May 19, 2006; Volume 02, Number 19
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Introduction |
| Promising Developments in the Relationship with Mainland China |
| Parliamentary Politics and Ozawa’s Debut as DPJ Leader |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning from the beautiful campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, May 19 th, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 19, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
Thanks for joining me again this week. Each Friday on this program we consider the longer-term significance of recent happenings in Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. I’m Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and producer of this podcast. E-mail me you comments and suggestions at RobertCAngel@gmail.com. I read them all carefully, and take them into consideration when planning future shows.
Also, be sure to visit the Japan Considered Project webpage. There on the Podcast page you’ll find links to audio files for each program, text transcripts for each show since the beginning of this year, and the show links for each week. Click on the archives links on the left-hand nav bar for access to earlier shows. And visit the site’s other pages as well. Lots of links to useful information. All clearly annotated, so you don’t waste your time.
This week I added an interview with Dr. James E. Auer, director of the Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at Vanderbilt University. Few Americans know more about, or have been more involved with, U.S.-Japan defense relations than Jim. In the interview, he describes his long career in U.S.-Japan relations and assesses the current state of that important relationship. I’ll leave a link to the interview in the show notes.
Professor Len Schoppa of the University of Virginia also made a valuable contribution to the Japan Considered Project’s collection of Occasional Papers this week. He provided us with a chart of the LDP’s factional history from 1959 to present. You can access it from the link at the end of his Japan Considered interview, or directly from the “Occasional Papers” page of the site. I’ll also add a link to the show notes for this week. A useful reference work that I’m sure will be accessed frequently in the months to come. Thanks, Len.
Speaking of e-mailed comments and suggestions, not long after publishing last week’s show, I received an e-mail from a thoughtful – and well-informed – listener who reminded me not to forget Hiroyuki Hosoda’s outstanding service as Chief Cabinet Secretary from early May through October of 2005. Hosoda at present serves in the delicate position of LDP Diet Affairs Committee Chairman. I had described Yasuo Fukuda as Shinzo Abe’s immediate predecessor in that post, which, of course is wrong. So, apologies to all for the “oops moment,” and thanks to the sharp-eared listener for the correction. Keep this up, and I’ll have to add an “Oops Corner” as a regular feature of these programs!
Last week we ran out of time before we could consider recent developments in Japan’s relationship with Mainland China. So, we’ll begin with that topic this week. Following that we’ll take another look at parliamentary politics this week, with emphasis on relations between the LDP, the DPJ, and strategies for managing parliamentary affairs.
Promising Developments in the Relationship with Mainland China.
Judging from media reports on domestic politics in Japan, relations with Japan's largest East Asian neighbor, the People's Republic of China, are perilously strained. Opponents of the Koizumi reform package, and indirectly, of Shinzo Abe, continue to criticize Koizumi's management of relations with China, and call for a more accommodating approach. Koizumi's stiff-necked diplomatic posture, those critics charge, has damaged Japanese interests in the region. They urge selection of a successor to Koizumi who will be more accommodating with Beijing. And with Seoul, for that matter. Asian diplomacy, they predict -- and hope -- will feature prominently in the competition to succeed Koizumi as LDP president.
Earlier this month, Keizai Doyukai, or the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, released a report urging Koizumi to suspend his visits to Yasukuni Shrine. The report concluded that Koizumi's visits are a major reason Beijing refuses to hold top-level meetings with their Japanese counterparts. Koizumi's critics in the media and political world quickly pointed to the Doyukai Report as evidence that Japan's business leaders believe Koizumi's conduct of relations with China has damaged Japan's business interests.
All of this is as expected. Koizumi’s opponents hope his conduct of relations with Japan’s East Asian neighbors will prove a vulnerability, in spite of his continuing – even rising – public popularity. A point around which opposition to his administrative and economic reforms, and to his chosen successor, can accumulate. And it may. No sane person would want to have Japan’s relations with Mainland China mismanaged.
If we look beyond the political posturing, we discover a number of signs that Sino-Japanese relations actually are improving. On Sunday and Monday of week before last, Japan held vice-ministerial meetings with China. During the meetings, agreement was reached to hold ministerial-level talks in the near future, probably on the sidelines of the Asian Cooperative Dialogue scheduled for later this month in Qatar. According to reports just in early this morning, those meetings have been confirmed for May 23 rd.
China also agreed to another round of official talks to try to work out bilateral problems over exploitation of gas reserves in the East China Sea, an issue we've discussed in detail on this program. Those talks were held in Tokyo earlier this week. Afterward, each side expressed appreciation for the opportunity to clarify their position. Which in diplomatic talk means no progress was made toward agreement. But at least both sides agreed to continue discussions. Another round of talks is expected in June, this time in Beijing. More important, neither side took the opportunity to launch a public tirade against the other at the end of the talks. In fact, remarkably little information was released to the press after the meetings by either side. Probably a good sign.
And the good news continues. At the end of the month, METI is sponsoring a huge three-day conference in Tokyo intended to provide China with more energy-saving technologies. The organizers anticipate participation of at least 600 representatives from Japan and China, with at least two prominent Japanese cabinet members scheduled to give addresses.
In case anyone has missed the point, China's ambassador to Japan, Wang Yi, gave a speech on May 9 th to the Asian Affairs Research Council that was interpreted to be far more conciliatory than past Chinese official pronouncements. Wang did include mention of the need to address what he described as “historical issues,” but in a less confrontational tone.
All of this is encouraging. The Japan- China relationship is THE critical relationship in Asia. Both states have dominated the region at different times in the past. Both suspect the other of planning to try to do so again. And neither will passively accept such a development. Peace in the region requires Japan and China somehow to get along, and hopefully to cooperate.
During the past few years the Chinese side has made much of the significance of the interpretation of recent history. Not earlier history, certainly. That would work to their disadvantage. Rather, their focus has been on the period of Japan's aggressive behavior on the Asian Mainland during the early and mid-20 th Century. Japan, Beijing has argued, has yet adequately to recognize the error of its nationalist and militarist ways, and to apologize adequately for their behavior.
Because of this, China is offended when Junichiro Koizumi, in his official capacity as prime minister, visits Yasukuni Shrine. Convicted Class A Japanese war criminals from the militarist era have been enshrined there. Offended to the point that it is impossible to hold official discussions on matters of mutual interest. China’s Foreign Minister Li has been, perhaps, the most colorful proponent of this position in the recent past.
I recognize that individuals in China may be genuinely offended by Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Some, even to the point of bitter protest, to the extent their government will allow it. But I find it hard to believe that a great nation, a nation of the stature of China, would allow such emotions to fundamentally influence its foreign relations. China is a practical, mature, and incredibly experienced actor in international relations. Few societies can boast as long, or as successful, a record of accomplishment. China also is a skilled international negotiator, perhaps even more effective when dealing from positions of weakness than from positions of strength.
Rather, it seems to me more likely that Beijing has been using the Yasukuni Shrine issue as a means of pressuring Japan for negotiating concessions at little real cost to China. And, to demonstrate, both to a domestic Chinese audience and to the rest of East Asia, that China still is able to dictate the terms under which relations with the Center Kingdom will be conducted. An old pattern.
China’s recent shift in tactics suggests to me that Beijing has recognized, somewhat belatedly, that the Yasukuni Card, as Prime Minister Koizumi called it, has outlived its usefulness. That continued demands for apologies from Japan for World War Two behavior have come to generate more public resentment within Japan against China’s position than sympathy. So, they’ve decided to tone it down, and return to negotiations over substantive issues.
If true, that’s a good thing. Conditions in Japan have changed during the past decade or so. Especially since Koizumi’s assumption of the premiership in 2001. The memory of the World War Two defeat, and of the subsequent Allied Occupation, remains. But it’s now being remembered by an entirely new generation, filtered through a half-century of subsequent experience.
Japan today is quite a different international actor than the Japan of the 1950s and 60s. Greater self confidence has replaced the near-masochistic behavior evidenced during the early post-World War Two decades. This will be characterized as a resurgence of “nationalism” and “militarism” by Japan’s international critics and their domestic sympathizers. But whether it’s a resurgence of state nationalism or simply decay of 1950s state masochism, Japan has, in fact, changed. And that change requires nations hoping to negotiate successfully with Japan to employ new tactics, and possibly even new strategies, to accomplish their objectives. That, of course, includes the United States.
Parliamentary Politics and Ozawa’s Debut as DPJ Leader
Last week we spent a good bit of time considering the importance of the Diet for Japan’s politics. The Parliament, I noted, is at the core of the political system, the source of its legitimacy. In the past there have been times when parliamentary debate, even discussion of parliamentary affairs, has seemed less than exciting. Committee and plenary session meetings during which canned questions elicited canned responses, with all parties appearing as if they wished they were somewhere else. A bilious member’s flash of temper from time to time was about all the entertainment one might expect. The real action, informed observers of Japanese national politics knew, was at the administrative level, in the dingy offices of the major bureaucracies that ran the government.
That seems to be changing. Japan’s political reporters now are giving parliamentary debate better coverage than they have in the past. And, perhaps responding to intensifying public attention, the participants themselves seem to be putting more effort into the parliamentary enterprise. That’s a good thing. Japan’s government is designed to run that way. Whether it does or not.
This Wednesday, newly selected DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa faced LDP President and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in their first one-on-one debate since Ozawa assumed the DPJ presidency. The occasion was debate before a 3:00 PM Joint Lower and Upper House meeting of the “Fundamental National Policies” Committee. This is Japan’s “question time.” “Question time” debates among party representatives were introduced in February of 2000. They are held infrequently. This was only the 38 th such event since the system’s creation.
[play Ozawa clip]
That was Ichiro Ozawa, offering his formal greetings to Prime Minister Koizumi at the beginning of the session. As leader of the main Opposition party, Ozawa had 45 minutes to grill the Prime Minister on the government’s policies. Given Ozawa’s reputation for confrontation, media expectations were high prior to the event. But those expecting fireworks were disappointed. Ozawa chose to focus his comments and questions on the education bill. He, as well as the Prime Minister, maintained calm demeanor throughout.
Evidence of the “New and Improved” Ichiro Ozawa, or just traditional caution? Hard to tell. But the clip gives you a sense of the whole event. I’ll put a link to the videotape of the session in the show notes for those of you who would like to view the full 45 minutes or so of the Committee meeting. [link to file]
For our purposes on this program , one interesting point did surface. Early in their exchange, Ozawa chided Koizumi for allowing the LDP to ram a bill through a committee without the consent of the DPJ. Students in my Japanese politics classes often have difficulty understanding this “ramming through” issue. And it is a bit odd, when you think about it, given the overwhelming majority the ruling coalition enjoys in the Lower House. How can an overwhelming majority vote be described as “ramming” through legislation in a democratic system? Well, it can in Japan.
Like so many things in contemporary Japanese politics, though, proper explanation of the “ramming through” phenomenon requires some history. Since its formation in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party has maintained a decisive majority in the Lower House of Japan’s Diet. For much of that period, the Japan Socialist Party served as the major Opposition party. Under formal Diet decision rules, the majority LDP could pass most any bill upon which they themselves were able to reach agreement.
This, the Socialists and other Opposition parties argued, was “undemocratic.” It mocked competitive parliamentary procedure, and, in essence, disenfranchised supporters of all parties, other than of the LDP. Well, there was something to that argument. And in any case, most of the Japanese political media at the time sympathized with the Opposition in their grievance. So, during this era, when an issue came before the Diet upon which the ruling LDP and the Opposition parties disagreed seriously, LDP threats to settle the dispute by using their parliamentary majority to pass the bill resulted in sharp accusations from the Opposition of undemocratic LDP “railroading,” or “ramming” behavior. The media usually reported those accusations sympathetically.
That’s not the end of the story, however. During this earlier period, so intense was the disagreement between the ruling LDP and the Opposition parties, especially on issues related to foreign relations, that the Opposition could, and did, disrupt Diet proceedings to prevent legislative action by the LDP majority. Japan’s news media usually interpreted the events as legitimate defensive behavior on the part of the Opposition in response to the undemocratic behavior of the LDP. Disruptive Opposition behavior at times included physical disruptions of Diet proceedings, and “walk-outs” in protest of LDP action.
That is, all Opposition parties would refuse to attend committee or plenary hearings of the Diet. This the political media described as an “empty Diet.” Leaving the LDP alone to carry on. With their numerical majority. If they wished. The LDP soon learned it rarely was worth the passage of the bill.
Instead, informal arrangements were worked out through which such walk-outs were avoided by private consultation between the LDP and the Opposition parties before or during debate. The LDP agreed to accept certain modifications to the legislation proposed by the Opposition. Opposition members were allowed to make fiery speeches denouncing any and all during debate. And in the end the legislation passed without disruption, with nearly everyone happy.
By the late 1980s, these informal arrangements had begun to break down. A number of causes can be identified. Perhaps most important, the declining fortunes of the Opposition parties. Especially the Socialists. Also important was a decline in near-automatic news media sympathy for the boycotters. During the short-lived non-LDP Hosokawa Administration in the early 1990s, even the LDP itself tried the tactic against Hosokawa. But once back in power, the LDP under the skillful political tactician, Keizo Obuchi, stood up to the threat and actually passed legislation without the presence of the Opposition, generating only minimal criticism in the media.
So what? You may well ask. Just more Japanese domestic politics “inside baseball?” Not at all. Under Seiji Maehara, the Democratic Party of Japan agreed not to use the Diet boycott tactic to avoid votes. But I suspect the more confrontational Ichiro Ozawa may at least threaten boycotts, if not carry one out. Surely, the possibility will be discussed. It will be interesting to see how Japan’s political news media, and informed public opinion, responds should the threat arise.
That’s all we have time for again this week. Thanks for tuning in, and for your interest in Japan’s domestic politics and international relations. Be sure to check the Japan Considered Project website, at www.JapanConsidered.org, for transcripts of this and earlier programs, and for other useful information. Don’t forget Jim Auer’s interview in the Interviews section, and Len Schoppa’s LDP faction chart in the “Occasional Papers” section. Send your comments, corrections, and suggestions directly to me at robertcangel@gmail.com. I look forward to reading them all.
Let’s go out this week with some beautiful harmony from the Seldom Scene’s 20 th anniversary album. We miss you, John Duffy.
[bluegrass clip]
Goodbye all. Until next week.
