August 18, 2006; Volume 02, Number 30
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning! From the beautiful – and now a bit more temperate – campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, August 18th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 30, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for dropping in again today. Really, with no exaggeration, weather here has turned quite nice. Warm still. But with enough white puffy clouds in that Carolina Blue sky to keep the temperatures down to almost reasonable levels. Maybe we’re over the worst of that summer heat here. I hope you are enjoying weather equally nice, wherever you are, throughout the world.
I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and creator and host of this Podcast. Each week we take twenty minutes, or so, to consider the longer-term significance of recent events for Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. I don’t claim – or try – to provide comprehensive coverage of either domestic politics or international relations. But hopefully analysis and interpretation, provided from a somewhat different perspective, will make up for it.
So, thanks for tuning in. And continue to send your suggestions and comments to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all, and take each one into consideration when planning future programs.
Speaking of “throughout the world,” listener statistics for the program continue to increase. According to the folks who keep track of such things, we continue to make encouraging gains our international listenership. Of course, most of you are in the United States and Japan. But listener numbers are increasing steadily in Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asian countries other than Japan. Albania? Welcome! Two regular listeners there. And a surprising number of you in Spain. Don’t know why. But glad to have you. I hope all of you find the program worth the time it takes you to find it and to listen.
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This has been O-Bon Week in Japan. The week most sensible folks in Japan’s metropolitan areas return to their “furusato,” or home towns, to greet family – present and past generations. Tokyo should be a ghost town now – of a different sort! With few people left to create newsworthy events. I had hoped to use the resulting “down time” to catch up with important topics we’ve had to let slide during past weeks.
However, throughout O-Bon week, news from Tokyo has been chuck-full of politically and internationally significant material. So, we have a lot to consider this week. And, we’d better get right to it. First, we’ll examine the significance of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15th. I’ve received a surprising number of e-mails about this topic since the visit was announced. So we’ll take a look at what this subject really means. While we’re at it, we then can consider Prime Minister Koizumi’s role in Japan’s domestic politics and international relations after he leaves the premiership. An important topic, I think, that’s been given virtually no attention in Japan’s political press.
Russian Interception of Fishing Boat Incident
First, though, we have to take note of an unfortunate incident that occurred on Wednesday morning, Japan time, in the foggy seas off the Nemuro Peninsula of Hokkaido. That’s Japan’s northernmost island. This area is the subject of territorial dispute between Russia and Japan. According to Japanese and Russian press reports, early Wednesday morning, around 4:00 a.m., a Russian border patrol vessel intercepted a Japanese fishing boat near Kaigara Island. The Russian vessel fired flares, and then small-arms warning shots, toward the fishing boat. One of those warning shots killed one of the four Japanese crewman on the fishing boat, 35-year-old Mitsuhiro Morita. The Russian patrol vessel then towed the Japanese boat to Kunashiri Island, which is now controlled by Russia. There, the boat and its remaining crew members were held on suspicion of poaching.
Japan’s government established a special information task force in the Kantei to coordinate collection of information on the incident right away. Journalists seeking immediate response from the Kantei were told the Government would have no comment until they had received more information. But that they were likely to protest excessive use of force against the fishing vessel. Foreign Minister Aso in response to reporters’ questions early Wednesday said he planned to take the matter seriously, but that he too could add no additional information.
Russia’s Federal Security Service also issued a statement soon after the incident. They charged that the Japanese boat refused to stop when ordered to do so by the Russian patrol craft. And they said the boat tried to ram a small inflatable carrying Russian inspectors when it approached, making it necessary to fire the warning shots. They described the Japanese fishing boat as a “high-speed schooner,” the Kisshin Maru 31, that was suspected of poaching crab in the disputed area.
Once the details of the incident reached Tokyo, Japan’s government lodged a protest with Russia’s embassy in Tokyo. And dispatched a senior Foreign Ministry official to Moscow for further consultation. Other officials were sent to Nemuro to arrange for the return of Morita’s body and to demand release of the other crew members and the boat.
Today, Vice Foreign Minister Akiko Yamanaka and Gaimusho officials are on Kunashiri Island to interview the Japanese crew members and escort Morita’s body back to Japan.
Significance of the Kisshin Maru Incident
Early Japanese and Western media reports were quick to conclude that this unfortunate incident would heighten tensions in the already-tense Japan-Russia relationship. The “Northern Territories” issue, after all, has been blamed for the failure of the two countries to conclude a World War Two peace treaty. But that hasn’t happened. At least not so far. And I doubt that it will.
Both countries have issued official and unofficial statements intended to support their positions. The Russian side charges that the Nisshin Maru 31 was a known crab poacher that tried to escape arrest when confronted. And that the killing of the crew member was totally unintentional, caused by a high wave sending a warning shot astray during arrest efforts. The Japanese side insists that the crew member’s death represents exercise of excessive and unreasonable force by the Russian side, given the circumstances, and that an official apology, at least, is warranted.
Our concern on this program is with what such incidents as the Kisshin Maru 31 capture tell us about Japan’s conduct of foreign relations. It’s only been two days since publication of the first reports of the incident. But so far, at least, there is no evidence that Japan’s government will try to use this unfortunate incident to whip up domestic nationalist or anti-foreign sentiment. Or to increase popular support for its incumbent regime. Or that regime’s policies. Neither Japan’s foreign minister nor prime minister have expressed “outrage” during emotionally-charged press conferences. There have been no anti-Russian public demonstrations in Japan. Officially sanctioned or otherwise. That’s encouraging. And an example other Asian nations might profitably consider.
In the longer term, however, I suspect that news of this incident will make Japan’s attentive public even more skeptical of a return to the conciliatory posture that characterized Japan’s conduct of foreign relations during the 1950s and 1960s. During the period that the United States assumed virtually full responsibility for Japan’s international security. Especially when combined with North Korea’s recent missile displays, and more recent rumors of preparations for nuclear weapons tests. And established concerns about territorial problems in the East China Sea and Sea of Japan. Japan’s attentive public, in other words, is even more likely to expect future Japanese prime ministerial regimes to continue to enhance Japan’s self-defense capabilities. This should not be interpreted as a “return to militarism.” Rather, it’s a predictable response to changes in Japan’s external and domestic environments that necessitate adaptation of policies and behavior.
Prime Minister Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine Visit: “Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain.”
Tuesday was August 15th, the 61st anniversary of Japan’s surrender at the end of World War Two. After weeks – even months – of public speculation, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made good on an early campaign promise by visiting Yasukuni Shrine to pay his respects to Japan’s war dead. And he went as Japan’s prime minister. Not just as an individual.
Koizumi, in morning coat, arrived at the Shrine in an official car soon after 7 in the morning. His visit was covered live by Japan’s television stations. Then immediately upon his return to the Kantei, Koizumi held an unusual meeting with the Kantei press corps to explain his actions and respond to questions. Clearly, this was no routine event. Reporting on the event, and analysis of its significance, dominated Japan’s political media coverage during the first part of the week. And it still continues on.
Yasukuni Shrine, and official visits by Japanese government officials, have been topics of political controversy in Japan for some time now. Especially since the secret enshrinement in the late 1970s of twelve individuals identified as Class A war criminals during the international war crimes trials following World War Two.
Prime Minister Koizumi, as he explained during his meeting with the press following Tuesday’s visit, insists that he visits the Shrine to pray for peace, and out of respect for Japan’s war dead. His critics charge that his official visits glorify – and to some extent, legitimate – individuals responsible for the suffering Japan’s actions during World War Two inflicted upon the world. And upon Japan itself.
Government of China spokesmen’s insistence that Koizumi’s Shrine visits represent an insult to the Chinese people has further complicated the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue. The South Koreans in recent years have joined the Chinese charge. Both countries have demanded that Koizumi refrain from visiting the Shrine or face diplomatic sanctions. They’ve been unwilling to hold summit meetings, for example. We’ve talked about this before on this program.
Koizumi and his supporters have countered that the Chinese and South Korean comments represent interference in Japanese domestic affairs, and have rejected their demands out of hand. During the past few months, Beijing seems to have recognized that their vocal attacks on Koizumi over the Shrine visits were doing more harm than good to Japanese attentive public views of China. And they have downplayed their criticism. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesmen expressed outrage following Koizumi’s visit, of course. But compared to Foreign Minister Li’s comments earlier in the year about the same issue, China’s official reaction was quite calm.
Domestic discussion of the issue in Japan continues unabated, however. With Japan’s newspapers and television stations giving the issue prominent play, both in their news and in their commentary sections. The Japanese media have pulled out all the stops to maintain the Yasukuni visit as a key issue in the public discussion of the LDP presidential election, scheduled for the 20th of next month. Front-runner in that race, Shinzo Abe, for example, is condemned for failure to issue a definitive statement of his Yasukuni visit intentions before the election. Indeed, Japan’s political media has devoted more attention to this than to any other issue. Social welfare policies? Unequal regional development problems? Growing economic inequality across generations? The undesirable consequences of marketization policies? Population decline? National tax rates? Substantive foreign policies? All of these important issues have received much less attention in Japan’s political press than has the Yasukuni visit problem.
Yasukuni Shrine Visit Protests as a Symbol Representing Larger Concerns
What accounts for this? Especially when so many other pressing issues face post-Koizumi Japan? Well, I’m not sure. But I think the Yasukuni Visit issue has become something like a marker in Japan’s national political discourse. Or a symbol. That is, it is an issue used by Koizumi’s critics to represent much more than the advisability of official Yasukuni Shrine visits. If this is true, when Japanese political commentators bring up the Yasukuni issue, they are not just referring to Yasukuni. They are criticizing the overall direction of the changes Koizumi has made in Japan’s foreign relations.
Those changes might be summarized here as Koizumi’s efforts to revise the more conciliatory international policies and behavior that characterized Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. To replace them with foreign policies and behavior he believes more appropriate to Japan’s current international and domestic environments. A more independent, self-reliant orientation, perhaps, describes it.
I’ve come to this conclusion after discussing the Yasukuni visit issue with as many Japanese as I can during the past few weeks, and by comparing their views on the Yasukuni visits with their overall foreign policy views. I’ve found “a high correlation,” as my scientifically-inclined colleagues here would say. Those significantly opposed to the official Yasukuni Visits, without exception, prefer a more conciliatory foreign policy for Japan. Those who either support the visits, or are unconcerned about them, almost without exception, support Koizumi’s conduct of foreign relations.
So, the Yasukuni debate really isn’t about Yasukuni. It’s about how Japan should interact with the rest of the world in the decades to come. And therefore it is more significant than the mythical “neutral observer” might think at first glance. It’s a shame, though, that the issues involved can’t be more forthrightly discussed. Japan’s public, and ultimately those parts of the world Japan interacts with, would be much better served by a frank discussion of the real issues. Should Japan adopt more independent, self-reliant foreign policies, or not? Let’s hope that happens once the LDP presidential succession is decided.
The Post-Prime Ministerial Koizumi Question
Which raises the question of why Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi decided on this August 15th to visit Yasukuni Shrine. Since Tuesday, his visit has been described, especially in the foreign press, as his “swan song,” his “final act” on the political stage. And so on.
Of course it wasn’t. And we need to think more about that. This is an issue that’s received virtually no attention in Japan’s political press. It’s most unlikely that Koizumi will resign his Lower House Diet seat and return to private life. He is far more likely after stepping down just to take a vacation. Probably a vacation shorter than we expect. And then return to Japan’s political stage as one of Japan’s very few successful prime ministers. Even more successful, it might be argued, than Yasuhiro Nakasone, the only other living prime minister to have left office with rising poll numbers and his head held high.
Koizumi is, for a Japanese politician, relatively young. He appears to be in good health, if understandably a bit tired. As evidenced by his decision to visit Yasukuni Shrine on Tuesday, he seems to have lost none of his enthusiasm for the rough and tumble of political life. Indeed, he may find it difficult, after a short vacation, to abandon the limelight.
Sooo, if he does return to public life, what role will he play? Indeed, will he remain a significant force in Japanese politics as a former prime minister?
I’m inclined to think – based on unashamed speculation here – that Koizumi will remain an important force. And that his involvement will have significant influence upon the administrations of his successors. Koizumi proved himself an accomplished political actor. Indeed, he introduced “Koizumi theater” into the political process, according to his critics. But, he’s far more than just a political player, a political gun-slinger, who plays the game for the thrill of competition. Someone who has no real political convictions. I believe he had – and maintains – a genuine interest in a number of issues that are important to the future of Japan’s domestic politics and international relations.
First, and ultimately most important, he is likely to maintain his opposition to the LDP’s personalistic factions. He is most unlikely to re-join the faction he himself once led while Yoshiro Mori was prime minister. It’s likely he will continue his campaign to weaken the power of faction leaders over Japan’s central political executive.
How? By providing encouragement and support to those LDP members who agree not to affiliate themselves with a faction. And by encouraging amenable faction members to take their responsibilities to the people and the Party more seriously than they do their membership in a personalistic faction. And by blasting “Factionist Politics” in Japan’s political press every chance he gets. That’s a theme that resonates for Japan’s attentive public.
In addition to continuation of support for privatization of government functions, where possible, Koizumi also is likely to support more independent, self-reliant international relationships for Japan after leaving the prime ministership. This he could do by serving subsequent cabinets as a senior adviser on foreign relations. Or as a special international emissary, taking advantage of personal relationships he has developed during his five years in the Kantei. Koizumi, as he demonstrated during his Tuesday morning meeting with the Kantei press corps, is a persuasive speaker. He appears to me to have a keen understanding of Japanese public political sentiment, and the skills necessary to influence that sentiment when he chooses. Here too his public statements will be effective, I think.
One cloud on the horizon I see for the post-prime ministerial Junichiro Koizumi is his relationship with Japan’s political press. As with every prime minister before him, Koizumi has inevitably made bitter individual enemies within Japan’s political press corps. His decision early on to modify the relationship between the prime minister and the press corps also did nothing to enhance his reputation with Japan’s journalists overall. That significantly limited the direct access the Kantei press corps had heretofore enjoyed to the prime minister, and, you might say, formalized the relationship. Also, Koizumi doesn’t have a senior press figure to watch his back, so to speak, the way Yasuhiro Nakasone has had Yomiuri’s Tsuneo Watanabe. Or if he does, I haven’t heard about it.
So, Koizumi’s relationship with Japan’s political press is likely to change dramatically the moment he leaves the Kantei and is no longer prime minister. And almost certainly, not for the better!
Let’s hope that Japan’s political journalists who know more about this post-premiership Koizumi issue begin giving it more thought soon. They should have interesting insights once they turn their attention in that direction.
That’s all we have time for on this O-Bon Week. Which was supposed to be non-eventful! Thanks for joining me again this week. And continue to send your comments and suggestions for the podcast to me at robertcangel@gmail.com. I look forward to reading them.
Well, the anticipated flood of complaints about the omission of the bluegrass ending for last week’s program was more modest than I expected. Indeed, not a single …. Well, sometimes e-mail messages get lost in the University’s Spam filter. I’m sure there were many more sent than arrived ….
So, this week another special treat. From the incomparable John Duffey again. From his “Always in Style” compilation on Sugar Hill Records, the haunting “Long Black Veil.”
[bluegrass clip]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
