August 11, 2006; Volume 02, Number 29
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good Morning! From the sunny, and somewhat cooler, campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, August 11th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 29, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for tuning in this week. I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and creator and host for this Podcast. It’s good to be back. Vacation was nice. But I missed the opportunity to talk with you about Japan’s domestic politics and international relations.
No, last week wasn’t another case of PodFading! Just a vacation. That I mentioned before leaving. The first in quite a few years. I’m supposed to be getting back into the normal vacation routine. But, we’ll see….
I returned yesterday from a ten-day trip that took me from Columbia, South Carolina, to the very heart of the Finger Lakes Region of New York State. And then back, and around South Carolina. Ten days of camping, beautiful scenery, and visits with family and old friends. Plus, over 1,400 miles of driving, towing a hard-sided pop-up camper! It was a great adventure. And a great learning experience. But it’s good to be back behind the Japan Considered microphone. And back preparing course syllabi for the fall semester – now nearly upon us here at USC.
A lot has happened in Japan’s domestic politics and international relations during the past two weeks. Just before Japan’s annual O-Bon Festival. More on that celebration next week. There may be some domestic political significance.
Fortunately, I was able to keep up with the English and Japanese language news from Tokyo while on the trip. That was possible through the miracle of WiFi connections to the internet. Many campgrounds these days provide what they call a “WiFi cloud” for their more industrious – or obsessive – campers. It was a great addition to the adventure. In fact, were my elderly laptop computer just a little more powerful, I could have produced and distributed the Podcast from the road. From one of those WiFi-equipped campsites. At least, in theory. Maybe a project for the next vacation. Whenever that happens.
This week we have to consider developments in the race to succeed Junichiro Koizumi as president of the LDP, and prime minister of Japan. A lot has happened since we last met. Some of it significant. Well, significant for us, anyway. Since consideration of those happenings helps us better understand how the LDP and Japan’s domestic political system works. And how it’s likely to work in the future.
Our further consideration of developments during the past two weeks in Japan’s major Opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, or Minshuto, will have to be somewhat delayed. Media coverage of the DPJ, in both English and in Japanese, is surprisingly limited. So, during the last program, I asked folks with a better grasp of recent goings-on in that Party to write in with information and suggestions. Normally such requests bring forth dozens of e-mail messages, many of them with useful ideas. I’d even hoped to find someone in Tokyo to do a Skype Phone interview on the subject! This time, however, the silence was deafening – to coin a phrase …. Not a single listener came forward with better information on the DPJ.
Sooo, I’ve had to dig deeper into the files I’ve collected over the years for historical background. And, deeper into the internet for more current material. Thank heaven for Google, Goo, and a couple of other on-line search engines that make the search process quicker and more comprehensive. My files, collected religiously since the 1970s, are of limited value for this, of course, since the Party has such a short history. (Though several of the key individuals involved have been around for a good while.) All this will take another week or so before it’ll be worthwhile to take up the DPJ again.
So, on to consideration of developments during the past couple of weeks in the LDP presidential race.
Most important, it’s now near-certain that there are only three candidates in the race. In alphabetical order, they are, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Shinzo Abe, Foreign Minister, Taro Aso, and Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki. For a few days it appeared that Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga might add his name to the list. Probably as a result of the positive media coverage he received last month in the wake of North Korea’s diplomatic missile initiative. But he was encouraged NOT to stand by senior leaders of his own LDP faction. And he wisely followed their advice. Senior LDP member, Taku Yamasaki, too dropped from consideration last week, after hinting broadly that’s he’d be willing to stand if LDP colleagues wanted him to. They didn’t.
Shinzo Abe continues to lead the pack, appearing to gain support with every passing day. As we discussed week before last, nothing in politics is more attractive than a winner. And Abe now appears near-certain to win. More on that in a moment. Foreign Minister Aso remains visible. But political commentators in Japan still question whether he can generate even the required 20 LDP Diet Member endorsements required to register his name as a candidate on September 8th.
Finance Minister Tanigaki’s Candidacy
Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki is another matter. He’s the only one so far to have formally declared his candidacy. And he still seems serious about the race. He’s traveling around the country, speaking where he can, delivering his policy messages. Now, whether those policy messages will gain or lose him support, is another matter entirely.
We covered his candidacy announcement week before last, and his performance at the first of LDP Secretary General Takebe’s Party Bloc Meetings in Tokyo, on July 28th. Very convincing. But somehow he seems to have difficulty getting his poll numbers into the double-digits. The latest one I’ve seen, in fact, was only 9%.
Tanigaki has come out solidly in opposition to prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and says he won’t make them if he wins the race. Japan’s political journalists ask him time and again about the Yasukuni issue, and he replies consistently to their questions.
Tanigaki also continues during his speeches around the country to insist that Japan’s national sales tax rate must be raised significantly during the next few years. Doubled, in fact! You’ve got to admire him for that. Most political candidates avoid discussion of tax increases, even when they’re inevitable. And everybody knows they’re inevitable. It just isn’t good politics. But Tanigaki seems to believe that he can gain support by being “sincere” about this issue. Or, maybe he just believes it has to be said!
He does make a good case for his tax increase proposal. At every stop he argues that Japan’s population is aging rapidly – more rapidly than was expected even under earlier official pessimistic predictions. He points to the decline in Japan’s savings rates. He insists, quite reasonably, that Japan’s government has to balance its accounts soon, run a surplus, and begin to reduce its long-term debt. Otherwise, Japan will have difficulty coping with growing social welfare demands as the “baby-boomer” generation is pensioned off. To be supported in their old age by a decreasing number of gainfully employed younger Japanese. This, Tanigaki argues, can’t be done through spending cuts alone. More money’s got to come in. Makes economic sense! Even if you’re not Finance Minister. But will it make political campaign sense? Tax increases have been a tough sell in the past …. Ask Walter Mondale.
Tanigaki Failing to Receive “ABA” Support
I’m frankly surprised that Tanigaki hasn’t been able to attract the ABA [Anybody But Abe] element within the LDP, given his firm opposition to Yasukuni visits by the prime minister. And his open willingness to cope with government budget problems through an increase in the national sales tax rate. He seemed – and still seems – to me the ideal alternative to Yasuo Fukuda. Indeed, a better ABA candidate than Fukuda ever would have been himself, considering Tanigaki’s positions on the important issues. And his established association with the more liberal wing of the LDP. But it’s been a while now since Fukuda announced his decision not to run. And the flow of former Fukuda supporters to Tanigaki’s camp has yet to reach anything we might describe as “stampede” levels.
Instead, we’re seeing declared LDP “AnybodyButAbe” Diet Members shift their support from Yasuo Fukuda to Shinzo Abe himself. As Abe’s fortunes rise in all of the polls. This suggests that LDP political insiders now believe that Abe’s lead in the race is unstoppable, and that they would rather back a winner than a loser. That’s at least understandable in political terms. If disappointing. As we’ve noted repeatedly on this program, the LDP as a whole would be better served by a hard-fought campaign for the Party presidency. As would be the eventual winner. More on that point too in a moment.
More on the Significance of Opinion Poll Reports
Mentioning opinion poll results offers an opportunity to give more consideration to the poll numbers tossed around while handicapping the LDP presidential race. During the last program I mentioned the importance of considering each poll’s sponsors, and those sponsors’ political inclinations. This likely affects wording of questions, methods of polling, and a number of other factors.
In addition to that, we should take note of the specific population being polled.
There are several populations relevant to LDP presidential elections. All of them have been polled at one time or another, and the varying results reported. Some of the polls are region-specific. Often the Tokyo metropolitan area. Lots and lots of people. But, of course, in no way representative of the whole country.
Then there are polls of LDP members of the Lower and Upper Houses of the Diet. They represent a critical population for LDP presidential races since they have been allocated nearly 60% of the total votes in the race.
Then there are regular LDP rank-and-file Party members in the prefectural branches. Or, less formal polls of “prefectural branch leaders.” This population too is important since it gives us an idea of how the 300 votes in the presidential race allocated to the prefectural branches will turn out.
Beyond that, are polls of eligible voters, either LDP supporters who aren’t Party members, or all eligible voters regardless of political leanings. Polls of this population have only indirect influence on the LDP presidential race. Since it gives both Diet members and Party branch members an idea of how the public will vote in future Diet elections. A point close to the heart of any politician.
So, each of these populations poll somewhat differently. And each population, as I said, has somewhat different significance for the outcome of the LDP presidential race. We have to take care not to compare poll results from one of those populations with those of another population. In the future, I’ll try to be more specific when reporting poll results on this program, giving the poll’s sponsor and the population polled, as well as the results. The 9% result for Tanigaki I mentioned earlier came from a Yomiuri poll of 3,000 eligible voters nationwide. It was conducted last weekend, well after Fukuda’s announcement.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe’s star brightens with every passing hour, it seems. By mid-day yesterday it was clear that LDP Diet Members dissatisfied with Abe had been unable to agree among themselves to support an alternative candidate. Tanigaki was available, just waiting to be asked to dance.
But the leaders of even the LDP factions most sympathetic to the policies he was espousing began to release reports of their intention to back Abe. Former LDP Secretary General Makoto Koga and current METI Minister Toshihiro Nikai are the co-leaders of the largest of the three splinter factions that formerly constituted the Kochikai. Once they announced plans to support Abe, it was clear that faction leaders’ efforts to assemble an ABA coalition had failed. And that the anti-Abe – or anti-Koizumi reform – contingent within the LDP had decided they were better off trying to align themselves with a sure winner than they would be backing a likely loser. Even though the likely loser was espousing policies very much in line with their own. The LDP hasn’t prospered for all of these years by allowing Principle to trump Political Expediency. Politics 101, I guess.
In spite of this, Abe continues to campaign as though he expected significant opposition in the September LDP Presidential race. Late last month he began a speaking tour that has taken him to Osaka, Kyoto, and Iwate to give speeches in which he explains his policy positions. And to promote his plans to give those who have tried and failed in Japanese society a second chance. He’s scheduled to attend Secretary General Takebe’s second LDP Bloc Meeting in Yokohama on the 22nd of this month. At least it can’t be said that Abe is behaving as if he’d already been named LDP president. And that’s good for all concerned.
Speculation on the Look of an Abe Premiership
In addition to Abe’s speaking engagements around the country, Japan’s political journalists have been reporting regularly on plans for the Abe prime ministerial administration. A common theme running through these anonymous reports is Abe’s intention to further centralize Japan’s national political decisionmaking in the Kantei.
One potentially significant example of this was reported earlier this week in Nihon Keizai Shimbun – Japan’s equivalent of the Wall Street Journal. Nikkei reported that Abe intends to create a Japanese National Security Council. Headed by the prime minister, council members would include the chief cabinet secretary, the foreign minister, the defense agency chief, and the finance minister. A new post of national security adviser also would be created. That individual would be appointed from among members of the Diet. And would become a member of the council.
According to the Nikkei report, Abe plans to charge this new organization with coordination of Japan’s foreign relations, and the management of international emergencies. He hopes the new Council will do a better job of coordinating the activities of the various government agencies responsible for Japan’s foreign relations than has the existing Security Council of Japan. That body, established originally in the hope it would play an overall coordination role, has proven too closely aligned with the Defense Agency to do the job.
I suspect we’ll hear more of Shinzo Abe’s policy platform during the coming week. It will be interesting to see how much of it involves efforts to improve Kantei coordination of Japan’s notoriously independent ministries and agencies. And in the process, create a more responsible central political executive for Japan. That, I believe, is one of the most significant results of a shift from Factionist to Populist prime ministers. IF that shift continues under Abe and his successors.
Significance for the Liberal Democratic Party
So, how have all of these developments affected the LDP? Especially the failure – at least so far – of a credible ABA challenger to emerge in the race?
Well, most obvious, I suppose, is that the race will be a lot less exciting with one candidate so far ahead. Even if Finance Minister Tanigaki stays in the race, and continues to present alternative policies, his activities will be taken much less seriously. Abe, naturally, will receive the lion’s share of public and media attention. But even Abe’s efforts will receive less public attention than they would in a tight race. Since the outcome is inevitable. Even winning-team fans are inclined to leave the stadium during the later innings of the game when their team’s way ahead, and victory is assured.
That, I believe, is unfortunate for the LDP, and for Japan as a whole. It will mean less opportunity for Japan’s public to consider the important policies discussed in the LDP presidential race. It will mean the LDP will have less opportunity to energize its base through discussion of those policies in preparation for the elections to come. And Opposition parties will have less opportunity to take advantage of those discussions to present alternative policies to their potential voters. Television news coverage of the race will focus even more on “feature” pieces than policy discussion. Haircuts, styles of clothing, and the like. Heaven knows, we already have enough of that.
Will Abe Become a Factionist Prime Minister?
A regular listener wrote in day before yesterday to note the increasing support Shinzo Abe is getting from LDP faction leaders. He asked if that means Abe, if elected, will become a Factionist prime minister rather than a Populist prime minister. It’s an interesting question. And like most interesting questions, denies a simple answer.
We’re probably safe to assume, though, that the LDP faction leaders now pledging their support are doing so in the hope of gaining some of the benefits that traditionally accrued to them and their predecessors in return for such support. Especially appointments to key government and Party positions for themselves and their faction members. And, almost as important, they wish to avoid being labeled as “outsiders” – what we used to call “anti-mainstream.” That would make it more difficult for them to attract new members, even keep their current members, and to maintain levels of public support, including funding.
So, it seems to me that on the faction leaders’ side, motivation and expectations remain pretty much what they’ve always been. The recipient’s situation is quite different, however. That’s because there’s a world of difference between an LDP presidential candidate who goes out and solicits the support of LDP faction leaders. And an LDP presidential candidate who has been offered the faction leaders’ support without asking for it. The latter – and Abe appears to me to be in the latter position – doesn’t have to promise special treatment to the faction leaders in return for their support. He simply has to graciously accept the proffered backing, and smile. Leaving him free to make his own decisions about personnel and policies – if he’s so inclined.
Will Abe be so inclined? Well, hard to tell. But it looks that way – so far. That would make him more of a Populist than a Factionist prime minister. Even though he’s received the support of the factions. As I mentioned during the last program, Abe’s announced his decision to resign from the Mori Faction before declaring his candidacy. And he’s said he has no intention of being bound by the recommendations of the LDP’s faction leaders when naming his cabinet and formulating policies. These aren’t things a serious LDP presidential candidate would say publicly without giving the matter serious thought.
And, this again brings us to the future of the LDP’s factions. An even more complex topic. We considered it briefly week before last, focusing on the motivations of the various participants. We’ll have to focus on this important issue during a future program. But it won’t be long before we begin to read articles in Japan’s political press about the end of LDP factions. As usual, most of them will exaggerate the situation in order to get attention. We won’t need to do that here. LDP factions are not likely to disappear in the near future. Their functions, though, are likely to change significantly as they battle to survive. And that will affect the way politics is conducted at the national level in Japan. We’d better pay attention!
Well, that’s all we have time for this week. Thanks for listening. Or for reading, if you’ve gone to the Japan Considered website and downloaded the transcript of the program. They’re all there, from the beginning of 2006, at least. Just point your browser at www.JapanConsidered.ORG and have a look. Audio files too of all Japan Considered Podcasts from the beginning on November 18, 2005, are available there as well. Please continue to send your comments and suggestions to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all and take each into consideration when preparing future programs.
No time this week for Bluegrass. Apologies for that. I’m sure to get a storm of e-mail protests. But we’re out of time. So, for now,
Goodbye all. Until next week.
