September 8, 2006; Volume 02, Number 33
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning! From beautiful Spring Valley in Columbia, South Carolina. This week I’ve been away from the University for a few days. Rare occurrence! But unavoidable. Feeling better now. And weather today in Columbia is ideal, somewhat overcast, but with very reasonable temperatures. Maybe a little rain in the afternoon. Just as I like it. Not everyone’s cup of tea, of course ….
Thanks for tuning again this week. Or, if you’re a first-time visitor to the Japan Considered Podcast, a hearty South Carolina welcome. I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and creator and host of this Podcast. Each week at this time we review recent developments in Japan and consider their longer-term significance for Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. Point your browser at www.JapanConsidered.org to learn more about the Japan Considered Project.
A number of you have written in to note the lack of international topics lately, and to urge a return to more “balance.” Great idea. But recently domestic political events have pushed international affairs off the end of our time-frame, so to speak. This week, I’ll try to remedy that by including discussion of Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent international trips and what they mean for Japan’s international relations overall.
And, speaking of e-mailed comments, thanks to all for taking the time to send them. And keep them coming to RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read each one, and appreciate the feedback. This past week e-mail response to the program was especially heavy. I didn’t expect it. Much of it was focused on the distinction I’ve made between “Factionist” and “Populist” electoral candidates in Japan and its implications. Judging from the comments, my casual treatment of that particular point has left plenty of room for misunderstanding, and some confusion. So, this week, if time permits, I’ll make a couple of additional comments on that topic, that hopefully will provide some clarification.
First, though, I’d better mention celebration of the birth on Wednesday of a baby boy to Princess Kiko and Prince Akishino. This yet-to-be named child has inspired a high volume of media coverage in Japan. Even around the world. Though at least one network television report in the United States described the baby as brother to Princess Aiko, daughter of Crown Prince Naruhito and Princess Masako. Not so, of course. Rather, a cousin. But the American media do their best with Japan, I suppose. We should be grateful they even noticed.
So, a celebrated event. But, you might reasonably ask, “political significance?” Why bother to bring it up here. This program focuses on Japan’s domestic politics and international relations.
Well, I think there is a political angle we probably should consider. Announcement of the birth of a boy has provided Shinzo Abe and the LDP with an excuse to remove the female throne succession issue from their political agenda this year, and probably next. As Prime Minister Koizumi learned earlier this year, and we discussed on this program at the time, the female imperial succession issue proved considerably more controversial, especially within the LDP, than had been expected. Or, at least, than I expected.
Prime Minister Koizumi was publicly committed to legislation that would modify the Imperial House Law to allow female succession to the throne. This expressed intention earned Koizumi praise from sectors of Japan’s political media not usually so generous to him and his conservative policy agenda. Public opinion polls indicated that a healthy majority of Japan’s attentive population was ready to accept the idea of an empress, if no male heir was available to become emperor. We discussed this to some extent last year when the issue arose. Including the prime ministerial advisory commission appointed by Koizumi, and its conclusions.
There, of course, were negative rumblings from the beginning. But the thing that seemed to give that opposition greater credibility was an article published earlier this year by the emperor’s cousin, Prince Tomohito of Mikasa. Also, brother-in-law to Foreign Minister and LDP presidential candidate, Taro Aso. It’s unusual for members of the royal family to express their views so frankly. So the Prince’s article got quite a bit of press.
Apparently encouraged by the Prince’s statement, very conservative members of the LDP began to question the bill’s advisability. Some flatly opposed the idea of changing the rules of imperial succession. Others said that the matter was too serious to decide quickly. And that more deliberation was necessary.
With the more liberal wing of the LDP already openly skeptical of his conservative political agenda, Koizumi could ill-afford to pursue an issue that appeared likely to alienate some of his most conservative supporters within the Party. Energy behind promotion of the Bill rapidly dissipated, and it was not introduced during the last Diet session.
This, however, left Koizumi vulnerable to criticism within the Party, and especially from Japan’s political press, for not pushing the Bill forward. Especially, given its popularity with the attentive public. And the very real concern over succession of the imperial line in Japan.
Sooo, announcement of Princess Kiko’s pregnancy must have been doubly pleasing to Prime Minister Koizumi, since if a boy were born he would be eligible to ascend the throne. And since that would provide better justification for shelving the female imperial succession legislation.
This also, of course, must have come as excellent news to Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, the front-runner to succeed Koizumi as president of the LDP. He would have been as reluctant as Koizumi to alienate the right-wing of the LDP, and their supporters. The conservative nature of his policies is sure to attract at least as much media criticism as did Koizumi’s, if not more once the honeymoon is over. And he will need all of the conservative support he can muster within the Party.
Any other political implications of the royal birth? Well, here’s an issue tailor-made for the Democratic Party of Japan. They could write their own version of a new Imperial House Law, and press for its consideration. That, Abe would be reluctant to do right now. With such a legislative proposal, the DPJ should be able to generate positive media attention, and even popular support for that position. And for once, they would be supporting a proposal, rather than just opposing something that the LDP has proposed. A significant step.
This is not to say that the basic issue of whether the Imperial House Law should be amended to allow females to ascend the throne has disappeared. In spite of the arrival of a baby boy, the question is bound to surface again. The birth has only bought Abe some breathing space at a particularly delicate time.
Media Speculation on an Abe Cabinet
Even more than last week, Japan’s political media this week has been full of information about Shinzo Abe’s first cabinet, its operation, and its policies. All very natural. Japan’s political journalists, like their American counterparts, compete to be the very first to report important facts. Scoops, I think they’re still called. But the intense pressure on journalists and editors to be first out with important news results in publication of enormous amounts of speculation, guessing – intelligent and not-so-intelligent guessing – and lots of wishful thinking.
Some of the articles appear to be spun from thin air, with little substance beyond the political inclinations or objectives of the writer. Others have, and even sometimes cite by name, more concrete sources. But it would be foolish to rely even on them for solid information. Since, very much like the national budget process we discussed last week, many of these articles are little more than trial balloons. Decorated and floated either in the hope of gauging public reaction, or with the intention of getting the name of an individual cabinet member candidate, or policy proposal, before the attentive public. Thereby giving it greater significance than it had before.
It’s simply too early to speculate on the make-up of Abe’s first cabinet. Or even on the policies he and his new cabinet colleagues will choose to pursue. Beyond their essentially conservative orientation. So, I have decided not to include even the most credible of the speculative reports on this program. We’ll just have to wait and see. And it won’t be long.
Breaking that rule for just a moment, though, it does seem clear that Shinzo Abe intends to maintain, and even expand, the enhanced role Japan’s Central Political Executive has been playing in Japan’s policy formulation and implementation.
That, in my view, will be the most important aspect of his premiership – IF he’s actually able to do it. There will be strong pressures against him. The bureaucracies can be expected to continue to fight a rear-guard action against “political interference” in their work, as they describe it. And, they are likely to receive support from those who oppose the substance of the policies Abe will pursue with his enhanced Central Political Executive. Abe has his work cut out for him. Though as an alert and well-informed listener to the Podcast commented earlier in the day, Koizumi has established the precedent. And that precedent will be of great help to Abe as he pursues his own policies and institutional modifications.
Prime Minister Koizumi as a “Lame Duck” Prime Minister
Everyone -- everyone listening to this program, anyway -- knows that Prime Minister Koizumi will be leaving the Kantei in mid- to late-September this year, and that Japan will have a new prime minister. Since the beginning of the year, when it became clear that Koizumi actually intended to keep his promise to leave office at the expiration of his second term as LDP president, the Japanese political press has been full of speculation about his successor. Now that it’s Ivory Soap purity-certain that Shinzo Abe will succeed Koizumi, the speculation on the first Abe Cabinet continues.
All natural, and even useful. But what we haven’t seen much of during this period is reporting, or even speculation, on what Junichiro Koizumi plans to do after leaving the Kantei. And its potential significance for Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. In fact, the only mention of this I’ve seen came earlier this morning in a brief Asahi Shimbun article. According to this article, Koizumi told reporters late last month that he hoped to lead a quiet life as a regular Diet member.
Well, maybe that response explains why Japan’s political press has written so little about this potentially important topic. Whenever asked, Koizumi simply replies that he wants to lead a quiet life as a typical LDP member after leaving office.
That seems highly unlikely to me. Koizumi has been the sort of person who has to be the bride at every wedding, the corpse at every funeral, and the baby at every christening, as Alice Roosevelt said of her father. It seems to me unlikely that Koizumi will change suddenly upon leaving the gates of the new Kantei. Even less likely is the idea that Japan’s political press corps would allow him to evaporate into obscurity, even if he wanted to. He’s just too good copy!
We’ve considered this point before on this program. Koizumi must be genuinely tired, and genuinely sick of the press. For now. So, he’s likely to take some time off. But not long. Probably not as long even as he plans. He’s bound to be consulted by his colleagues on matters of importance. He’s bound to be interviewed by the press when issues arise in which he’s played an important role. He simply has too much potential as a political tool for Japan’s political world to leave him alone. And, judging from his past behavior, he wouldn’t want that even if they did.
Koizumi and the Future of LDP Factions
One issue that almost certainly will continue to interest him is the structure and operation of his own Party, the LDP. He arrived in office committed to reducing the influence of the Party’s personalistic factions over Party affairs, and the operation of the government. He made dramatic progress toward that objective during his premiership. But the job is far from done. The LDP’s personalistic factions remain an important force in Japan’s domestic politics, and even policymaking. More about that in a moment. It’s unlikely Koizumi is completely satisfied with that state of affairs.
But, no longer prime minister, or even a faction leader, what can he do? Well, he may continue to speak publicly against the influence of faction bosses. He may continue to serve within the Party as a focus of anti-Factionist sentiment and activity. Encouraging, and providing legitimacy to the efforts of others. LDP factions and faction bosses these days need all the support they can get. And they hardly need an enemy as formidable as Koizumi has proven himself to be coaching and cheerleading for the opposition.
Koizumi also has demonstrated beyond doubt during his premiership that he understands communication with Japan’s attentive public, and how to motivate public support for his policies. Even his detractors praise him for that – if back-handedly – with their accusations of “Koizumi theater.” I believe this ability to connect with Japan’s attentive public has become a more valuable political asset during the past half-decade than it was in the past. Koizumi can be expected to continue to use it, and to coach others whose policies and actions he favors, in the art. That will be good for those who wish to push the LDP in a more Populist direction, and bad for those who hope to maintain the more elitist, cadre structure that has characterized it in the past.
Koizumi’s August and September International Trips
Another area in which Koizumi might be expected to play a significant role is Japan’s foreign affairs. During his premiership, Koizumi has made more than 50 official international trips. In the process, staying out of Abe’s way, making for a smoother prime ministerial transition. Some of the trips, like the Elvis Summit in the United States, have been portrayed in the Japanese press as little more than nostalgic junkets. But even the Elvis Summit, as we discussed on this program, had an important strategic purpose. Confirming Japan’s continued interest in its relationship with the United States. A purpose skillfully accomplished.
Beginning with a two-day visit to Mongolia on August 10th and 11th, Koizumi has made a number of strategically important international trips during his last days in office. The Mongolian visit was considered especially important since Japan has great expectations of the coal and cooper reserves available there. Add to that the critical geographic position Mongolia occupies between China and Russia. And, Mongolia’s continuing diplomatic relations with North Korea. No wonder 80 LDP parliamentarians found time to visit Mongolia during July and August alone!
Koizumi then made a four-day visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in late August, returning to Japan on August 30th. Like Mongolia, these two countries are of great potential strategic importance to Japan. First, because of their rich mineral and energy resources. Second, because of their proximity to both China and Russia. And the competition among China, Russia, and Japan over influence in the region. According to Uzbek Foreign Ministry sources, Koizumi broadened Japan’s diplomatic objectives by offering to serve as a go-between between Uzbekistan and the United States, while those two countries try to improve their relationship.
Koizumi just this week left Japan for Finland, to attend the 6th Asia-Europe summit meeting to be held there on the 10th and 11th. Finland is of more importance at the moment since it holds the presidency of the European Union, a position that rotates among the Union’s members. Koizumi also is scheduled to give the keynote speech at the first plenary session of the Asia-Europe Summit Meeting. His topic? The global response to security threats and the importance of multilateral cooperation. Quite a change from international summit meetings in the past when the Japanese prime minister could be dismissed as a mere transistor salesman. Koizumi also was quoted as keen to strengthen European support for Japan’s North Korea policy through his meetings in Finland.
Asked before departure whether he planned to meet with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts, Koizumi candidly responded that he had no intention of begging for any meetings by promising not to visit Yasukuni Shrine. He said he wouldn’t participate in meetings that required him to meet preconditions. Quite a strong statement of his position on this issue. We’ll have to talk more about the whole Yasukuni Shrine Visit topic and its real significance in a future program. But that can wait. You might want to read the celebrated Japanese fairy tale, “Tengu no Kakure Mino.” Or, “The Tengu’s Cape of Invisibility,” in preparation.
Meaning of the Factionist-Populist Distinction
Well, we’re already a bit over time. But just few more minutes to try to clarify the distinction I’ve been making on this program for some time now between Factionist and Populist politics, and what it all means.
First, for me, these two terms define the opposite poles of a continuum, rather than exclusive, either-or, categories. Individuals and actions, then, exist conceptually somewhere on that continuum. Between the two poles. They’re never purely “Factionist” or “Populist,” since both terms represent ideal types. So, all individuals and actions considered within this framework, to some extent, share characteristics of both ideal types. But it’s the proportion of each type that we should keep our eye on.
Second, the term “Factionist” doesn’t seem to me all that bad. But “Populist” is less than ideal. It arrives heavily freighted with meanings from use in other contexts. Meanings I have no intention of implying here. They’re mostly negative. Suggesting efforts of political figures to excite public opinion with what the observer, at least, considers bad ideas.
My use of “Populist” here is quite different, certainly not negative. I simply mean the effort to expand the circle of significant participants in political activity. As opposed to limiting significant political participation to a few Party or Faction leaders. This, of course, may include pandering to public opinion. But such pandering certainly isn’t required. And, this way we don’t have to worry so much about the personal biases of the observer.
For some time now I’ve been a keen observer of Japan’s central political executive and how it’s been changing. Use of these Factionist and Populist terms came to me as I observed the early Koizumi premiership. Koizumi’s premiership certainly was different. Koizumi was a more independent, personally responsible, and decisive chief executive than were Japan’s past prime ministers. He relied less on what was euphemistically called “broad consultation” within the LDP to formulate his policies. He exercised more independence in his appointment of cabinet members and senior Party officials. But what accounted for that difference? Certainly Koizumi wasn’t the first Japanese prime minister who hoped to exercise the responsibilities of that office more independently!
It seemed to me that Koizumi was able to behave differently as Japan’s prime minister because of the way he sought, and then maintained, his position as LDP President. Most observers would agree that Koizumi relied less on LDP faction leader support for his election than he did on broader, or more popular, support within the LDP membership. And even – indirectly – the attentive Japanese public. That made him less dependent upon the approval of the Party’s faction leaders, both to maintain his position and to implement particular policies. So, I thought of him as more a “Populist” than a “Factionist.”
Back to the continuum point of a moment ago. That did not mean that Koizumi could completely ignore the LDP’s Faction leaders. Or completely ignore factional membership within the LDP. Or that LDP factions suddenly had become unimportant. It just meant that he didn’t have to rely on them to the extent his predecessors had, so he was able to behave more independently. Less Factionist, and more Populist, in other words. In Koizumi’s case, considerably more.
So what? You may ask again. Does all of this really matter to those of us who only want a better understanding of Japan’s domestic politics and international relations? Or is it just more “inside baseball.” Well, I think it does matter, and I think the distinction helps us to understand what’s going on these days in Japan.
First, it influences the process through which the new LDP president selects the members of his cabinet, once he’s elected prime minister by the Diet. The nature of that selection process will affect, as I mentioned last week, the quality of the individuals chosen to serve in cabinet and senior Party posts. And, as important, the relationships those individual cabinet members have with the prime minister. And, with each other!
Second, it affects the nature of Japan’s top-level policy formulation and implementation processes. Domestic and international. A prime minister less dependent upon LDP Faction leader approval, working with cabinet members selected for their abilities and support for the prime minister’s policy agenda, will behave quite differently than we’ve seen in the traditional model of Japanese prime ministerial leadership. Policies pursued will require broader, or more “popular” approval than in the past. Policy formulation and implementation processes won’t take as long as they used to. Japan’s central political executive will appear to be more decisive – AND more responsible. Cabinet meetings these days must be quite different than they used to be.
Third, it affects the nature of lobbying in Tokyo. Or, more politely, the representation of particular interests in politics. Patterns of power and influence change. Those hoping to influence those patterns then must adapt their strategies and tactics to the new environment. Who has the action on a particular issue? Who decides? How can they be influenced? My own lobbying experience in Japan was restricted to the latter half of the 1970s and early half of the 1980s. Under the old system. Quite a different game than that being played today. Though, of course, in lobbying the most important determinant of process is the nature of the issue or objective pursued.
So there you have it. I hope this responds to most of the comments and questions I received by e-mail last week. Thanks for sending them in. And continue to send your e-mail to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all and take them into consideration when preparing subsequent programs.
Well, we’re way over time again this week. No time even for bluegrass. Thanks again for tuning in. And join me here again next week when we’ll again consider the significance of recent events for Japan’s domestic politics and international relations.
Goodbye all. Until next week.
