for the broader picture. We just don’t try to provide that here.
Response to the past few programs has been unusually heavy. That’s not a complaint. I’m delighted to hear from you. Please continue to send your comments and suggestions for the program to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all, and take each one into consideration when planning subsequent programs.
In that spirit, this week I’ll devote a good bit of our time together responding to two topics that listeners have mentioned often during the past few weeks. The first is the difference between parliamentary and presidential systems, and how the parliamentary system affects operation of Japan’s central political executive. The second it some more information on Prime Minister Abe’s beefed-up Kantei staff. Hopefully clearing up confusion on the various types of prime ministerial assistants we read about in the news these days.
But first, of course, we’ll have to consider what Japan’s response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons test tells us about Japan’s conduct of international relations. And also take notice, at least, of Prime Minister Abe’s visits to Beijing and Seoul for those long-anticipated summit meetings.
North Korea Tests a Nuclear Weapon
North Korea made good on its earlier threat and conducted a test of what it described as a nuclear weapon on Monday, October 9th, around 10:35 in the morning. That’s Korean time. Verification took a while, and created some confusion. But by the time Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s plane touched down in Seoul for his long-anticipated summit meeting with South Korean President Roh, negative reaction to the North Korean test from around the world had begun to hit the wires. Even Mainland China, North Korea’s long-time ally and supporter, joined the international chorus of condemnation.
Japan’s reaction to the North Korean provocation was immediate and measured. There was no evidence of the dithering and hesitation Tokyo displayed in the face of previous international challenges. Prime Minister Abe condemned the test during his comments to the press following his summit meeting with President Roh in certain, but deliberate terms. He described Pyongyang’s action as a threat to international peace and security, including, of course, that of Japan. He assured the Japanese public that Japan would implement its own countermeasures, while pressing for a firm international response through the Security Council of the United Nations.
Also important to note here is that in the hours and days immediately after announcement of the test, senior Japanese government officials went out of their way to assure the Japanese public that they were in no danger from nuclear fallout. Defense Agency Director-General, Fumio Kyuma, the same day recognized the test as a serious provocation. But he urged a prudent response, and concluded it represented no immediate physical threat to Japan. North Korea, he noted, still lacks the technology required to reduce their nuclear weapon to a size that would make them deliverable by missile. So, it’s important to note, since announcement of the test, Japan’s key government officials have not manipulated the news in a way intended to excite Japanese public opinion. In a way intended to increase public support for a more active Japanese military response. If anything, quite the opposite. That’s significant, I think.
Still, Pyongyang’s decision to disregard its long-standing non-nuclear commitments was too serious a breach of the international peace to be ignored. Prime Minister Abe and other senior government officials immediately held bilateral consultations with their counterparts in the United States, China, South Korea, and other key nations. They assured them that Japan would cooperate in international countermeasures, and encouraged them to do the same. Japan then focused its diplomatic attention on the United Nations Security Council.
There, Japanese representatives urged the five permanent members to agree to a meaningful set of Chapter 7-based sanctions on North Korea, and the demand that Pyongyang return immediately and unconditionally to the Six-Way Talks. Japan, who chairs the UN Security Council during October, worked closely with the United States to create a draft resolution defining sanctions. A tricky business, since Russia and China, realistically, would have to agree. And a prompt response was essential. We’re still waiting for the Security Council to announce its decision. But Tokyo is optimistic.
In addition to encouragement of international response through the United Nations, Japan’s government quickly implemented additional sanctions of their own against North Korea. By the end of the week, Tokyo had banned all North Korean vessels from visiting Japanese ports, and prohibited all imports from North Korea. New restrictions also were placed on visits by North Korean citizens. Since Wednesday, or so, there’s been some discussion of the role Japan would, or could, play in efforts to stop and search North Korean vessels, should it come to that. Another potentially difficult diplomatic problem Tokyo will have to face.
So, in all, a reasoned, deliberate, but firm response to a diplomatic provocation right in Japan’s own neighborhood. Perhaps consideration of this will encourage observers around the world to think up an alternative to their usual set-phrase description of Shinzo Abe as a “militant nationalistic hawk.” Judging from his response to the North Korean provocation, he’s turned out to be considerably more nuanced than that.
Summit Meetings With Mainland China and South Korea
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his wife, Akie, left Tokyo for Beijing on Sunday morning, the 8th. For the long-anticipated summit meetings with Chinese President Hu Jintao and other senior government and Communist Party officials. The following morning he flew from Beijing to Seoul for summit meetings there on Monday, the 9th, with South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun and other South Korean government officials. It was during that flight to Seoul that the world learned of North Korea’s nuclear weapons test. No need for a 19-Gun Salute on his arrival. That’s for sure!
The meetings in both Beijing and Seoul went according to plan. No surprises. Nothing unexpected. Nobody forgot their lines, indulged in a personal tirade, or fell down stairs. At least, in public. So, there’s really little for us to consider here about these meetings, beyond the extremely important fact that they were held.
Clearly, Mainland China has decided that open lines of top-level communication with Japan are more valuable now than any potential international public relations benefit they might gain from continuing to stir the Yasukuni/History Memory pot. Whether that’s because of a shifting political power structure within China, or because Beijing’s international propagandists realized their efforts were having an effect on Japan’s public opinion opposite of that intended, I just don’t know. Can’t even speculate. Maybe a combination of the two.
But we do know the summit meeting was held, and that both sides seem happy with the result. There was some discussion of the past, and its current interpretation. But mutual concern over the North Korean nuclear test threat overshadowed that topic. Also as expected. And, it appears that Mainland China’s leadership today is more concerned with the economic aspects of the current bilateral relationship than it is with the past.
Perhaps the only surprise to come out of Prime Minister Abe’s whirlwind visits to Mainland China and South Korea was the absence of a joint Japan-South Korean declaration of condemnation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons test. These two countries clearly have the most to fear from North Korea’s nuclear weapon. One Japanese political reporter said Abe proposed such a statement, but that Roh was unwilling to go along. Maybe it was just too sudden to decide such an important step. Maybe President Roh was concerned about Kim Jong Il’s nuclear bomb blowing the Sunshine out of the most important element of his administration’s foreign policy. Again, I can’t even speculate.
In the end, the two leaders did agree that North Korea’s test was a violation of the South and North Korea Nuclear-Free Declaration, that Japan and South Korea must cooperate to discourage nuclear proliferation, and that the overall relationship between the two countries should be more “forward-looking.” Well, that’s better than backward-looking, I guess. It should help.
Mr. and Mrs. Abe returned home to Japan Monday night to near-universal praise for their performance during their first delicate diplomatic tour. Even Abe’s harshest journalistic critics in Japan published editorials that praised his efforts. We’ll just have to wait to see if this represents a honeymoon bouquet, or if it’s the beginning of a positive trend. At least, the artificial “not-speaking-to-each-other” aura of the past few years has been lifted from Japan’s formal relationships with its East Asian neighbors.
A “Presidential” Prime Ministerial System for Japan?
During the past few weeks several listeners have written in to remind me that Japan does not have a “presidential” national system. Rather, it is a prime ministerial system. Well … yes. That’s true. Obviously true! So, surely there’s more behind those comments than a simple statement of fact. Let’s have a look.
Since the beginning of this program late last year I’ve followed closely what I see as the change, and growing importance, of the central political executive in Japan’s national policy formulation and implementation processes. The central political executive being defined as the prime minister and cabinet, and their immediately supporting administrative apparatus. What we often hear called the Kantei, or Prime Minister’s Official Residence. That’s a trend I’ve observed and written about for a good while now. Well over a decade.
For the most part I’ve described this increase in central political executive influence in positive terms, even uncritically. Suggesting that Japan’s post-World War Two Constitution defines a prime minister and cabinet that’s expected to play more than a rubber-stamp role in the affairs of Japan’s government. And I still think that’s true. Japan, it seems to me, is better off with an effective central political executive than with an ineffective central political executive. A prime minister and cabinet that assumes political responsibility for the policy positions it publicly articulates and pursues. Responsible prime ministerial government, in other words.
Others, however, disagree with this line of reasoning. They believe Japan is better served by a less active, even passive, or “balancing” central political executive. This is especially true, I suspect, of those observers who find the specific policies proposed by more active central political executives distasteful. They argue that Japan’s traditional prime ministerial system requires the incumbent prime minister to consult more broadly in the selection of his or her personnel choices, as we discussed last week. And also in the formulation of his or her policy objectives. To “balance” the views of those – at least within the LDP’s parliamentary delegation – who have different opinions and policy objectives. This more balanced approach, they believe, will lead to better government, greater stability, and predictability, over time. It’s also led – to the perception, at least – of a weaker, ineffective, central political executive in Tokyo.
This may be where the confusion between “presidential” and “parliamentary” systems comes in. Prime ministers, and those close to them, who have tried to raise the profile of the Kantei during their incumbency, have sometimes described their efforts as making their premiership more “presidential.” That is, to exercise the more independent influence they believe American presidents exercise. I’m thinking here of Prime Ministers Nakasone, Koizumi, and even Abe. An example. Recently, sources within the Abe Kantei have said they intend to create a National Security Council, like the American White House NSC, for Japan. And have given Prime Ministerial Adviser, Yuriko Koike, responsibility for its creation. A more “presidential” premiership, in other words.
Some prime ministers – Yasuhiro Nakasone comes to mind here – have even suggested – maybe out of frustration with the LDP’s parliamentary delegation – that Japan’s Constitution should be amended to allow direct selection of Japan’s prime minister. As happens with the American president. This, to increase the independence and influence of the prime minister from – presumably – parliamentary influence.
Such a change, of course, would fundamentally change the nature of Japan’s traditional political system. And it never, to my knowledge, has been considered seriously. Further, as has been demonstrated recently by Prime Minister Koizumi, and it appears so far, by Prime Minister Abe, the same thing can be accomplished within Japan’s current parliamentary system. There’s really no need to make reference to the American presidential system, or its supporting institutions. And bringing them up may just create more confusion. Even opposition.
Just work toward development of a central political executive that assumes public responsibility for formulation of realistic policy objectives, aggregation of political support for those objectives, and oversight of their implementation. A genuinely responsible central political executive, in other words. One that will be held accountable by the public, and by the public’s representatives in the Diet, for the quality of their policy proposals, and their efforts to see those proposals implemented.
This would hardly amount to a “presidential” regime. Rather, it would better be described as an effective prime ministerial regime. What Japan’s current Constitution calls for, in the first place! The shift away from the Factionist model of prime ministerial selection and operation of government we’ve observed during the past half-decade or so, I believe, encourages such a change. Non-Factionist Prime Ministers, as we’ve described them on this program, are less dependent on the LDP’s faction leaders for their selection, and once selected, for their continuation in office. They are better positioned than were their Factionist predecessors to become genuinely responsible central political executives.
So, I agree that Japan does not have a “presidential” national political system. It’s a parliamentary system. But that indisputable fact doesn’t excuse incumbent prime ministers from their constitutional responsibility of providing Japan with genuinely responsible, effective central political executive leadership.
Recent Kantei Staff Appointments
A listener in Northern Virginia, who has asked to remain anonymous, wrote last week with another interesting question. He said he was confused by the recent flurry of appointments of prime ministerial assistants and secretaries, and asked me to clarify comments I’ve made here and there on the subject. I’m probably to blame for the confusion by not being clear on the distinctions among the various prime ministerial assistants I’ve mentioned on this program.
The main source of confusion seems to be between two types of prime ministerial assistants in the Kantei. The first group are the prime ministerial advisers who have been given responsibility for overseeing policy implementation in five areas considered critical by Prime Minister Abe. These are the prime ministerial advisers we discussed during last week’s program. Since its 1996 revision, their appointment has been authorized under Article 19 of the Cabinet Law. Four of these prime ministerial advisers are currently serving as members of the Diet. Kyoko Nakayama, who has been given responsibility for the sensitive North Korean abduction issue, is not a Diet Member. But she has worked with Prime Minister Abe on that particular issue for some time.
As I noted last week, these five prime ministerial assistants are scheduled to meet as a group twice a week to discuss progress toward their policy objectives. And, they meet without accompanying career bureaucrats. This arrangement naturally has clanged alarm bells throughout Kasumigaseki, home of Japan’s powerful government ministries and agencies. Absent effective central political executive leadership in the past, Japan’s career bureaucrats have become accustomed to calling most of the important shots for Japan’s national government. They’ve been key players in both policy formulation and implementation. And like any bureaucratic institution, are unlikely to watch their power being compromised without complaint.
It’s only natural for the Kantei to expand its senior personnel as it seeks to enhance its own position in Japan’s national policy formulation and implementation processes. But we can’t dismiss the possibility that the new positions will create administrative confusion, at least in the near-term, as spheres of responsibility and authority are defined and redefined. Clashes between the five new prime ministerial assistants and cabinet members, for example, seem to me inevitable. Who has final authority? Who really has the ear of the Prime Minister? The cautionary comments last week of LDP Upper House Caucus Leader, Toranosuke Katayama, about the danger of confusing lines of responsibility cannot be dismissed so easily. He has a good point. Shinzo Abe wouldn’t be the first national chief executive to establish competitive – even adversarial – relationships among his closest aides. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt’s example often is mentioned in this regard. But that style of executive leadership requires close attention and very strong policy and administrative direction from the chief executive.
The second group we’ve mentioned, prime ministerial secretaries, may be confused with the prime ministerial advisers, or assistants, just described. If only because there are five of them as well. But they have quite different functions. Four of the five secretaries were selected, after careful vetting of their policy inclinations, from the ranks of promising career bureaucrats from the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Economy, Trade, and Industry, and the National Police Agency.
The fifth, undoubtedly most important, member of this five-person group is Prime Minister Abe’s political secretary. He is Yoshiyuki Inoue. Inoue stands out among this group of blue-blooded career bureaucrats because he is not, and never has been, a career bureaucrat. Indeed, Inoue wasn’t able to attend university upon graduation from high school, let alone one that would get him through the higher civil service exam. Instead, he joined the Japan National Railway and worked as an assistant train engineer. While there he obtained a degree in economics from Nihon University through correspondence.
We’ll have much more to say about Inoue and his role in future programs. He’s been one of Abe’s closest aides for some time now, trusted with some of his most delicate political assignments. For example, Inoue was the only person said to accompany Abe during his isolation at Lake Kawaguchi late last month to decide his personnel selections for cabinet and party posts. Abe is said to trust him because of his personal loyalty and because he has faced and overcome severe personal adversity.
These five secretaries – Inoue and the four career bureaucrats – serve as administrative gatekeepers for the prime minister. And as intermediaries between the powerful ministries and agencies and the prime minister’s office. They have been extremely important in past cabinets, and are likely to become even more so under Abe. For one thing, their position inevitably will place them between the five prime ministerial advisers and the cabinet ministers once the bureaucratic back-and-forth starts in earnest. Let’s hope they’re up to the challenge. In the past these prime ministerial administrative secretaryships have been one of the busiest and most demanding positions in Japan’s government. Now the job has become even more demanding. No place for wimps!
There’s another point worth mentioning while we’re on the topic of Kantei personnel. That’s Prime Minister Abe’s decision to appoint Junzo Matoba as the deputy chief cabinet secretary for administrative affairs. This generally is considered to be the top career bureaucratic position in government. By tradition, this important appointment has gone to a former administrative vice-minister of one of the ministries that were part of the prewar Ministry of Internal Affairs, or Naimusho. Matoba, however, is a former official of the Ministry of Finance.
Another of Japan’s “Iron Rules of Bureaucracy” broken by Shinzo Abe. Another demonstration that Abe actually intends to strengthen to Kantei’s role in policy formulation and implementation at the expense of the career bureaucracies. Matoba has long been close to Prime Minister Abe. And before that, even to Abe’s father, Shintaro Abe. Bureaucrats beware … in other words. This is not your father’s Kantei!
Well, we’re near the end of our time together. A long-time listener who’s forgotten more about broadcasting than I’ll ever know, recently urged me to keep closer track of the time and not impose excessively on listeners’ schedules. I’ll do my best. But there’s just so much of importance to cover each week that it’s hard to come in close to twenty minutes. Practice, practice, practice.
In compensation, today I’ve got a special Bluegrass treat for you. It’s a short selection from the original members of the Seldom Scene. From 1974. here you have what’s arguably the greatest bluegrass band yet to be organized in all its glory. John Starling, John Duffey, and the rest. Enjoy a short selection from “Different Roads.” You can find the whole song on iTunes, available for download. Or, you can order the full album from the Sugar Hill Records website at www.SugarHillRecords.com. Enjoy.
[bluegrass clip]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
