June 2, 2006; Volume 02, Number 21
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
Good morning from the beautiful, but overcast, campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, June 2nd, 2006. and you are listening to Volume 02, Number 21, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for joining me today for another program. I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and producer and host of this Podcast. Each week at this time I explore the longer-term significance of recent events concerning Japan’s domestic politics and international relations.
This week we’ll begin with a brief look at the international side. Nothing earth-shaking. More confirmation of trends we’ve discussed during past weeks. Then we’ll return to domestic politics, with focus on events related to the intensifying competition within the LDP to succeed Junichiro Koizumi as Party President. Some new developments there that may prove significant, and some interesting new information. Finally, we’ll consider some unusual parliamentary maneuvering related to the conspiracy crime bill now before parliament
New Offerings on the Japan Considered Project Website
But first, a “heads-up” on recent additions to the Japan Considered Project website. The interview with Japanese/Chinese translator, Tom Coffey, is up and running at last. Apologies to those of you who went in search of it earlier in the week. Thought I’d have it done sooner. But the wait should be worth it. Translation is an essential aspect of the Japan studies enterprise, and Tom Coffey is one of the best translators around. I’ll provide a link to the interview here, and in the show notes.
Also, click again on the Japan Considered “Occasional Papers” page. Professor Len Schoppa has provided us with a summary of his presentation to a panel on post-Koizumi Japan that was sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. It was held on May 31st, 2006. Professor Schoppa’s presentation is entitled “The 2006 Koizumi Succession in Historical Perspective.” I’ll discuss some of Len’s points in greater detail below. But the whole presentation is well worth reading. I’ll provide a link to it here too, and also in the show notes. This is the presentation for which he prepared the historical chart of LDP factions we had up last week. That chart now is included in his presentation toward the end.
Thanks to all of you who’ve taken the trouble to send your comments and suggestions about this program, and about the Japan Considered Project website. I read them all, and appreciate the effort. Keep ‘em coming. I learn a lot.
How to Listen to Japan Considered Podcasts on Your Desktop Computer
Last week, one of our more technologically apprehensive listeners wrote to suggest that I provide a simpler explanation of how to access these weekly Podcasts. Actually, it seems he’s been a “reader” rather than a “listener.” He wrote that he’d been reading the program transcripts for some time. But he didn’t own an iPod, and wondered if there was some other way to access the audio files.
Well, there is. In fact, according to the feedback I receive, more people listen to the programs on their computers than on iPods, or other portable mp3 player devices. Here’s how. If you use a PC. Go to the Podcast page of the Japan Considered Project website. Scroll down to the show notes for the date you want. Then right-click on “Click here for the audio file for today’s program” at the top of the entry. That opens a menu, or list of choices. Left-click on “Save target as …” and save the file to your desktop, or another location where you can easily find it. The file will download to your computer. Then, go to the file, double-click on it, and it will play in your default audio player. It doesn’t matter which one you use. It should play in them all. Mac users should hold down their control key, click on the “Click here for the audio file for today’s program,” and select “Download link to disk.” This will download the file to your computer. Locate the file, click it, and listen.
I’ve found it easier to download the iTunes program, and then subscribe to podcasts from there. The iTunes program is free, and simple to download, install, and use. Even I could do it! You can listen to podcasts on your computer through the iTunes program, and even view video podcasts, should you subscribe to one. There are a number of other free alternatives to iTunes available on the Web. Experts tend to have strong opinions about them, like they do about PC and Mac computers. I’m nowhere near that level of expertise, though. Now, Fords vs Chevys! That’s another matter entirely! We take that debate seriously around here!
Japan’s international relations news has been relatively quiet during the past week. Preparations continue for Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Washington at the end of June. The Prime Minister has repeated as often as asked that he has no intention of extending the current ordinary session of the Diet beyond its June 18 th scheduled close. That would interfere with international travel plans of any kind, since the prime minister and cabinet members are required to attend Diet sessions when summoned.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Japan’s major economic daily newspaper, on June 1 st, reported that Prime Minister Koizumi has declined repeated “U.S. government” invitations to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress, as we mentioned last week. Nikkei added that Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is disappointed with the Kantei’s decision not to accept the invitation, noting the speech would be a first in US-Japan relations.
It’s hard to know what actually happened, or is happening. But it does seem it was the Kantei and not the Foreign Ministry that made the call. That alone is important. Did Congressman Hyde’s letters poison the well? Something else, perhaps? But, as noted last week, the fact that at least, as of now, no speech to a joint session of Congress is on the agenda, represents a significant change in the management of U.S.-Japan relations. It would be difficult to imagine such a thing happening in years past. Just a hint from the U.S. side that such an invitation might be withdrawn would have driven Japan’s international facilitators to agree to most anything, short of the return of Okinawa, to avoid embarrassment – or blame! Not the way it works these days, it seems. Undoubtedly, a good thing for both countries, in the longer term, at least.
Japan’s official discussions with Mainland China have proceeded quietly during the past week, continuing to show modest improvement in the relationship. A listener wrote recently to note that Japan’s relations with China have long been characterized by periods of relative calm followed by periods of confrontation. Almost like the tides. That’s been true throughout most of the post-World War Two era. So, we can expect a return to shrill confrontation at some point in the future. Though it appears that Japan during the Koizumi premiership, has been less conciliatory, or accommodating, than was standard practice in the past, once Beijing got its steam up.
It’s been some time since I’ve heard or read the once-common phrase “happo bijin Gaiko” used to describe Japan’s conduct of foreign affairs. Translated sympathetically this term describes an even-handed, or omni-directional, approach to international relations. But understood less charitably, it describes an accommodationist posture that drove Tokyo’s representatives to agree to almost anything to avoid public censure from other countries. Implementation of such agreements, of course, was another matter. And that eventually hurt Japan’s credibility as an international actor.
The three-day Japan-China conference on energy conservation measures opened in Tokyo on Monday, May 29 th. Over 700 participants from both countries were joined by several cabinet-level officials, and loads of positive publicity. China’s participants hope to learn how to apply some of Japan’s energy-saving technology, as China’s energy demand continues its exponential rise in response to economic growth. Japanese industry is considered to be at least nine times more energy-efficient than China today. At least, by Japanese observers. This METI-sponsored event must be considered a significant success, and a demonstration of what can be accomplished when Beijing and Tokyo agree to cooperate rather than pick at each other. Chinese industry becomes more efficient, and Japan faces less global competition for its essential energy imports.
While this energy conservation forum was being conducted successfully in Tokyo, planning moved ahead for bilateral talks between senior foreign ministry officials responsible for consular affairs. The talks are scheduled to begin on Monday, June 5 th, in Tokyo. Japanese representatives are expected to press their demand for an explanation of what happened to the Japanese Consular official who committed suicide in the Shanghai Consulate year before last. The Chinese side is expected to deny any involvement in the official’s death, which they describe as the result of over-work. Not a very promising agenda. Perhaps the waves of cooperation and confrontation that have long characterized the relationship have shifted to more rapid cycles. Or, maybe Tokyo and Beijing have entered a new phase in their bilateral relations in which both can occur at the same time.
It’s been some time since we’ve considered Japan’s relations with South Korea. And in the interim, on Wednesday, May 21 st, the South Koreans held important local elections. The ruling Uri party of President Roh Moo-hyun suffered a serious defeat. Various explanations have been offered for the crushing blow. Commentators sympathetic to the policies of President Roh and his Uri Party, have suggested the electoral thrashing resulted from a sympathy vote for major opposition party leader, Pak Guen-hye, who suffered a nasty knife attack while preparing to give a speech soon before the election. Other observers have noted that local elections nearly always turn on local issues. So this staggering defeat at the local level does not represent widespread popular renunciation of President Roh’s policies.
Both explanations undoubtedly have merit. But they must offer faint comfort to the Uri Party as it prepares for presidential elections next year. Surely a victory of similar magnitude in the local elections would have been described by those very same pundits as an outpouring of popular support for the Uri Party and President Roh’s policies. Uri national Chairman, Chung Dong-young, resigned to assume responsibility for the defeat. Chung before the election was a strong candidate to succeed Roh as President next year.
Now, how will this affect Japan-South Korean relations? Hard to tell. Even for someone qualified to speculate on South Korean politics. And I have enough trouble just keeping up with Japan! On the one hand, one could speculate that the disappointing electoral results might limit the ability of the incumbent presidential regime to continue their hard-ball approach to Japan. Perhaps out of a general sense of vulnerability.
On the other hand, popular support for President Roh and Uri has been declining for some time. Many Japanese observers believe he has turned up the anti-Japan rhetoric to shore up declining public support. And his anti-Japan rhetoric doesn’t seem to have been a major source of popular discontent with his regime.
It is possible, however, that the results of the local election will affect South Korea’s policies toward North Korea, and perhaps make possible more cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo in their effort to cope with the North Korean Kim regime. At least we can say with some confidence that the May 31 st South Korean election results won’t work to Japan’s disadvantage in the short, medium, or longer-term.
The LDP Presidential Race Run-Up
Although the two top contenders have yet officially to announce their candidacies, the temperature of the LDP presidential race rose a few more degrees during the past week. Diet Member support groups for both Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda held preliminary meetings that attracted widespread political media coverage. The support group action actually began in mid-May when Yuji Yamamoto and 17 other LDP members formed a group to which they plan to invite first and second-term Upper House members, and Lower House members who have been elected 6 times or less. They called their group the "Sai- Chayarenji Shien Giin Renmei." This literally translates as the "Diet Member's League to Support a Second Challenge." Yamamoto and other participants insisted that their primary purpose is to develop policies to address the growing economic imbalance in Japanese society. The imbalance that inevitably results from the current administration’s structural reform measures. The group met a second time on May 25 th.
Not to be outdone, this Thursday, June 1 st, 32 LDP Diet Members who were first elected when they were over the age of 50, met as the “Kurou-nin no Kai.” Yasuo Fukuda accepted the chairmanship of the group. Kurou-nin are, literally, individuals who have endured a lot. During the speech accepting the group’s chairmanship, the 69-year-old Fukuda noted that although young people can make important contributions, the older generation too has something to offer.
Since the Nagata e-mail fiasco and the DPJ decision to replace the youthful Seiji Maehara with the more experienced Ichiro Ozawa, Japan’s political press has been speculating that youthful political candidates may no longer be as attractive to Japan’s public as they have been recently. That the public is recognizing the importance of experience and good judgment in their leaders. The Fukuda group seems to be trying to capture that, and to turn Fukuda’s advanced age – he turns 70 in July – to his advantage. Wishful thinking? Perhaps. But the emergence of the two groups has been greeted warmly by Japan’s political press. Something solid, and easily explained, to report on. More like a boxing match than a contract bridge tournament. We don’t have that luxury – or necessity – here.
The support group saga didn’t end with the announcement of the Fukuda group’s creation, however. Today, June 2 nd in Tokyo, the group held what they called their “inaugural meeting,” and invited Shinzo Abe to accept the chairmanship. Here he is:
[Abe clip]
In his acceptance speech Abe referred to the importance of the group’s primary stated policy objective: giving those who have tried and failed a second chance. Most surprising, however, was that 94 LDP members of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet attended, and several others who were unable to attend were represented by staff members. The group included about 30 members of the Mori Faction, and five other factions. Around 30 unaffiliated LDP members were counted. Only two LDP factions were not represented. Judging from the Japanese language television and newspaper reports, such a large turnout surprised most of Japan’s political journalists.
LDP Prefectural Branch Participation in Presidential Elections
Last week I lamented the lack of information on the current state of LDP prefectural branch organizations, and asked listeners to e-mail me with any contributions they might make. Yesterday I was delighted to hear from Professor Len Schoppa of the University of Virginia. He kindly provided the Japan Considered Project “Occasional Papers” with that summary of his comments at the May 31 st CSIS meeting in Washington I mentioned earlier. In addition to his very useful factional chart, his summary includes his analysis of the race to succeed Koizumi as LDP president, in historical perspective. He even includes toward the end a couple of final scenarios that make for very interesting reading.
Len also provided valuable information on the role of the LDP prefectural branches in the September Party presidential election. He was joined on the CSIS panel by Chiba Institute of Science Associate Professor, Yukiko Amakawa, a friend and adviser to Shinzo Abe. Professor Amakawa told Len and the group that the LDP has changed the rules defining the role of prefectural branches in the selection of the LDP president.
The prefectural branches still are allocated 300 votes. But, Professor Amakawa reported, the Party has decided that all branches will allocate their votes proportionally rather than on the winner-take-all basis. That was a decision that had been left up to the prefectural branches in the past. Further, and equally important, Professor Amakawa added, the LDP has decided that the prefectural branches must keep the results of their elections secret until the Diet Members vote on September 20 th. Then the final vote totals will be announced all at once.
These changes, Professor Schoppa noted, clearly were designed to prevent Shinzo Abe from taking advantage of his higher public popularity to determine the final vote through a strong showing in the prefectures. The strategy that Koizumi used against former prime minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, in 2001. Len has integrated these changes into the scenarios for the September 2006 LDP presidential election he presents in his paper. I urge you to give it a read. Great stuff. Also, have a look through Professor Schoppa’s website, “Japan Politics Central.” This, I believe, was the first Japan politics meta-site to appear on the web. I’ll put a link here and in the show notes.
So, the significance of all this for those of us who would rather watch boxing than contract bridge? The rules changes Professors Amakawa and Schoppa describe will reduce the influence of the LDP’s prefectural branches, and rank-and-file membership during the next LDP presidential election. As intended. They will strengthen, all else constant, the influence of the LDP Lower and Upper House Members in that contest. More Factionist, in other words, applying my categories, and less Populist.
But all else is NOT constant – here or ever. Other factors often mentioned on this program have complicated – and continue to complicate – the lives of LDP faction bosses. We’re not observing the LDP of the 1970s or the 1980s – let alone the sixties! Further, the two LDP Diet member leagues I mentioned earlier created to support Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda both include members from several factions.
Will these groupings endure? What degree of control will the major faction bosses have over their activities, even if they do endure? Cross-faction LDP groups are nothing new. But in the past they have had only limited influence over selection of LDP presidents. That process was dominated by the faction leaders.
Much more to consider here. Not the least of which is the effect the DPJ with Ichiro Ozawa at the helm will have on all of this. But we’re way over time already. It will have to wait until next week. In the meantime, any of you with additional information on the current state of LDP prefectural branches, please send an e-mail to RobertCAngel@gmail.com. It would be most useful early next week. But any time will be fine.
In closing, I can’t resist mentioning an unusual bit of Parliamentary Theater that played out today in Tokyo. For some time the ruling coalition has been trying to pass a bill that would criminalize conspiracy to commit a crime, as well as commission of the crime itself. Legislation along this line is necessary if Japan is to be able to ratify the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime that Japan initialed in December 2000. Such legislation, if not carefully drafted, could easily infringe upon individual rights. So, the Opposition has been justifiably vigilant, and critical of the ruling coalition bill. Rather than agree to debate the coalition bill, the DPJ decided it had to submit its own bill, and did. Critics at the time charged the DPJ with “playing politics.” But a bill was duly drafted and submitted for discussion.
Well, Friday, in the Diet Affairs Steering Committee, the ruling coalition announced suddenly that they would scrap their own bill and endorse the bill presented by the DPJ, and called for a vote. This surprised the DPJ. As intended. Senior DPJ leadership, suspecting a trick, responded that they would never agree even to debate the bill with the ruling coalition, let alone vote on it, and absented themselves from the Committee. The ruling coalition representatives said they were uncomfortable voting on the bill without the participation of the DPJ – especially since it was their bill, and all. And that was the end of that!
The DPJ was left with egg on their faces. They had refused to debate their own bill! Party representatives later justified the action by saying that they feared the LDP simply would pass the bill and then revise it during the next Diet session. But, of course, the same could be said of any legislation passed …. And, Foreign Minister Aso was quoted as saying the DPJ bill did not meet the requirements for ratification of the U.N. Treaty. So they couldn’t agree to debate. Again, a point. But hardly a reason to refuse to debate the necessary changes.
Well, what are we to make of this? Will DPJ commitment to parliamentary confrontation with the ruling coalition be seen as “obstructionism” rather than legitimate “confrontation”? Will DPJ leaders have to promise to think things through more completely before making public statements? At least we can conclude that age and experience provide no absolute guarantee against imprudent actions by Party leaders. It will be interesting to see just how long this incident is remembered in Nagatacho and the Japanese political press.
Again this week we’re way over time. Sorry about that. I’ll buy a better clock early next week and see if that helps. Or, maybe Tokyo will go quietly to sleep in this hot summer weather. Please continue to send your comments and suggestions to me at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. And visit the Japan Considered Project website for transcripts and additional materials related to Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. Bluegrass will have to wait another week. But in the meantime check the iTunes Bluegrass music category for some wonderful suggestions.
Goodbye all. Until next week.
