August 25, 2006; Volume 02, Number 31
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning from the beautiful campus of the University of South Carolina. Looks like a temperate day coming on. Or temperate for late August here, anyway. Today is Friday, August 25th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 31, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for joining me again this week. Or, a hearty South Carolina welcome to those of you who are listening for the first time. Classes just started here at USC. It’s nice to have the students back. Nothing quite as desolate as a university campus with no students. I have two classes this semester: one an introductory course on international relations, and the other a course on Japan’s domestic politics. Both met for the first time yesterday. It looks like a promising semester!
I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and creator and host of this Podcast. Each week at this time we take 20 minutes or so to consider the longer-term implications of recent events in the news related to Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. This isn’t a comprehensive news program, now. Quite the opposite. I select only a few of the many possible topics and spend more time on each of those selected.
Several of you have asked how I make those selections. Well, there’s no science involved. Just the sense that closer consideration of the topics selected will provide us with a better understanding of Japan’s overall domestic politics and conduct of foreign relations. Send in your suggestions for new topics to cover when you feel I’ve left out something that might prove useful. I don’t promise to use them all, but certainly will consider them when preparing new programs. The e-mail address is RobertCAngel@gmail.com.
Speaking of listener feedback. A couple of e-mails received during the week require response. The first came from a well-informed and attentive listener who noticed that at one point I said Prime Minister Koizumi chose to visit Yasukuni Shrine on June 15th. Of course, the visit came on August 15th. Sorry for the error.
A second listener wrote to ask about the origins of this program and my qualifications to present it. The Japan Considered Project website offers more detailed information about both of these subjects. Those of you interested might take a tour of the introductory pages at www.JapanConsidered.org. Or, just do a Google search on Robert C. Angel and Japan. Though, since asked, I’ll try to provide some detail at the end of this broadcast for those who may be interested.
Podcast Production Advice on the Web
Each week a few notes arrive from folks who hope to produce their own podcasts. They often have more interest in the production of such programs than in the content. I’ve managed to learn to use the various software packages required to create and publish the programs. But I’m not competent to answer any but the most basic technical questions. More like someone operating a player piano.
I can, however, suggest a good source of sound production information on the Web. Point your browser at www.audio2u.com. That will take you to a comprehensive website created by Bruce Williams. Bruce is an Australian audio engineer with many years in the business. He produces four weekly podcasts, including his weekly “Building the Pod.”
Each week, for the past 60 weeks or so, Bruce has explained on “Building the Pod” how to use Adobe Audition. Audition is a sophisticated, complex program notorious for its steep learning curve. As of today, August 25th, Bruce provides around 60 weeks-worth of “Building the Pod” in his Audio2U archive. If you’re serious about improving the sound of your podcast, and on a limited budget, just begin at week one and work forward. Bruce will walk you through the process in clear, easy-to-understand language.
“Building the Pod” is by far the best source of training I’ve found for Adobe Audition. I doubt that I would have tackled Audition without it. And now I wouldn’t use anything else. Bruce is a natural teacher, one of those technical folks who can explain complex matters simply to the rest of us. A great gift.
And, for those of you with some spare change, Bruce recently was asked by Lynda.com, a producer of training videos of all sorts, to create “Audition 2.0 Essential Training.” I’ve yet to see or hear any of the videos. But according to Bruce’s site, the series is available now on Lynda.com’s website. Or click on the Building The Pod webpage for a free 24-hour pass to the Lynda.com website. The addition of video must make Audition even easier to understand.
The Kisshin Maru 31 Incident Continues
A long-time listener wrote last week to say it’s been some time since we’ve considered international relations on the program. He’s right, of course. We’ve been focused almost exclusively on domestic political affairs for the past few weeks. With only brief mention of international goings-on.
Lots going on in Japan’s international affairs. Most visible recently has been the after-effects of Russia’s seizure of a Japanese fishing boat from Nemuro, Hokkaido, imprisoning the crew, and killing one of them in the process. Negotiations continue over this unfortunate, and potentially explosive, incident.
As of today, Friday the 25th, the body of the slain fisherman, Mitsuhiro Morita, has been returned to Japan. But Russian authorities continue to detain the three remaining Japanese fisherman, and have impounded their boat. Shinzo Abe described the Russian action as “unacceptable” during his first regular briefing of the Kantei press corps after his vacation. And LDP Secretary General, Tsutomu Takebe, who hails from Hokkaido, has traveled to Russia in an effort to obtain the crew’s release, demonstrating how seriously Tokyo takes the issue.
But Russia is standing firm, charging that the crew of the Kisshin Maru # 31 knowingly violated Russian territorial waters. That they almost certainly were engaged in poaching. And that they themselves were responsible for the incident since they were running at night with no lights in order to evade detection. So, the incident drags on.
As mentioned last week, for us, the real significance of this potentially explosive incident is that it hasn’t been allowed to explode. By either side. This is encouraging. We can only hope that it continues, and that a solution can be found that will at least partially satisfy both parties in the dispute.
The East China Sea Gas Exploitation Dispute Continues
Another potentially explosive international issue for Japan continues to simmer to the south. This one involving the territorial dispute with Mainland China over natural gas exploitation in the East China Sea. We’ve mentioned this dispute a number of times on this program. So, to save time today, check back in the archives if you need background on the topic.
Earlier this month, Japanese news sources reported that the China National Offshore Oil Corporation announced on their corporate website the beginning of gas production at the disputed Chunxiao Oilfield in the East China Sea. Japan calls it Shirakiba, which I can actually pronounce! The information was confirmed in an August 7th article in the internet version of China’s official English language newspaper, the Beijing China Daily. A pretty reliable source when it comes to Chinese affairs.
Japanese media reports expressed concern over the report of a unilateral Chinese decision to begin production there since bilateral negotiations are on-going over exactly that issue.
Japanese government response, however, was moderate. METI Minister Toshihiro Nikai issued a statement the following day, August 8th, urging a cautious Japanese response. He said that actual production had yet to be confirmed. And, Japan had made an official request to resume bilateral discussion of the issue.
Now, METI Minister Nikai is well known for his conciliatory stance toward Mainland China. And I suppose his cautious response might be described charitably as “predictable.” But we should also note that Nikai’s public comments were allowed to stand by the Kantei. Neither Official Government Spokesman Shinzo Abe nor Foreign Minister Taro Aso made contrary comments after Nikai’s statement was released. And, a week later, on August 14th, METI told Japan’s press that it had received official assurance from Beijing that gas production had not started at the site. Japanese media observation later confirmed that. Though they found that production was in full swing at a site just 18 kilometers to the northeast.
So, again, the handling of this potentially explosive diplomatic issue suggests that Tokyo continues to avoid using international incidents to enflame Japanese domestic opinion, or to increase support for the incumbent government or its policies. A good sign, given the prickly nature of diplomatic relations in the East Asian region.
The LDP Presidential Succession Race
Japan’s political media continues to provide in-depth coverage of the LDP’s presidential race. According to all informed observers, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Shinzo Abe, remains the near-certain winner. Neither Finance Minister Tanigaki nor Foreign Minister Aso have been able to come even close. And unexpectedly, at least for me, Tanigaki in many of the surveys has dropped even behind Aso. Though neither candidate represents a real threat to Abe.
Abe’s success, as we noted in previous weeks, has attracted even more supporters among the all-important LDP members of the Lower and Upper Houses of the Diet. One telling example of Abe’s formidability can be seen in announcement of the creation of a parliamentary study group critical of Prime Minister Koizumi’s less conciliatory Asia policy. The group is chaired by former LDP Secretary General Koichi Kato – once considered a strong prime ministerial candidate himself – and Hajime Funada. They held their first meeting yesterday, the 24th, and attracted 19 additional LDP members.
Kato and other members of the group have openly discussed their plan for some time now, including their hope to return to a more conciliatory policy toward Mainland China and South Korea. Yet, surprising for me, they have declined to openly support Finance Minister Tanigaki in the LDP presidential race. Even though he proposes very similar policies! Presumably out of fear they would be disadvantaged once Abe won the race. Such support undoubtedly would be welcomed by Tanigaki. And it would help to insure at least some substantive discussion of issues during the LDP presidential election campaign. But, political expediency will always trump principle, I guess.
Speaking of issues in the presidential race, Kyodo News today released the results of an interesting survey they did earlier in the week. They surveyed the 47 secretaries general of the LDP prefectural branches. One question asked was what issues the prefectural party officials would most like to see discussed during the Party presidential campaign. 31 of the 47 said they would like to see growing economic inequality discussed. Especially the growing gap between rural and urban Japan. Four of the secretaries general said they would like to see medical care and pension problems discussed. And only two said they would like the debates to focus on international problems.
Hmmm. Add to this that domestic economic and social welfare issues emerge as the most important concern in every national-level survey of eligible voters I’ve seen to date. I guess Yasukuni Shrine visits by the prime minister are easier to cope with. But it suggests to me that plenty of room exists for the LDP’s parliamentary Opposition to raise domestic economic issues in the two Lower House by-elections scheduled for October and the Upper House elections in the summer of next year.
The Democratic Party of Japan: Opportunities and Challenges
Let’s turn now to the opportunities and challenges facing the Democratic Party of Japan. This is a big subject, and we have time today just for the first installment.
The DPJ is by far the largest of the Opposition party in Japan’s political party system. If only for that reason, it should be of interest to us. But the DPJ represents even more than that. Careful observation of its organization and activities should tell us more about the very nature of parliamentary opposition in Japan. How the system works.
Indeed, if we look for the right indicators, and interpret them accurately, the DPJ can tell us how traditional cadre political parties of this sort struggle to cope with changes in their domestic and international environments. This includes especially adaptation to introduction of new communications technologies. And adaptation to the influence on their constituencies of decades of quite broadly distributed economic prosperity. Traditional cadre, elite-dominated, highly centralized, parties in many other political systems face similar challenges.
Without question, the DPJ today has many opportunities to move up in the fluid world of Japan’s parliamentary politics. If only because the September 2005 General Election bloated LDP Lower House membership well beyond any sustainable level. And because the LDP next month will face the loss of its highly successful Party president. Given those conditions, it will be hard for the DPJ not to make significant gains.
But having said that, the DPJ’s challenges and problems are so great that it makes better sense for us to begin today with them. We might divide those challenges into problems of leadership, problems of diverse membership, and problems of agreement on policy direction. We’ll focus on leadership issues today and take up diverse membership and policy disagreements in subsequent programs.
Ichiro Ozawa assumed the presidency of the DPJ in early April of this year. His selection as party leader bordered on an act of institutional desperation, following the ill-fated efforts of Seiji Maehara and his band of young reformers. At the time, Ozawa seemed genuinely reluctant to assume the top job. And most certainly, others within the Party were reluctant to see him do it. But in light of the Party’s disastrous showing in the last general election, and the negative fallout from the Nagata e-mail disaster – an issue we followed on this program – desperate measures seemed called for. Ozawa was selected to take the helm.
As I’ve mentioned before on this program, Ozawa is both a brilliant and controversial. Both of those characteristics should be kept in mind when evaluating his performance as DPJ leader. Few politicians can boast Ozawa’s understanding of Japan’s national political scene, or match him as a Party tactician. And that’s a great plus for the DPJ. But Ozawa finds it difficult to escape his reputation as a political tough guy, a person who refuses to pull his punches when dealing with other parliamentarians, with national bureaucrats, or even with members of the Japanese press corps. Generally speaking, he’s thought of more highly as a political tactician than as a champion of political ideals.
This makes Ozawa himself “excellent copy,” as the journalists would say. In fact, he’s one of the few figures in Japanese public life, outside the imperial family, who can afford to handle the Japanese press by limiting their access to him. Back in the 1990s, for example, he refused to hold press conferences at all for some time, after becoming offended by what was written about him.
Japan’s senior political reporters are a pampered lot. Many of them enjoy generous expense accounts, and the luxury of being taken to and from their appointments in chauffer-driven automobiles. It’s hard to accept being talked down to, I guess, when you’ve arrived at the meeting in a chauffer-driven car.
I mention this because much of the press coverage the DPJ has received since Ozawa became president has been more about Ozawa than about the Party itself. That’s understandable, of course. Perhaps inevitable. But in Ozawa’s case, one gets the impression that the press corps is just waiting to pounce on a mistake. Waiting for him to lose his temper. Or to make an outrageous statement that they can plaster onto the following day’s front pages. This distracts from efforts to get the Party’s message out to the voting public.
Further complicating the DPJ’s leadership problems, Ozawa must share the spotlight with other party leaders. Especially Naoto Kan and Yukio Hatoyama. Both former Party leaders, who maintain strong personal followings within its ranks. Ozawa has wisely included Kan and Hatoyama in his Party management team. And I’ve tried to learn more about how this triumvirate arrangement is working in practice. But no luck. I can’t even dig up good rumors! Folks in Tokyo who know about such things aren’t willing to comment. And those willing to comment haven’t had much useful information to contribute. We’ll just have to judge from the results, I guess. But it’s hard to imagine three senior political figures with less in common than Ozawa, Kan, and Hatoyama.
For the past several days Japan’s political press has been carrying reports from un-attributed “sources” about the political “manifesto” Ozawa plans to publish before, or at the time of, his official announcement of candidacy for another term as DPJ President. Today, Kyodo News reported that it will appear in the form of a book, to be published by Shueisha, on September 1st. According to this article, the book will be entitled “Ozawaism,” and will outline Ozawa’s domestic and international policy positions in some detail. If that actually is the title, it’s quite an interesting choice.
According to Kyodo, Ozawa proposes in the book that Japan create a special military force, separate from the current Self Defense Forces, that will be available to serve when called under the command of the United Nations. He also proposes increases in government farm price supports to the point that Japan can consider 100% self-sufficiency in food. And measures to reduce economic disparity between rural and urban regions of Japan. Together with expansion of the social welfare safety net. Quite a policy agenda, it seems.
We’ll undoubtedly hear more about the book after its publication. I’ll keep you posted. Both on the specifics of Ozawa’s policy proposals and on the reaction those proposals elicit, once published. We can only hope that the book will help to shift attention from the personalistic to substantive policy discussion. Though that’s a long shot …. Realistically speaking.
Personal Background and Origins of the Japan Considered Project
We’re over time yet again. But I did agree to add something on my own background and the origins of the Japan Considered Project. Briefly, I’ve enjoyed spending the last four decades or so involved as a student, participant, and academic in Japan’s relationship with the United States. This all began during the early 1960s with a tour in Japan as a member of the U.S. Air Force. After that, a few years of knocking around in the U.S. and Japan, then Columbia University in New York for undergraduate through PhD degrees in political science and Japan studies.
Language training at Columbia – 30 credits as an undergraduate – and then an intensive year of further language training at the Stanford Center in Tokyo. The Stanford Center under Dr. Ken Butler’s direction, provided – and still provides – wonderful language training. They can take even poor language students like me, and within a year, prepare them to work academically or professionally in Japanese. I recommend their program to anyone serious about the language.
Beyond that, I was president and CEO of the Japan Economic Institute in Washington, D.C. from 1977 to 1984. A great experience that may be reflected in my approach to the PR and lobbying aspects of Japan’s politics and international relations. Since 1986, though I’m hardly a typical academic, I’ve enjoyed peaceful university life here at USC, with trips to Washington and Tokyo to break the routine.
The origins of the Japan Considered Project are much simpler to explain. I developed the general concept during a hospital stay in mid-June 2004. I’d spent most of the previous several years working on creation of the John C. West Forum on Politics and Policy here at the University, and on our Department’s undergraduate program. Very little time had been left over for Japan-related activities.
Having time for longer-range “what’s-it-all-about” type thinking while in the hospital, I decided it was time to remedy that situation. And Japan Considered was born. At first it was only the website, with its links to useful information and interviews with other American specialists on Japan. In mid-November 2005, I learned about podcasting and added this podcast to the mix. Since funding was limited – non-existent, really – the project had to focus on those activities I could fund out-of-pocket. The website and podcast fit the bill perfectly. The University kindly provides web hosting services.
So there you have it. Thanks for dropping in again today. Please continue to send your corrections, suggestions, and general comments to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I enjoy reading them, and take each one into consideration when planning future programs.
No time for bluegrass this week. I’ll try to make up for it next time. So, until then,
Goodbye all. Until next week.
