July 17, 2006; Volume 02, Number 26
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good morning! From the warm – well, really, hot – campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Monday, July 17th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 26, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for tuning in. We’re running a little late again this week. But it’s a beautiful day here in Columbia, South Carolina. Glad to have you join me. Each week at this time we consider the longer-term implications of events in the news related to Japan’s domestic politics and Japan’s international relations. Not a comprehensive news service, by any means. Instead, I select two or three items and consider their longer-term significance.
Another very busy week in Japan’s political and diplomatic worlds. So we’d better get right to it. No major items for the “Oops Corner” e-mailed in recently. Though a few listeners did complain they had to wait too long for last week’s program. Sorry about that.
This week we’ll focus on two topics. The first is the outcome and significance of the July 2nd Shiga prefectural gubernatorial election. I think there’s been far too little attention given to this development in both the English and the Japanese political media. Then we’ll consider what I call the “Preemptive Attack Attack” on Japan that followed on the heels of North Korea’s missile launch display. In contrast to the Shiga election, this issue has received a lot of political media attention. But I fear that its treatment may invite significant misunderstanding – some intentional; some not.
The Shiga Prefectural Gubernatorial Election, and Japan’s Lady of the Lake
Monday morning, July 3rd, Japan’s political world awoke to a surprise. A middle-aged female college professor – supported by the Socialist Party, no less – had bested a well respected two-term incumbent, supported by most everybody else, in the previous day’s gubernatorial election in Shiga Prefecture. This wasn’t supposed to have happened!
Incumbent, Yoshitsugu Kunimatsu, was a solid two-term prefectural governor. He ran as an independent in this and in both of his earlier election races. But he enjoyed the acknowledged and active support of the prefectural LDP, the Komeito. And even the Democratic Party of Japan. It’s not uncommon for candidates to run officially as “independents” in Japan’s prefectural and local elections, even though they have the acknowledged support – and opposition – of particular parties.
The DPJ’s Decision to Join the LDP in Support of Incumbent Kunimatsu
What was surprising about Kunimatsu’s support, however, was that it included the Minshuto, Japan’s major opposition party. Minshuto, as part of their effort to build a more assertive, competitive party, had decided earlier on not to jointly endorse candidates in prefectural and local elections with the LDP. As a matter of policy. They made quite a thing about that decision at the time. Minshuto leaders described the Kunimatsu endorsement when it was announced in June as a rare “exception” to this important principle.
That “exception,” to me, is revealing. It could only have been made because DPJ strategists concluded that Governor Kunimatsu was a shoo-in. He couldn’t lose! We’re not considering here an incumbent who had some secret vulnerability that would knock him out of the running. So it would be foolish for the DPJ to endorse a sure loser. They had jointly endorsed him in his two previous campaigns, in 1998 and 2002. Why change now? For the sake of principle. True, he had a couple of opponents. But neither was very threatening. One a middle-aged female college professor with no political experience, and the other someone supported by the Communist Party. Nothing at all to be worried about. Better to be standing with the winner late election eve, than with the loser while explaining the importance of abiding by election strategy principles.
In addition, gubernatorial elections in Shiga had not been especially exciting events for some time. Only 38.7% of eligible voters turned out for the last one in 2002, for example. This low voter turnout, all else constant, would benefit candidates who enjoyed the endorsement of tightly-organized parties and their support groups.
Yoshitsugu Kunimatsu was as solid a Traditional political candidate as his dignified name suggests. At 68 he certainly wasn’t too old to run for electoral office. He had won handily both of his previous elections, in 1998 and 2002. He had a long career before that in the Shiga Prefectural government. Before his move to electoral politics he headed the KenCho’s influential general affairs department. Since then, for eight years he had effectively represented Shiga Prefecture. He wasn’t the sort of fellow whose personal behavior led to embarrassing episodes that had plagued the images of some other prefectural governors. Further, he had quite a solid record on environmental affairs, an important issue in Shiga Prefecture.
Shiga Prefecture and Lake Biwa
Shiga is a smallish Japanese prefecture with a population of around 1.3 million. The thing that comes to most people’s mind when they hear its name is Lake Biwa. Lake Biwa occupies fully one-sixth of the prefecture’s land area. It’s the largest lake in Japan. It serves as the primary water supply for more than ten percent of Japan’s total population. As significant, Biwa is a very old lake, one of the oldest in the world. That makes its ecology even more interesting. It’s often compared in that regard to Russia’s Lake Baikal. Japanese environmentalists, many of them based in Shiga Prefecture, have done much during the past two or three decades to enhance international awareness of Lake Biwa’s remarkable characteristics. So the people of the prefecture take great pride in this wonderful resource. It’s the best-known symbol of the region.
It’s reasonable to say that Professor Yukiko Kada wouldn’t have stood a chance in the July 2nd Shiga gubernatorial election had it not been for Lake Biwa. And her close association with it. Truly, she became “The Lady of the Lake” in her remarkable campaign.
An academic environmentalist since the 1970s, Professor Kada moved to Shiga Prefecture early in her career. There she focused on the potential of Lake Biwa. She was the driving force behind creation of the Lake Biwa Museum. She has played an important role in raising public interest in the Lake’s unique features and importance within Shiga Prefecture, and around the world. Punch her name into Google and you’ll get dozens of hits from past international conferences – some even in English!
Her work as an environmental sociologist popularized concern over pollution threats to the Lake, and their significance to the Prefecture as a whole. That is, the environmental integrity of Lake Biwa became a subject of concern for a broad spectrum of Shiga Prefecture’s population. Not just those identifying with the anti-market-system ideological ecology fringe. True, she had the support of the prefectural Socialist Party. But her appeal went well beyond that – as demonstrated by the election results.
This probably is more than you ever wanted to know about Lake Biwa, or even Shiga Prefecture. What, you may be asking yourself, does this have to do with the future of Japan’s domestic politics? Well, I think we can learn a lot by considering the background and outcome of this election. If we consider it within the proper framework.
Professor Kada ran a typical “Populist” campaign. As we have used that term on this program. Her campaign slogan was a single word in Japanese: “Mottainai.” I would translate that into “What a waste,” in the way that young people these days use the phrase. “Mottainai” was brilliantly conceived to encapsulate the core issues of her campaign: wasteful government spending on public works projects. These projects, she charged, not only cost more than Shiga’s people could afford. They also had adverse environmental effects – perhaps even endangering Lake Biwa. Most immediately, Kada promised to halt construction of a new bullet train station. She and her supporters argued the station was unnecessary, and – well – “Mottainai.”
She may be a political novice. But clearly, Professor Kada understands populist-style politics. Her campaign took off, attracting far broader support than anyone expected. The campaign made good use of the communications media. And possibly – though I don’t have solid information about this – the Kunimatsu campaign may have been over-confident in the beginning. Kada’s long experience publicizing Lake Biwa and her pleasing appearance made her a natural for television coverage. “Mottainai” was the crowning touch. A TV news producer’s dream!
At the end of the campaign, The Lady of the Lake won an amazing 217,842 votes. Leaving Kunimatsu with only 185, 344 votes, and a candidate of the Japan Communist Party with just over 70,000. That’s an amazing performance by any candidate. As a point of reference, in 2002, the whole LDP-Komeito-DPJ machine had delivered Kunimatsu just over 285,000 votes.
Significance of the 2006 Shiga Gubernatorial Election
So what? You’re certain to be asking yourself by now. Well, I think most important, it shows that “populist” political campaigns properly managed can win in Japan. And as important, they can win outside the big urban centers that are considered hotbeds of the legendary “floating voter.” Shiga Prefecture is a long way from Shibuya. Both geographically and culturally. Ask any Shiga teen-ager!
Voter turnout for this election – an election expected to be a “ho-hum” affair with no real issues – reached 44.94 percent. Nearly 45 percent! This compares with 38.7% in 2002! The increase, I think, can be attributed to the nature of the campaign run by Professor Kada. Voters, it shows, can be motivated to go to the polls when presented with the right appeals.
Looked at from the other side, the Shiga gubernatorial election showed that solid traditional Party organization – what I’ve discussed on this program under the rubric of “Factionist” politics – will no longer be enough to win elections when challenged by a spirited – and smart – “Populist politics” campaign. Governor Kunimatsu enjoyed the combined traditional support of the LDP and Komeito prefectural organizations. And even that of the DPJ, this time again. But this time, some of those 285,000 voters from 2002 were lured away by the appeal of Professor Kada’s “Mottainai” populist campaign.
If it can happen in Shiga, it can happen in a lot of places. And that’s something LDP and DPJ national party strategists should consider seriously as they prepare for the 2007 Upper House election, and the next general election.
As sure as day follows night, during the next few months we’ll read in Japan’s political media about the growing appeal of environmental issues. Based on analysis of this election. Environmental lobbying groups, of course, will encourage this. They will point to the Shiga experience as evidence of a “sea change” in public attitudes toward the environment, and caution political candidates to support their environmental causes, or risk poor Kunimatsu’s fate.
It seems to me, though, that the “Mottainai” campaign happened to work in Shiga because a candidate and campaign identified an issue that resonated with the Shiga prefectural public. In other prefectures, in other electoral districts, quite different issues may prove to be the key to a successful “populist” electoral campaign. Each prefecture, each district, may well be different. Requiring a different appeal to achieve the “resonance” that Professor Kada achieved in Shiga this time around with “Mottainai.”
If so, the significance for the LDP and the DPJ is profound. It means that central party election planners in Tokyo can achieve only so much on their own. They must develop more effective two-way channels of communication with the leaders of the prefectural and local branches of their Parties. And not just with the leaders responsible for collecting funds and party memberships from local businesses. Also, with local leaders who have a good handle on the interests and concerns of the potential voters in their region. The Party Faithful, who come out for every election, rain or shine, are no longer enough. Nor are the traditional campaign strategies that have gotten them to the polls.
The party that proves most effective at this in upcoming election campaigns stands a good chance of picking up parliamentary seats. The party that ignores this trend may be in for nasty surprises. It also, of course, has important implications for the types of candidates selected to run, and the way they are selected.
Of course, the DPJ has understood this for some time. Especially the Party’s younger members who, until Nagata’s fraudulent e-mail fiasco, supported Seiji Maehara. They pioneered innovative prefecture-level candidate selection and interaction. And judging from his public statements and meetings with prefectural branch officials since late last year, LDP Secretary General, Tsutomu Takebe, understands it as well. He faces an up-hill fight to get his message across, however. The LDP’s traditional Factionists see things quite differently. It will be exciting to watch Japan’s major political parties grapple with this problem in the months ahead. I’ll try to keep you posted.
The “Preemptive Attack Attack” Following North Korea’s Missile Diplomacy
Finally today, a note on the “Preemptive Attack Attack” phenomenon Japan experienced soon after North Korea’s decision to add missile launches to their recent diplomatic initiatives.
First, let’s be clear. Among those of us who assume full responsibility for dressing ourselves each morning, and who know the first thing about Japan, there’s nobody who really believes that Japan was considering the launch of a preemptive attack against North Korea following the July 5th [July 4th in the US] North Korean missile launch. Not in Japan. Not in Korea – North or South. Not in China. Or in the United States. It just doesn’t make sense! Informed observers wouldn’t believe it. But they might use public discussion of the topic to promote their own interests. Or the interests of their political “team,” as they see them.
First of all, Japan lacks the military hardware to carry out such an attack, even if they wanted to. Even the head of Japan’s Self Defense Agency has repeatedly made that point. And it wouldn’t make good sense for other Japanese cabinet officers to threaten publicly to conduct military action for which they lacked the equipment – and for which everyone knew they lacked the equipment. Such a silly exercise would only reap international criticism for its very mention, if not a worse response.
So, it’s safe to assume that everyone involved in this discussion who is knowledgeable about Japan realized that they were participants in a word-play game of some sort. Our responsibility here is to sort out their motivations and objectives by reviewing what actually happened. And then try to set the record a bit straighter than it now seems to sit.
Why does this still matter, you might reasonably ask. The United Nations Security Council Resolution has been passed, and the world has moved on to other concerns. Well, I think it matters because the record of the “preemptive attack attack” will remain in the English language policy discussion, giving ample opportunity for misunderstanding. And eventually, possibly, miscalculation, should it become genuine conventional wisdom. It wouldn’t be good to have English language commentators on Japan’s foreign relations really believing that Japan in early July 2006 threatened to launch a preemptive military strike against North Korea.
Unlikely, you say? Well, I found two examples of this in the news commentary just today, Monday, the 17th, with only a simple Google search. Today’s Washington Times, July 17th, carries an OpEd piece by John Carey, entitled “Testing Allied Fault Lines.” Carey is the former president of International Defense Consultants, Inc., and a well-known Washington commentator on military affairs. In his article, Carey wrote: “Japan floated the notion of a pre-emptive strike on North Korea, only to be rebuffed by China, Russia, and South Korea.” Reading his otherwise interesting piece, it sounded to me as if Mr. Carey believed that Japan had actually considered a preemptive strike.
The second mention Google provided this morning came from the website of New America Media. New America media describes itself as “the country’s first and largest national collaboration of ethnic news organizations.” A July 16th article on their website includes the following: “At the start of the week, Japan said it was considering a pre-emptive strike against North Korea, which last week test-fired seven missiles capable of reaching the U.S. Mainland.”
Granted, these are only two examples. But our time here is limited. A number of others were available. And I suspect we’ll see more like this in the future. Future observers responsible for reporting on Japan may well believe that Japan in early July 2006 threatened to launch a preemptive military attack on North Korea. Not good, since it isn’t true, and may well skew their analysis. It’s one thing to use material like this as ammunition in the heat of current political debate. But we shouldn’t make the sometimes dangerous error of believing our own propaganda efforts, and passing them on to our successors as gospel.
Naturally North Korea’s July 5th launch of seven missiles into the Sea of Japan attracted considerable Japanese communications media interest and coverage. This interest continued throughout the week as Japan pressed the U.N. Security Council to take up the issue and issue a Resolution of condemnation.
Japan’s Sunday television news programs were no exception. Defense Minister Nukaga was interviewed for Fuji-TV’s popular “News 2001” talk show, and asked to explain how the Japanese government planned to protect the country from missile attacks. The moderator posed a series of hypothetical questions, asking Nukaga how Japan would respond to missile threats. Nukaga said that Japan had the right to defend itself against missile attacks from abroad if the threatening country had the capability of actually attacking Japan, and they had actually targeted Japan with that capability.
Foreign Minister Taro Aso appeared the same day on an NHK news show. In response again to hypothetical questions, Aso asserted that Japan has the right to defend itself against missile attack. And if a missile with a nuclear warhead was aimed at Japan, Aso opined, Japan wouldn’t have to wait until they suffered damage until they took action.
Does this amount to a threat of preemptive attack on North Korea? Hardly. Both Nukaga and Aso were responding to interviewers’ hypothetical questions about how the government intended to defend Japan if Japan was further threatened. They both assured the Japanese public that the government wouldn’t sit idly and wait for a nuclear missile to land before taking defensive action.
I first became aware of the potential problem the following morning, when an AP story with a misleading headline hit the wire. The July 10th [US time] article was filed by an experienced and well informed AP journalist with long experience in Japan. As most of you know, journalists don’t often get to write the headlines for their stories. And this sometimes causes problems. That appears to be what happened here.
The headline read, “Japan Considers Strike Against N. Korea.”
But the article told a story different in important respects, as demonstrated in its first two sentences.
“Japan said Monday it was considering whether a pre-emptive strike on the North's missile bases would violate its constitution, signaling a hardening stance ahead of a possible U.N. Security Council vote on Tokyo's proposal for sanctions against the regime.
Japan was badly rattled by North Korea's missile tests last week and several government officials openly discussed whether the country ought to take steps to better defend itself, including setting up the legal framework to allow Tokyo to launch a pre-emptive strike against Northern missile sites.”
Clearly, discussing whether Japan should establish the legal framework required to allow Japan to attack North Korea’s missile sites is a far cry from discussing whether or not to launch a military attack against North Korea, as suggested by the headline. And the debate referenced in the article has been going on for some time in post-WWII Japan. At least since the mid-1950s premiership of Ichiro Hatoyama. This is nothing new.
I made a note of the article, but didn’t think more about it until the next day. My colleague came in from his office next door to tell me that Fox TV News was reporting that Japan was threatening to launch a counter-strike against North Korea. He naturally was quite surprised. I rushed to his office to watch the video broadcast. It was filed from Seoul. To my surprise, the broadcaster was, in fact, saying exactly that. He then described the South Korean government’s shock and dismay over the news.
From there, the situation deteriorated rapidly. South Korea’s government issued repeated expressions of regret over Japan’s “provocative actions.” Japanese behavior, Blue House spokesmen said, was likely to destabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Japan, they said, was making what they described as “a fuss.” Though I don’t know how that was put in Korean. South Korean reference to Japan’s “preemptive strike threat” continues even now.
Mainland Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmen chimed in the following day, describing Japan’s actions as “extremely irresponsible.” They, of course, were outraged. So outraged, in fact, they’ve continued to make repeated reference to Japan’s latest indiscretion – that is, threatening a preemptive strike against North Korea.
Japanese spokesmen, including Prime Minister Koizumi, immediately disavowed any intention of launching a preemptive strike. And Chief Cabinet Secretary and Chief Government Spokesman, Shinzo Abe, repeatedly denied such intentions. But the theme had been set, the damage done.
Many of the subsequent commentators, while recognizing the theme for what it was, I suspect, found it convenient for their purposes. The South Korean Blue House’s situation is so obvious that even some of the South Korean press commented on it later in the week. To the extent Japan could be criticized in this affair, it would distract attention from skeptical review of the government’s conciliatory Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. Mainland China’s case was as obvious, since they are North Korea’s closest ally and traditional protector.
Japanese opponents of Koizumi’s less conciliatory foreign policies, within and without the LDP, found it difficult to resist this heaven-sent opportunity to join the chorus. Especially since their arguments for pursuing a more conciliatory foreign policy had taken a serious hit from Kim Jong Il’s missiles. Expressions of concern over the ill-advised discussion of counter-attacks were naturally widespread.
Perhaps I’m more concerned about this than the situation actually warrants. This sort of behavior is inevitable when perceptions of public beliefs and concerns actually matter in politics. Partisans on all sides will manipulate information to suit their objectives. Still, I do hope that responsible participants in the discussion will make an effort to set the record straight once the issue loses its value for them as a political tool. We have enough misunderstanding related to Japan in the English language discourse without manufacturing more.
Well, we’re way over time this week again. Thanks for listening. And I hope you will join me again next week when we consider Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. Hopefully, beginning with an update on the DPJ as it prepares for the 2007 Upper House Election. In the meantime, please continue to send your comments and suggestions to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. And browse through the Japan Considered Project website at www.JapanConsidered.org. Remember, that’s “org,” not “com” or something else. Yet again no time for bluegrass. So,
Goodbye all, until next week.
