June 30, 2006; Volume 02, Number 24
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Listener Comments |
| Program Sound |
| Relations Between the Central Political and the Bureaucracies |
| The Non-Gai-Atsu Bilateral Summit |
| The Role of Gai-Atsu |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning, from the sunny, and already warm, campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, June 30th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 24, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for dropping by this week to consider the longer-term significance of recent events related to Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and creator and host of this Podcast. Point your browser at www.JapanConsidered.org to visit the website of the Japan Considered project. There you can find links to all of the audio files for Japan Considered Podcasts, text transcripts for each program, interviews with people who have contributed to the study of Japan’s domestic politics and international relations, and links to other websites that provide useful information in English about Japan.
It’s been another busy week in and around Japan. Lots going on, including an important U.S.-Japan Summit Meeting. We’ll consider the implications of that meeting today, with special attention to the “gai-atsu” phenomenon in out bilateral relations.
But first, let’s check through listener comments received since the last program. Several of you wrote in to remark on the sound of last week’s show. Seems it didn’t quite measure up. Even I could tell the difference, once you pointed it out. “Lose the tin can!” was one of the most memorable suggestions.
The difference in sound was caused by trying a small lavaliere microphone. Not quite a “tin can.” But apparently not as good as the regular headset microphone I’ve been using since the beginning of the series. As you see – or hear! – I’ve gone back to the old system. It too is far from a high-end ideal. But we’re on a budget here, as I’m often reminded. Maybe someday we can have one of those fancy studio microphones that can make even Pee Wee Herman sound like Walter Cronkite. But it will be a while. Till then, I’ll do my best with what we have, and keep a better eye on Adobe Audition’s meters. The quality of the production matters, and I’ll try to produce programs you can listen to.
Those of you interested in audio production should listen to Mark Jensen’s podcast, Podsqod. “P-o-d-s-q-o-d.” Mark’s an experienced audio pro who does a program every week day. I’ll put a link in the show notes and in the transcript. He’s been an invaluable source of advice on microphones, sound cards, and all of the other things that go into creating a broadcast – internet or traditional. So give him a listen, and let me know what you think of Podsqod.
Relations Between the Central Political Executive and the Bureaucracies
Another listener commented about the relationship between Japan’s central political executive and the career bureaucracies. He was absolutely correct when he suggested that prime ministers who gained and maintained office depending more on populist-type support, and less on traditional factionist-type support, are better able to control Japan’s career bureaucrats. That, I believe, is one of the most important differences in the behavior of Factionist and Populist prime ministers, as I’ve defined them.
Prime Ministers who gain office through populist campaigns have greater freedom in appointing – and dismissing! –members of their cabinets. Just as Japan’s Constitution prescribes. They’re not bound to accept the recommendations of the LDP faction leaders, in the traditional pattern, in order to keep their own jobs. All else constant, this leads to cabinets made up of ministers who support their prime minister’s policy objectives, and who will feel more obligated, at least for a time, to demand that those policy objectives be reflected in the work of the government ministries and agencies they head. That’s how they please the person responsible for their appointment. And keep their jobs.
This, I believe, leads to more genuinely responsible and democratic government. Governments more easily held accountable by the public for sincere pursuit of the policy agendas their leaders espoused during their campaigns for votes. And, that’s not a bad thing – depending, of course, on how you feel about democratic legitimation of government.
Most career bureaucrats, of course, resist this trend. They fear what they describe as “political interference” in their work. Reasonably so. Most immediately, they fear Kantei interference in their ministries’ personnel decisions. The Kantei has always influenced senior ministerial appointments. But such interference more often than not was based on personalistic ties, or personalistic antipathies, than on policy differences.
The Kantei when occupied by Populist prime ministers can be expected to go well beyond that, using approval of bureaucratic promotions to assure pursuit of the policy objectives they have established. That’s even worse! For Japan’s career bureaucrats, who are certain they are better qualified than the politicians to define and pursue Japan’s national interests.
I’ll talk more about this in future programs. But thanks to our attentive listener for early mention of this important point.
Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to Washington: The non-Gai-Atsu Summit
As this program is being recorded, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and U.S. President George Bush are in Tennessee touring Graceland, home of rock and roll singing legend, Elvis Presley. For years, much as been made of Prime Minister Koizumi’s admiration of Elvis Presley’s music. Both by Koizumi himself, and by observers and commentators. It appears that the American and Japanese officials responsible for planning this important bilateral summit meeting decided to use Koizumi’s interest in Presley as their organizational focus, knowing it would attract a lot of media attention. Perhaps they also hoped it would distract attention from some of the more controversial aspects of this important bilateral summit meeting.
This decision to highlight Elvis Presley appears to me to have had both positive and negative consequences. Probably more positive than negative. But official endorsement of the Elvis theme has given the American, and to a lesser extent, the Japanese, political press, good reason to devote much of their already limited coverage to this superficiality, at the expense of the genuinely important issues discussed. And the manner in which they were discussed. Nearly all of the media coverage sounds as if were written by journalists who’d recently completed summer internships at People Magazine! So, it inevitably will be known to future generations as the “Elvis Summit.” Such is the power of the name that it’s unlikely much beyond that will be preserved. And that’s too bad.
By any reasonable measure, this bilateral summit was a great success. Every event went off as planned. Meetings, lunches, dinners, visits to Arlington Cemetery, and even what Mike Green described as the road trip aboard Air Force One to Graceland. The solidarity of the bilateral relationship that long-serving ambassador to Japan, Senator Mike Mansfield, liked to call “the most important in the world -- bar none,” was confirmed during meetings yesterday and today. That’s important. And it didn’t just happen spontaneously.
President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi agreed to urge North Korea to reconsider its plans to test an intercontinental ballistic missile. In quite blunt terms. They agreed on the need for Mainland China to clarify the objectives of its growing military expenditures, and provide more transparent accounting. They weren’t sidetracked by concern over Yasukuni Shrine visits, or the like. President Bush sincerely thanked Prime Minister Koizumi for Japan’s support in Iraq specifically, and in the battle against terror in general. And while differences of opinion on the Iran problem and India’s nuclear future were apparent, they were handled comfortably and confidently by both sides.
So, there was much more to this bilateral summit meeting than mutual appreciation of the music and showmanship of rock and roll legend, Elvis Presley.
Perhaps most important, this bilateral summit meeting diverged from the traditional post-World War Two pattern in that “gai-atsu” appears to have played virtually no role in the planning or conduct of the meetings.
“Gai-Atsu” is a Japanese word that simply means external -- or foreign -- pressure. I use it here not to display my Japanese linguistic abilities. But because it is commonly used in English when discussing the conduct of U.S.-Japan relations. Perhaps only “Sushi” is a more familiar Japanese term for folks in Washington involved with Japan. Everyone seems to know the word “gai-atsu,” and to use it in daily conversation. Though they may not fully understand all of its implications.
Since the Allied Occupation that ended World War Two, Japan has been unusually dependent upon its former enemy, the United States. Dependent upon reasonably priced American raw materials, foodstuffs, and manufacturing technology. Dependent upon the rich American market to absorb the manufactured exports that drove Japan’s post-WWII economic recovery. And dependent upon the ultimate national security guarantee that the bilateral Security Treaty and U.S. “nuclear umbrella” have provided the largely demilitarized Japan in a potentially hostile world.
As important, Japan has recognized that dependence, and made maintenance of a solid relationship with the United States the cornerstone of Japan’s post-WWII foreign relations. Americans also have recognized Japan’s dependence. And discovered early on that threats during bilateral negotiations to limit Japan’s access to the American market, or to alter the nature of bilateral security arrangements, would quickly persuade Japan to agree to most American demands.
This is hardly surprising. But when considering “gai-atsu,” two less obvious points are worth making, I think.
First, Japan’s economic and military dependence on the United States has continued. But it’s not as absolute today as it was fifty, or even twenty, years ago. Japan’s economic dependence has diversified somewhat. And Japan’s indigenous military capabilities have increased as well. I’m not talking here about absolutes – either-or. Rather, differences of degree. But degree often matters when it comes to diplomatic relations. The Japanese side of the relationship, not surprisingly, has been more aware of those changes than has the American side. Some Americans continue to behave toward Japan as if it was still 1955, and the Occupation had only just ended. One can almost imagine them packing chocolate bars for the children when they prepare for a trip to Japan. Not a very shrewd way of conducting bilateral relations.
Second, the Japanese side of the bilateral relationship over much of the post-WWII era, has usually been quite willing to play along with the “gai-atsu” game. That’s because it offered the incumbent LDP leadership and senior bureaucrats significant political advantages at home. Japan’s leaders could avoid responsibility for inevitable, but politically disadvantageous, policy changes by blaming them on irresistible “Gai-Atsu” from Washington, rather than on their own decisions.
Liberalization of long outdated laws and regulations that protected Japanese producers in their home market? Producers upon whom the LDP relied for political funding and other kinds of support? Regrettable, to be sure, Tokyo said. But the changes had to be made to maintain the all-important relationship with the United States, who could be heard demanding the changes in no uncertain terms. “Sending a message,” it was called. Expansion of Japanese military or defense spending? Also regrettable, Tokyo said, in a number of ways. But again, something demanded by the United States, and therefore unavoidable. “Gai-Atsu,” doncha know.
The result was that Japan’s central political executive was for some time spared the need to make and publicly defend many tough political decisions over the post-WWII period. It might be argued that the Japanese central political executive during that period was not capable, even if it had been willing, of stepping up to the plate. Many long-serving American government officials, career and political appointees, can recall times they were approached informally by their official Japanese counterparts and asked that Washington raise the volume of the demands for change in Japan’s policies. High-decibel gai-atsu from Washington, they were told, was the only way the changes could be made on the Japanese side. Folks in Washington were rarely found reluctant to talk tough to foreigners. Leaders of important interest groups, and their representatives in the House and Senate, were especially effective at launching these “gai-atsu” messages.
Well, lots has changed since the heyday of bilateral Gai-Atsu. As noted a moment ago, Japan’s overall dependence on the United States has declined. As important, under Junichiro Koizumi, Japan has had a different sort of central political executive. One more capable of making its own political decisions, and taking political responsibility for those decisions once made. Populist versus Factionist, to use my terms. Utilization of gai-atsu in the conduct of U.S.-Japan relations, always has had a long-term corrosive effect on the reputation of the United States in Japan. Making us appear to be selfish bullies, eager to meddle in Japan’s domestic affairs. To some extent unfairly, as I have suggested here. Now, it has the added disadvantage of losing much of its effectiveness.
That realization, however, seems to have escaped some of Washington’s foreign policy elite. We experienced two efforts to apply gai-atsu in the traditional pattern during the run-up to this Summit meeting. Both must be judged failures.
The first was Pennsylvania Congressman John Murtha’s [Correction: Representative Henry Hyde's] open letter to House Speaker Dennis Hastert. In it, Murtha [Correction: Hyde] demanded that Prime Minister Koizumi renounce his visits to Yasukuni Shrine if he expected during his Washington trip to receive the unusual honor of an invitation to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress. As I mentioned soon after publication of that letter, Koizumi was asked by the Kantei press corps about the Murtha [Correction: Hyde] letter. He simply replied that he hadn’t asked to address the U.S. Congress, and had no intention of accepting an invitation if it came. Subsequent U.S. efforts to correct the problem appear to have failed. Too bad, really. It would have been a nice touch.
The second initiative represented a more traditional Gai-Atsu effort. We’ve followed the mad cow disease issue on this program since its eruption for the second time in January of this year. Japanese inspectors discovered prohibited carcass parts in beef imported from the United States. Japan’s government immediately suspended all beef imports from the U.S.
Discovery of the prohibited parts alone immediately inspired Japan’s Opposition parties, with communications media support, to attack the Koizumi Cabinet for allowing this to happen. A two-year ban on U.S. beef imposed for the same reason had been lifted only the month before. The Koizumi Cabinet was accused by the Opposition of valuing good relations with the United States above the well-being of Japanese citizenry. Understandably a serious, and delicate, political issue.
U.S. Administration officials recognized the problem for what it was. A substantive scientific issue that also had serious political implications – in both countries. With the Department of Agriculture taking the lead, they went about repairing the damage. After months of often heated negotiation, agreement was finally reached in mid-June that would allow Japanese inspectors access to U.S. beef packaging plants, and eventual resumption of exports. Implementation would take some time. But the issue was headed for reasonable resolution.
American beef producers, understandably, were impatient for quick resolution of the problem. They had perishable product already in the pipeline, and more on the hoof. They weren’t responsible for the errors that led to Japan’s import prohibition. But they would have to shoulder the majority of the cost. American beef producers believed the danger of mad cow disease was exaggerated in Japan. And some of the more cynical, or perhaps more experienced, of their members suspected that Japan’s domestic beef industry was aggravating the situation in the hope of increasing their own market share.
This, apparently, made the American Cattlemen vulnerable to the misguided political advice that led to their support for Senate Bill 3548. The Bill, co-sponsored by 18 senators from beef-producing states, would require the U.S. Department of Treasury to impose just over $3 billion in punitive tariffs on Japanese imports if Japan’s prohibition on the import of U.S. beef was not lifted by the end of August.
It’s hard to think of a measure more damaging to the interests of its supporters. The Bill has no chance of passage, and everyone knows it. The threat of trade retaliation required by the bill has no credibility. Japan’s Agriculture Minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, at a June 23rd luncheon meeting at the Foreign Correspondent’s Club, described the bill as “nonsense.” METI Minister Toshihiro Nikai was a bit more diplomatic during his comments on the legislative initiative at a press conference the previous day. But he did add that such “moonshine” these days was unacceptable, especially among allies.
Almost as damaging as a threat that lacks credibility, introduction of the ill-fated trade retaliation Bill has made it even harder for the Koizumi Cabinet to lift the prohibition on U.S. beef imports when the time to do so arrives. The Cabinet already is being accused by the Opposition Parties of knuckling under in the face of U.S. pressure – “gai-atsu,” of course – even through the actions demanded could endanger the health of Japan’s population. Reports of the Senate Bill’s introduction simply added credibility to the Cabinet’s political critics in Japan. Yes, American beef producers believe their product poses no risk to consumers. And have scientific evidence to support that point. But we’re well beyond the clean rooms of laboratories and into the realm of politics. Here, perceptions rule. And it’s easy to create the perception in Japan that there may be a danger to consumers. Whether warranted or not.
And this brings us to the third aspect of the Senate bill. Probably the most damaging for the interests of American beef producers. Its effect on Japan’s consumers of beef. Japan’s beef wholesalers will not buy American beef if Japanese consumers refuse to eat it. Public opinion surveys show beyond a doubt that the recent commotion over the danger of mad cow disease has made a majority of Japanese consumers suspicious of American beef, even if they like the taste.
Reports of irresponsible threats such as those contained in Senate Bill 3548 do nothing to restore the confidence of Japanese consumers in the reliability of American beef producers. Quite the contrary. What a shame! American beef producers deserve better than they’ve received for their political contributions this time around. So, in the spirit of proper response to Great Aunt Hattie’s gastric indiscretions in church, the best we can hope for is that the Bill and what it represents will be politely ignored by all present. That seems to have happened during this week’s Summit Meeting.
We’re well over time again today. Apologies for that. But I do hope those responsible for conduct of relations between Japan and the United States will recognize that traditional “gai-atsu” is no longer effective. Those in Japan should resist the temptation to substitute gai-atsu for responsible central political executive decisions. And those in the United States should abandon it in favor of more sophisticated lobbying in Japan. “Nai-Atsu,” or internal pressure, rather than “Gai-Atsu,” or external pressure. Harder to do, and often not near as much fun. But more effective, by far.
Thanks for listening again this week. I hope you found the program worth your time. Please continue to send your comments and suggestions directly to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all, and take them into consideration while preparing new shows. Visit the Japan Considered site at www.JapanConsidered.org for transcripts and audio files for this and previous podcasts, and links to more English language information on Japan’s domestic politics and international relations.
So, goodbye all, until next week.
