October 6, 2006; Volume 03, Number 36
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning from beautiful Spring Valley in Columbia, South Carolina. Today is Friday, October 6th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 36, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for dropping in today. I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and creator and host of this Podcast. Each week at this time we select two or three recent events in Japan’s news, and consider what they can tell us about Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. Well, most weeks, anyway. Last Friday I wasn’t able to get out a program. Too much going on at this end. And really, too much happening in Japan to absorb and consider in time for the program! The University has upgraded the servers they kindly allow me to use for the Japan Considered Project website and for this program. You can access the website at www.JapanConsidered.org. Click on in and have a look around at the annotated links to English language information available to you. Should you have difficulty accessing either the audio file or the transcript of this program, send an e-mail to me with details at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I’ll pass it along and try to get the problem rectified. Ah, technology! But we all must adapt to change.
A Time of Rapid Change in Japan’s Domestic Politics
Speaking of which, this is an exciting time to be observing Japanese politics! I’ve been fascinated by the subject for most of my life. But it’s never been more interesting than it has during the past few years. And especially the past few months.
Japan is well into another period of significant change. Both its domestic and international environments are changing rapidly. And Japan’s government struggles to identify, understand, and adapt to those changes.
It’s now more than 60 years since the end of World War Two and the ensuing Allied Occupation. That Occupation implemented significant reforms domestically in Japan. And internationally established conditions under which Japan was able to re-enter international society. All under the protection, and tutelage, of the United States.
In some ways, that early post-World War Two era was an idyllic time for Japan. A time when the whole nation could focus its energies on economic recovery, and then, on impressively rapid economic growth. A time when Japan could all but ignore the military security aspects of international relations, safe beneath an umbrella held overhead by the United States. Japan was able to demonstrate to the world that it had overcome its bellicose past – an essential aspect of the effort to re-join international society. Early post-World War Two onset of the Cold War, and its bi-polar tensions with the Soviet Union, gave the United States strong motive to maintain that protective relationship with Japan. And to maintain it well beyond the end of the Allied Occupation.
The bilateral security treaty with the United States surely remains an important aspect of Japan’s overall international relations. It appears likely to remain so for some time to come. But just as surely, Japan itself must recognize changes in the post-Cold War global order, changes in U.S. interests in the Asian region, and adapt their own behavior accordingly.
Japan’s been doing just that. Not to everyone’s satisfaction, of course. Either in Japan, or abroad. But for the most part, Japan’s adaptation to those environmental changes has been measured and cautious. Nostalgia for the simpler early post-World War Two past is understandable. Especially among older observers. But nothing remains the same. Changes must be made. And those changes, naturally, will generate new political tensions within Japan, and between Japan and its neighbors. We’re likely to see lots of this during the next few months of the Abe Administration.
Today we’ll consider how LDP President, Shinzo Abe, was elected Japan’s 90th prime minister, and the significance of the selection process that brought him to power. We’ll then give Abe’s selections for the senior posts of the LDP and his first Cabinet the same treatment. Plus consider the significance of Abe’s use of special prime ministerial assistants to strengthen the Kantei’s role in national policy formulation and implementation.
Before that, though, there are two or three very significant developments in international affairs that we’ll have to consider.
First, reports today from Tokyo and Teheran indicate that Japan has agreed to significantly scale back Japanese participation in development of Iran’s Azadegan oil field. From, it seems, a controlling 75 percent share, to only 10 percent. Though the negotiations are on-going. This appears to represent a compromise between those in Japan who had hoped to benefit from the 26-billion-barrel production estimated for Azadegan, on the one hand, and those concerned about the possibility of international sanctions on Iran in response to that country’s nuclear weapons development. We’ve discussed this issue before on this program, emphasizing the importance of reliable petroleum supplies for Japan. For some time now the United States has discouraged Japan’s participation in the project. So this latest development should please Washington.
After several days of media rumors and speculation, the Kantei earlier this week formally announced that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe would visit Beijing and Seoul for official summit meetings on Sunday and Monday, the 8th and 9th of October. In spite of the real importance of these meetings, the hardy Yasukuni Shrine Visit issue continues to attract widespread media attention. Some news outlets reported that Prime Minister Abe had been able to arrange the meetings by agreeing – perhaps unofficially – not to visit Yasukuni Shrine while serving as prime minister. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihisa Shiozaki today denied that any such commitment had been made. The more reliable Japanese media, though, already had exercised caution in reporting such agreement.
On Tuesday, North Korea’s announcement that it intended to test a nuclear weapon provided a new and more substantial focus of attention. It was certain that the North Korean announcement would rank high on the agenda of both summit meetings.
Which brings us to our third, and potentially most significant, international topic today. On October 3rd, Pyongyang time, North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs broadcast a statement notifying the world that North Korea intended to conduct a nuclear weapons test. The broadcast set no date for the test. But given the source, both Tokyo and Washington considered the announcement highly reliable. Not just more bluster from the Kim Regime. Following soon after Pyongyang’s July 5th surprise missile tests, this statement of intent sent shock waves throughout East Asia and the rest of the world.
The United Nations Security Council immediately opened informal discussions of the North Korean announcement. Reports from New York late last night indicated that the Security Council had agreed unanimously with only minor modifications to adopt a statement drafted by Japan cautioning North Korea that a test would destabilize the region. The statement also said such a test would result in U.N. sanctions. Though specifics weren’t mentioned. Reports from New York today suggest that both Russia and China were more cooperative in formulating this latest response to North Korea’s military initiatives than they were early last month after Pyongyang’s launch of seven missiles. That’s progress, and good news for Japan. It’s difficult to predict just how the North Korean announcement will affect Japan’s summit talks with China and South Korea. But it seems likely that this latest nuclear test threat will rank higher on the bilateral talk agendas than discussions of how history should be properly interpreted.
Shinzo Abe Becomes Japan’s 90th Prime Minister
[Abe press conference clip]
That’s newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introducing himself to the Kantei press corps at the beginning of his first press conference as prime minister. As expected, he was elected last Tuesday as Japan’s 90th prime minister. You didn’t need the Japan Considered Podcast to tell you that. Even the American communications media carried accurate reports of his election. But, as I’ve insisted for some time now, beyond noting the outcome of the Diet vote, we need to consider more carefully just how Mr. Abe was able to win that contest. How he conducted his campaign for the premiership. And how that campaign strategy will affect his behavior as Japan’s 90th prime minister. Did he win the premiership with a traditional, “Factionist,” strategy? Or did he wage what I’ve called for lack of a better term, a “Populist,” or “Non-Factionist,” campaign? Since last Tuesday, there’s been some disagreement among commentators on this point. So, given its importance, we should consider it here in more detail.
The Consequences of Traditional Factionist Politics
Observers of Japan’s domestic politics long have recognized the importance of the Liberal Democratic Party’s personalistic factions in the selection of the LDP president. And by extension, Japan’s prime minister. Indeed, Professor Nathaniel Thayer, and other noted academic analysts, have concluded that the LDP factions were created and exist in large measure to participate in the competition that selects the LDP president. They perform other functions as well, of course. But those other functions are performed mainly to support the factions’ roles as engines of competition during the selection of the Party president.
Under the traditional “Factionist” pattern of competition, aspiring LDP presidents were expected to seek the support of the major faction leaders in the party presidential election. We have only limited information on the negotiations conducted between LDP presidential candidates and the faction leaders. Given the – ah – delicacy of the topic. In years past, we often heard rumors that financial considerations may have influenced the outcome of those negotiations. But that’s hard, if not impossible, to prove. Again, due to the delicacy of the subject.
Since the mid-1950s, most aspiring political reformers in Japan criticized the LDP factions as “undemocratic” at best, and corrupt at worst. Reduction in the power of the LDP factions was a key element of the “political reform” they recommended. In a way, the intensity of the political reformers’ anti-LDP faction fervor can be interpreted as a testament to the factions’ importance. It’s ironic that now some of these same earlier evangelists of political reform urge greater consideration of the factions’ interests. Perhaps because the political reforms they espoused led to policy proposals they find distressing.
Negotiations between LDP presidential candidates and faction leaders occurred in secret. But we do know that allocation of cabinet and senior Party posts was an important element in most of those discussions. Faction leaders agreed to support candidates for the LDP presidency in return for the candidate’s commitment to accept said faction leader’s personnel recommendations. For one or more cabinet or senior Party positions. Big faction: several positions. Little faction: not so many positions.
For most Diet members, service as a cabinet minister, and the right thereafter to be called “Daijin,” represents their highest political ambition. Membership and faithful service in one of the LDP’s factions was the most reliable route to being recommended for such an appointment. Faction leaders also depended heavily on their ability to secure cabinet and senior party posts for their members to maintain their factions’ cohesion, or solidarity.
This factionist horse-trading, I believe, helps explain the behavior of Japan’s traditional prime ministers and cabinets – Japan’s central political executive. This isn’t hard to imagine. Consider the behavior in office of an individual whose selection as LDP president, and then prime minister, depended upon the support of several major LDP faction leaders. And whose continuation in office required him to maintain their support. Not much room for independent action or decisive leadership. That’s for sure.
Add to that the effect this Factionist personnel pattern had on Japan’s Cabinets. This traditional Factionist system populated cabinets with ministers and directors-general selected because of their years of loyal service to one of the LDP’s factions. Personal administrative ability or knowledge of the business of their ministries were secondary considerations. At best. As were their ideological and policy commitments. It’s easy to understand why Japan’s traditional Factionist cabinets have been described as playing little more than a confirming, or rubber-stamp, role in Japan’s national policy formulation and implementation processes. And why their meetings were usually so short!
Koizumi Promises Change – And Delivers!
Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi came into office committed to change that traditional Factionist pattern. He said he would ignore the personnel recommendations of the LDP’s faction leaders. Instead, he would appoint cabinet members on the basis of their personal qualifications to supervise the work of the ministry or agency they were assigned to lead. And on their personal commitment to the policy objectives of his Administration.
While some degree of compromise with the powerful LDP factions was inevitable, Koizumi largely delivered on his public commitment. Koizumi cabinets were qualitatively different than those of his traditional factionist predecessors. And, it’s fair to say, they played a more significant role in Japan’s national policy formulation and implementation processes during his premiership than did their predecessors. More in line with the role assigned the cabinet under Japan’s current Constitution. This was an important aspect of Koizumi’s campaign to increase the importance of the prime minister’s office, or the Kantei, in Japan’s government. At the expense of the various powerful ministries and agencies of government. We’ve covered the results of this change extensively on this program.
Significance of Prime Minister Abe’s Personnel Decisions
How then does Prime Minister Abe’s first round of personnel decisions measure up? Did he revert to the traditional Factionist pattern of horse-trading? Or, as he promised during his campaign, did he largely ignore the LDP faction leaders while drawing up his list of cabinet members and LDP senior posts? Selecting them instead on the basis of ability, suitability for the post, and commitment to his expressed policy intentions?
The reaction of Japan’s political media to these appointments has been interesting. Nearly all of the reliable outlets accept Abe’s claim that he rejected the advice of the LDP faction leaders while making his initial key personnel decisions. So we would err by describing his first cabinet as “Factionist.” But many of those same observers have criticized him for appointing such a large number of “Abe Friends.” That is, individuals who supported his campaign for the LDP presidency. Predicting that this pattern of selection is sure to get him into trouble.
This criticism may strike American listeners as a bit odd. At least, at first. “What,” they’re likely to ask, “was he supposed to do? Include a goodly number of his enemies, or those who oppose his policy intentions, among his appointees? That wouldn’t make sense!”
Well, to be fair, that’s not quite what Abe’s Japanese media critics mean. Though were their advice followed, it might turn out that way. Critics of Abe’s heavy inclusion of friends and supporters in his initial personnel appointments mean that his decisions don’t reflect a “balance of interests.”
“Balance” is an honored decision principle in Japan. Here, I think, Abe’s critics are displeased to see that Abe has excluded candidates for cabinet and senior Party post positions who disagree with the domestic or foreign policy lines he has articulated while running for LDP president. A “balanced” cabinet, in their view, would include a goodly representation of those who support other positions. Even if it didn’t result in strict factional balance along traditional lines.
This “balance” principle makes good sense if the individuals selected, and the central political executive they constitute, isn’t expected to exercise much leadership in Japan’s national political system. If it’s expected to play more of a “rubber-stamp” role, confirming or attesting to the decisions made at lower levels of government. Sort of a symbolic role, like the one assigned to the Emperor in the Constitution.
But, if the prime minister and cabinet intend to play a more active central leadership role in Japan’s government, then the “balance” principle makes less sense. A more active and influential central political executive requires, first of all, a clear statement of policy and intentions. It then requires selection of individuals who have both the inclination and ability to oversee implementation of those policies and intentions. It appears that by appointing what the Japanese political media describe as “Abe’s friends,” Abe intends to be something more than a symbolic, balancing, leader during his premiership.
We don’t have time to go through the individual cabinet and Party post names and bios here. I’ll put a link in the transcript and show notes [http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStatic/index.php?pageid=9&&&] to an excellent quick reference offered by Kyodo News. It provides a photo and short English language bio for each cabinet member. Suffice it to say that every individual appointed appears to share Shinzo Abe’s policy objectives, and even his ideological orientation. Tensions in any parliamentary cabinet are bound to emerge as ministries and agencies jockey for influence and budget. But this group appears more capable of supporting the policy lines Prime Minister Abe has articulated than would a group selected on the basis of “balance.” This naturally will draw sharp criticism from those observers who don’t share his conservative ideology or support his policies, domestic and international. And that, I think, is what we’ve seen to date.
Appointment of Five Special Prime Ministerial Advisers
One more topic concerning Prime Minister Abe’s Kantei personnel decisions requires mention here. That is his decision to appoint five special prime ministerial advisers, and to give them significant policy responsibility in his new government. Administrative reform efforts during 1996 were intended to strengthen the role of the Kantei in Japan’s policy formulation and implementation processes. Among other changes, they amended Article 19 of the Cabinet Law to allow prime ministers to appoint up to five additional assistants. Since then no more than two such assistants at one time have been appointed by any prime minister, including Junichiro Koizumi. Maybe, in part, because there just wasn’t room for them in the old Kantei building! But there’s plenty of room now in the new building. And they won’t even have to share telephones! Bureaucracies, it’s been observed, tend to expand to fill the office space they occupy. The new Kantei building is much larger than the building it replaced, if nowhere near as elegant.
Shinzo Abe stated during his campaign for the LDP presidency and premiership that if elected he would appoint five such assistants. And that he would give them significant responsibility for the policies he considered important. Abe has done just that. This naturally has alarmed many of Japan’s career bureaucrats, and even members of parliament who look out for particular bureaucracies’ interests. All fear – reasonably – that use of these special prime ministerial assistants will enhance the power of the Kantei – at the expense of the career bureaucrats in Japan’s ministries and agencies. Well, that’s exactly what Prime Minister Abe hopes to do!
Four of these five special advisers are LDP members of parliament themselves. One, Kyoko Nakayama, is not. But she’s well known for her work as a special adviser to the Kantei on the North Korean abduction issue during Koizumi’s premiership. All share Abe’s views on the policies for which they have been given responsibility.
The five policy areas parallel the concerns Prime Minister Abe articulated during his campaign for the premiership, and in his first policy speech to the Diet. They are: national security; economic and fiscal policy; the North Korean abduction issue; education policy; and public relations.
Public relations sounds odd, at first. But if I understand it correctly, Abe intends his newly appointed public relations assistant, Hiroshige Sekou, to assume responsibility for briefing the press on policy issues considered sensitive by the Kantei. This out of concern that in the past, opposition to Kantei policies has been reflected in the briefings senior bureaucrats have given the press.
We’ll have to keep close watch on the activities of these five prime ministerial assistants in the weeks and months to come. They now are scheduled to meet as a group twice weekly to discuss management of policy issues – just like the Cabinet – with no bureaucrats present. To the extent they become involved beyond the superficial level in Japan’s national policy formulation and implementation processes, they are bound to inspire criticism and opposition. First from the national bureaucracies. And then from the Diet members who traditionally support their causes.
Already, Yuriko Koike, Abe’s special assistant for national security affairs, has singed Foreign Ministry whiskers with a trip to Washington to meet with White House National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley. She’s a highly capable political figure, often mentioned as likely to become Japan’s first female prime minister. Her appointment as Hadley’s “counterpart,” with instructions to create a National Security Council for Japan, received something less than unanimous applause from the direction of Japan’s Gaimusho. This is only the beginning. In addition, as cabinet ministers and agency directors-general settle into their posts, even clashes between cabinet members and these prime ministerial assistants are inevitable.
We’re well over time again this week. Lots more left to consider. We didn’t even get to the substance of Prime Minister Abe’s first policy speech to the Diet. But that will just have to wait. Next week we’ll consider how Prime Minister Abe’s visits to Beijing and Seoul went, and any further developments on North Korea’s most recent diplomatic initiative. And, if time permits, add the third part of our review of the Democratic Party of Japan.
Soon after the last podcast went on the air, an alert and musically sophisticated listener wrote to note that I had promised an example of bluegrass legend, John Duffey’s, mandolin playing as well as his high tenor voice. But that the clip presented featured Ben Eldridge’s banjo rather than John’s mandolin. Quite right! Wrong clip! To make up for that Oops Moment, here’s an even better example of Duffey’s remarkable mandolin playing from “Tennessee Blues.” The whole song can be found on Sugar Hill’s 2001 release of Duffey classics, “Always in Style,” or through iTunes. Enjoy.
[bluegrass]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
