March 3, 2006; Volume 02, Number 09
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Introduction |
| South Korea’s Advice on Constitution Reform |
| Negotiations With China Over East China Sea Boundaries |
| Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Tokyo |
| The Nagata E-Mail Flap |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning from the beautiful campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, March 3 rd. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 09, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
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Thanks for tuning in again this week. Those of you subscribed must have received this broadcast as soon as it was uploaded to the University server. Those downloading must have gone to the Japan Considered website. And from there to the Podcast page. But even subscribers should visit that page from time to time. www.JapanConsidered.org. Early this week I added an “archive” feature to the show notes page. With that in place we can leave only a few weeks’ worth of show notes on the main page. That makes it more manageable and a lot faster to load. The earlier shows all are still available from that new “archive” section on the left-hand side of the page. The interview with John Campbell of the University of Michigan isn’t done yet. But each day, as time permits, I’m whittling away at it. His comments are very interesting. Come to find out, John has a background in radio broadcast. Always wondered where he got that great voice.
This week again we’ve got a lot to cover. We’ll begin with a few brief items on Japan’s international relations. South Korea, China, and Iran all were involved in significant ways this week. Then we’ll look at this week’s developments in what’s become the “Nagata e-mail flap,” if not the “DPJ e-mail flap.” As always, we focus on what these events tell us about Japan’s domestic politics and how Japan conducts its foreign relations. This really isn’t the place to come for a comprehensive Japan news summary. The newspaper and television station websites do a much better job of that. So, let’s get started. [Return to Topics]
South Korea’s Advice on Constitution Reform
March 1 st is the day South Korea celebrates the beginning of its independence movement. Its independence from Japan, to be precise. As in most countries, the occasion calls for high-powered speeches by public officials. This year marked the 87 th anniversary. And it was no exception to the rule. South Korean President, Roh Moo Hyun, delivered a widely-reported stem-winder in Seoul on Wednesday.
The speech included the usual recollections of colonialism, condemnation of Yasukuni Shrine visits, and island territorial disputes. Then President Roh offered Japan advice on current efforts to revise the Japanese constitution. According to reports from Seoul, Roh equated Japan’s current efforts to revise its post-World War Two pacifist constitution with reinforcement of Japanese military power. This, Roh admonished, would set back Japan’s efforts to be recognized as a “normal nation.”
President Roh would have done well to consult Beijing on the conduct of effective international public relations before approving the final draft of that important speech. Tokyo normally responds in a conciliatory manner to Seoul’s annual Independence Movement speeches. But this time it was different. No assurances this time that Japan would reflect on its past.
Instead, official and unofficial comments from Tokyo focused on President Roh’s constitutional advice. This was widely described as blatant interference in Japan’s domestic affairs. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, said during his regular press conference that the Japanese people would make their own decisions on the “domestic affair” of the Japanese constitution.
Prime Minister Koizumi, a bit more gently, suggested both sides put more effort into bilateral friendship and recognize each other’s recent accomplishments.
South Korea and Japan today share many of the same international challenges and opportunities. Opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation are great. The recently announced candidacy of South Korea’s Foreign Minister Ban to succeed U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan is just one example. With Japan’s support, who knows?
But little will be accomplished until the two nations agree to interact as equals. South Korea’s remarkable economic progress during the past several decades makes prolongation of the “injured petitioner” role less credible every year. We can only hope that future discussions between Japan and South Korea will focus more on mutually beneficial issues, and less on domestic political considerations. [Return to Topics]
Negotiations With China Over East China Sea Boundaries
Turning to China, bilateral relations there seem to be improving. Last month Beijing and Tokyo agreed to hold another round of official talks to resolve their differences over exploitation of energy resources in the East China Sea. The two-day round is scheduled to begin on Monday in Beijing. The meetings won’t be as important symbolically as a bilateral summit meeting. But the issues under discussion are substantively very important. Potentially explosive.
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea allows nations with coastlines to claim an exclusive economic zone extending 230 miles from shore into the ocean. The problems between Japan and China arise from overlap of their exclusive economic zones, so defined, in a narrow part of the East China Sea. This wasn’t of much concern until it was discovered that the disputed territory might well include important natural gas deposits. Resources both countries could put to good use.
Japan has proposed the issue be settled by drawing a line down the middle of the disputed territories, and then conducting joint exploitation operations in the area. China insists that the issue be settled by recognition of the extension of the Chinese continental shelf. That would give China claim to most of the disputed territory. Important interests are involved here, and both Japan and China have dispatched military craft to the region to protect their claims. It’s an issue that cries out for bilateral compromise, and hopefully, for bilateral cooperation on eventual exploitation of the energy reserves.
Yesterday, that’s Thursday in Tokyo, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, raised the stakes for the meetings just a bit. A Vice Minister announced that Tokyo expects China to respond with their own plan to Japan’s proposal for joint resource development in the area. We’ll have to wait until next week to see how all of this works out. [Return to Topics]
Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Tokyo
A final note on Japan’s international affairs for this week. The official visit of Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, to Tokyo, and Japan’s efforts to mediate the ticklish global dispute over Iran’s nuclear development program.
Tensions between Iran and the rest of the world have intensified during the past few months over Iran’s nuclear development program. Japan has joined the United States and other countries in condemning Iran’s resumption of uranium enrichment efforts last month. Iran is widely suspected of pursuing uranium enrichment activities for military nuclear application as well as peaceful energy purposes. Iran denies this.
Japan joined international criticism of Iran’s nuclear activities in spite of heavy dependence on Iranian crude oil. Iran now accounts for over 14% of Japan’s oil imports. Iran has warned Tokyo that it will suffer adverse economic consequences should it agree to join in any U.N. scheme to impose sanctions.
Japan’s economic interests in Iran don’t end with current oil imports. In February 2004, a consortium of Japanese companies won 75% of a project to develop southwest Iran’s Azadegan oil fields, a $2 billion project that is expected to produce 300,000 barrels of crude a day.
Japan can be forgiven for being a little jumpy about such investments. In 1974, with similar expectations, Mitsui invested heavily in a petrochemical development project named Bandar Shapur. It seemed like a great idea at the time. But the Iranian Revolution put an end to those dreams, even after renaming the project Bandar Khomeini, in honor of the Imam.
So it wasn’t surprising when Foreign Minister Taro Aso in mid-January invited his Iranian counterpart to Tokyo for a visit. Mottaki was no stranger to Japan, where he has many personal friends. He served there as Iran’s ambassador between 1994 and 1999.
Mottaki arrived on Monday for a three day visit. He held intensive talks with Foreign Minister Aso and METI Minister Nikai, paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Koizumi, and even had lunch with Keidanren.
That about summarizes the accomplishments of the visit. At least, the publicly announced accomplishments. No way to tell what transpired quietly. Japan maintains friendly relations with both Iran and the United States. They hoped through those friendships to serve a mediating role in this ticklish business of Iran’s nuclear development project. Even modest success would have enhanced Japan’s reputation as an actor on the international stage. Not to mention the possibility of protecting its own economic interests in Iran.
But, judging from public announcements, the visit accomplished little beyond confirming mutual good will. Foreign Minister Aso had to tell Mottaki that Japan intended to side with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, should the Iran nuclear question come up there. Aso urged Iran to accept Russia’s offer of providing uranium enrichment services somewhere outside Iran. And Mottaki had to tell Aso and everyone else that Iran would have to reconsider its economic relationship with Japan, including the Azadegan project, if Japan supported sanctions.
Before leaving to join his president in Malaysia, Foreign Minister Mottaki held a press conference in Tokyo. There he insisted that Iran had every right to continue peaceful development of nuclear energy. He noted that Article 4 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obliges nuclear nations to provide non-nuclear nations with the technology necessary for peaceful use of this important energy source. And, of course, Iran is interested only in peaceful application. He also said discussions are continuing with Russia over their offer to enrich uranium outside Iran. But that would be only a temporary measure, even if it were achieved.
The International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled to meet one final time on the Iran question next Monday in Vienna. Japan can only hope that something can be worked out before the U.N. Security Council is forced to deal with the issue, which would squeeze Tokyo from all sides at once. Not an uncommon position for the aspiring mediator. [Return to Topics]
Finally this week, let’s turn to what’s become the “Nagata e-mail flap” – if not the “Democratic Party of Japan e-mail flap.” This issue has stayed at or near the top of Japan’s mainstream media coverage since its eruption in the Lower House Budget Committee on February 16 th. Sustained interest in the issue is well justified on two counts. First, the outcome may well affect the course of Japan’s national-level political leadership for a few years. Second, analysis of information disclosed provides opportunities to learn more about Japan’s electoral politics. So let’s spend a few more minutes sifting through this week’s information to see what we can learn.
As we expected, public opinion continued to turn against Nagata, the DPJ, and the DPJ’s top leadership, throughout the weekend and early this week. DPJ President Maehara and Secretary General Hatoyama promised to hold a press conference during which all would be explained as soon as Nagata had recovered enough to leave the hospital.
The delay may have been unavoidable. But the DPJ suffered further injury as a result. Every political journalist in Japan, and many abroad, felt obligated to describe the damage. Public opinion polls were conducted and published. By Tuesday, it seemed as though every adult in Japan had been asked at least once to describe how angry they were at the bumbling DPJ. Not push-polling exactly. But a close cousin.
That afternoon, the 28 th, the DPJ finally was ready to present its public apology at a press conference held in the Diet building. By then the public atmosphere was thoroughly poisoned. Party President Maehara apologized for the inconvenience caused. Secretary General Hatoyama and Diet Affairs Chief Noda apologized for bad judgment. Nagata himself apologized for causing so much trouble by not completely confirming the authenticity of the e-mail before publicizing its contents in the Diet.
But, in response to a journalist’s question, Nagata refused to describe his e-mail as completely false, and based upon disinformation. He said the DPJ would continue to investigate the issue in a search for the truth. With that, any possible benefit the DPJ might receive from the press conference went up in smoke. Maybe Nagata still held some hope of uncovering evidence of a money trail between the Livedoor company and the LDP in time to redeem himself.
The unfortunate Tuesday press conference only prolonged the inevitable for the DPJ leadership. Their failure to clean up Nagata’s mess made them appear even more inept. The LDP indignantly refused the gesture. Secretary General Takebe refused to meet with Hatoyama to accept his personal expression of regret.
And the circus continued until late Thursday evening, March 1 st, when Nagata finally took the Floor to admit the e-mail was a fake, a fake based upon false information.
…….. Nagata’s Apology Sound Clip …….
That’s Nagata reading through his statement. I wouldn’t want to be in his shoes. LDP Secretary General Takebe, the object of Nagata’s e-mail accusation, then issued a statement accepting the apology, emphasizing Nagata’s admission that the whole thing was a fraud. So the battle between the LDP and the DPJ over what had become known as the Nagata e-mail scandal ended. The DPJ suspended Nagata from Party membership for six months, and the Discipline Committee of the Lower House next week will consider further punishment for violation of House rules.
What are the longer-term consequences of this unfortunate incident? First, by allowing eruption of this single misguided event, the DPJ leadership has squandered what appeared at the beginning of the year to be the heaven-sent opportunity to attack the LDP during the current Diet session. They had – and have -- a set of at least four razor-sharp issues. But since Nagata’s charge, we’ve heard little of government and LDP responsibility for tainted beef imports, building earthquake resistance data falsification, growing income inequality, or even of LDP electoral support for former Livedoor president, Takafumi Horie. Instead, talk has focused on DPJ shortcomings.
As if to confirm this point, on Thursday, March 2, the Lower House passed the LDP’s FY2006, 79.69 trillion yen national budget bill and sent it on to the Upper House . The ruling party usually has a much more difficult time getting their budget through the Lower House. This leaves the LDP free to submit and debate more of their administrative reform agenda in the current Diet session. Some of those reforms should interest Japan’s leading Opposition party.
The incident also reflects badly on Party President Maehara and his youthful management team. Though it’s a bit early yet to tell, it’s possible that this fiasco will tarnish the image of youthful, reforming political leadership in any Party. Maehara already was under attack from more senior, traditionally-oriented leaders of his own Party. Both from the Left and from the Right. Also, he’d lost the encouragement of the anti-LDP media commentators and academics with his positions on the military threat posed by China and constitutional revision.
Naturally, older party members already were criticizing the younger Maehara’s lack of experience. Nagata’s blunder and its aftermath gave them the opportunity to pour it on. For example, senior DPJ Member, Satsuki Eda -- lawyer, judge, and the brilliant eldest son of Socialist Party leader Saburo Eda -- was quoted as describing Maehara and his Party executives as “childish” on February 28 th. Another DPJ leader a few days later accused them of running the Party like a group of “college students.”
Such charges are offensive only to the young. But compared with traditional political leadership at the national level in Japan, Maehara and most of his most trusted aides are young. Until Nagata’s e-mail fiasco, their youth was considered a political advantage rather than disadvantage. It suggested a fresh way of looking at things and the possibility of “reform” that appealed to Japan’s voting public.
Will youth and reforming zeal now become a liability on Japan’s national political scene? Will the effect spill over onto the LDP as well? That would hardly please the 41-year-old Shinzo Abe. Of course, it’s still too early to tell. But certainly, those most immediately benefiting from the Nagata Flap are the traditional critics of Maehara within his own Party. His re-election as Party President in September is far from a sure thing now. Perhaps he will be replaced in September – or before -- by an older, more cautious Party leader who can be relied upon to pursue traditional, old-style electoral politics for a few more years. [Return to Topics]
That’s all we have time for this week. Drop by the Japan Considered website for a look at the show notes, and at a transcript of this week’s program, as soon as I can get it posted. www.JapanConsidered.org. Thanks again for tuning in. Also, continue to send me your comments and suggestions at japanconsidered@gmail.com. I hope each of you will return next week when again we consider Japan’s domestic politics and foreign relations.
In the meantime, lend an ear to a few bars from another stunning Tony Rice performance from his 1992 Rounder album, “Native American.” This one, just a peek at “There’s Nothin’ Like a Hundred Miles.”
[bluegrass]
Goodbye all. Until next week. [Return to Topics]
