2000; Volume 00, Number
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Japan Considered Podcast
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Good Morning from the overcast but unseasonably warm campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, February 17, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 07 of the Japan Considered Podcast.
I am Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and of this podcast. Thanks for tuning in , either as a regular subscriber or by downloading the files.
A regular downloading listener suggested that I move links to the audio files up to the top of the show notes where they’re more easily found and accessed. They had been down at the bottom. Also, a surprising number of listeners are downloading the transcripts as well as the audio files. This suggests the transcripts are worth the trouble it takes to prepare them. So, transcripts now are a permanent feature of the show.
However you came to the program, a hearty South Carolina welcome, and thanks again for tuning in. Continue to send your comments and suggestions for future shows to me at JapanConsidered@gmail.com.
Lots going on again this week in Japan’s diplomacy and national politics. So, let’s get right into it. This week I’ll try to cover a few of the more significant international events, and then a highly visible development on Japan’s domestic political scene that may or may not prove of enduring importance. But it’s just too interesting to ignore.
Japan's Relationship with North Korea
Japan's relationship with North Korea continued to produce noteworthy news items during the past week. This after the disappointing bilateral talks held week before last in Beijing. In general, it appears that the Koizumi Cabinet has decided to continue its “carrot-and-stick” approach. That is, publicly expressing willingness to discuss outstanding bilateral issues, including resumption of normal relations, earlier abduction of Japanese nationals by the North Korean government, and the future of Japanese aid to North Korea. At the same time they’re tightening the screws incrementally on benefits now accruing to Pyongyang in its relationship with Japan – especially opportunities to obtain hard currency.
Of note here is an Asahi Shimbun report on Wednesday, February 15 th that Prime Minister Koizumi addressed a personal letter to Secretary General Kim. Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe formally denied the same day that an official letter had been sent. But the Asahi Shimbun article suggests at the very least that a seasoned journalist had been led to believe that such a communication had taken place. While Asahi may fairly be criticized for the predictability of its ideological orientation, no sensible observer describes their well-trained journalists as unprofessional.
According to the Asahi report, Koizumi asked Kim to work toward normalization of bilateral relations by abiding by the principles established in the Japan-Pyongyang Declaration agreed upon in 2002. He suggested that Kim himself would have to assure that the normalization process continued. News of the personal communication appeared to demonstrate the Koizumi Cabinet’s reasonableness and cooperative posture. If Japan were later to take a tough line vis-à-vis North Korea, it would be only after more cooperative efforts had failed.
At the same time, not all is carrot in Japan’s dealings with North Korea. There is clear evidence that Tokyo has decided to further restrain the flow of hard currency from Japan to the Kim Regime in Pyongyang. Last week we mentioned the decision of the Fukuoka High Court against tax breaks for Pyongyang-linked properties in Japan. There was more discussion of the nationwide implications of that decision this week, and its effect on North Korean revenues from Japan.
In addition, Foreign Minister Taro Aso confirmed last Friday that the Foreign Ministry has been working on plans to intensify pressure against North Korea. Items mentioned in addition to higher taxes on North Korean properties, were tougher inspections of North Korean vessels visiting Japan and crack-downs on drug smuggling. With perhaps longer-term significance, both the LDP and the DPJ have announced plans to present bills focused on North Korea’s human rights records, including the requirement that the GOJ present an annual report on the topic. Carrots and sticks. And it appears that the momentum is turning toward emphasis on sticks. [Return to Topics]
The Relationship Between Japan and China
The relationship between Japan and China is certainly among the most significant for the future of Asia. Indeed, for the entire world. Both China and Japan, during different historical periods, have dominated Asia. Neither state now is willing to allow the other to re-impose that domination. And both suspect the other of intending to do so. So, competition between the two states for influence over Asia must be recognized as inevitable. The challenge is to maintain that competition at the level of “competition,” to prevent it from escalating to a level we have to call “conflict.”
The vice-ministerial bilateral meetings we mentioned last week concluded as planned on Saturday, the 11 th. No progress was reported after the meetings on the most critical issue under consideration: exploitation of gas fields in the East China Sea. Japan again proposed that China and Japan agree to draw a line down the middle of the disputed ocean area. Then each country could exploit gas and other natural resources on their own sides of that line. China again rejected the Japanese proposal, arguing that a line that recognized extension of the continental shelf was a better way of deciding who owned what. China again complained about untoward Yasukuni Shrine visits by Japan’s prime minister. Japan’s representatives again rejected the complaints as at least bordering on interference in Japan’s domestic affairs. Japan’s representatives demanded fuller explanation of the events that drove a Japanese diplomat at their Shanghai Consulate to commit suicide. China’s representatives denied that he did so in response to pressure from Chinese intelligence officials, and instead insisted he had been driven to kill himself by overwork.
But for all of the lack of progress – or, more accurately – the lack of progress publicly reported – the talks were characterized in Japan’s press as promising since they provided additional evidence that Beijing had adopted a more cooperative posture toward Tokyo during the past few weeks.
Those successful – or at least, non-disastrous – sub-cabinet talks weren’t the only indication of a thaw in Beijing’s handling of relations with Japan. Senior Japanese political leaders announced invitations to visit China in the near future for discussion with appropriate counterparts. And Shinzo Abe, widely expected to succeed Koizumi as prime minister, received visits from China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dai, following his first day of official talks in Tokyo. Last Monday, Vice Chairman Jing of the China-Japan Friendship Association also visited Abe in his Kantei office for what was reported by both sides to be friendly discussions.
Beijing, it seems, has decided to try to develop good relations with Abe before he becomes prime minister – if, indeed, he gets the top job. And this in spite of his expressed intention to continue his annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine, even should he become prime minister.
China, it seems, has recovered sufficiently from the anguish caused by Koizumi's Yasukuni visits to quiet violent popular protests and resume their diplomatic mission in Japan. If so, that's a good thing. Perhaps they have recognized that dramatic opposition to Koizumi's Yasukuni visits was damaging their image in the eyes of the Japanese public. Let’s hope more cooperative exchanges continue. And that future exchanges lay the foundation for settlement of the genuinely important issue of exploitation of resources in the East China Sea. [Return to Topics]
Permanent Membership on the Security Council of the United Nations
We have yet to consider another diplomatic issue that’s important for Japan. That is permanent membership on the Security Council of the United Nations. Japan joined the United Nations as soon as it could following World War Two, and since then has been one of that institution’s most supportive members. The same was true, by the way, for the League of Nations following World War One. At least until 1934. Japan’s financial contribution to the United Nation is second only to that of the United States. It even totals more than the combined contributions of the other permanent Security Council members. Yet, Japan has been denied Permanent Member status on the U.N. Security Council.
Officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have long argued that Japan should be a permanent member of the Security Council. In fact, early Foreign Ministry trial balloons on the subject were unceremoniously popped by LDP politicians who feared a firestorm of hostility from the Japanese public and Opposition parties that would complicate their management of parliamentary affairs. Now, however, Japan, unofficially and officially, is pursuing permanent membership, with near-majority support of the Japanese public.
Last year Japan joined Brazil, Germany, and India to form the G-4 bloc that proposed reform of the Security Council that would have raised Security Council membership to twenty-five, with five more permanent members. That proposal fell afoul of opposition from other countries, most notably the United States. Again, the Foreign Ministry was embarrassed. This time for failing to realize their proposal for permanent membership.
More recently, Japan has broken with the G-4 bloc, and has put forward their own proposal for Security Council reform. They hope to gather support from other U.N. members, beginning with meetings in Tokyo on the 15 th and 16 th with an association of Caribbean nations. The new plan would add only six members to the Security Council. A new member would have to receive a 2/3 vote of the General Assembly to be selected. And newly selected members wouldn’t necessarily have the same veto power now enjoyed by the five permanent members.
U.N. Security Council membership for Japan may fairly be described as more important symbolically than substantively. But symbols are as important in diplomacy as substance – sometimes more important. At least until the shooting starts. Japan has waited patiently to be invited to join the exclusive club to which they have shown such devotion. They believe themselves well qualified for membership. It’s quite possible that public explanations, at least in Japanese, of why Japan has not been allowed to join may turn bitter before long. That would not be helpful.
Fortunately for the United States, Japan’s communications media has paid more attention to Chinese and South Korean opposition to their U.N. plans than to opposition or ineffectual support from the United States. Both China and Korea have officially opposed Japan, citing outstanding diplomatic differences in justification. Hardly unexpected. China’s role, of course, is most significant. As a veto-empowered Security Council permanent member, it has the power to block any change it opposes. South Korea, at least under its current government, can be relied upon to go along with Beijing on this as well as most other issues.
During the past few days, a new issue has further complicated comprehensive understanding of the U.N. Security Council membership issue. That is discussion over who should succeed Kofi Annan as Secretary General. U.N. Secretaries General are appointed by the General Assembly with the approval of the Security Council. Secretary General Annan’s ten-year tenure expires at the end of this year. Tradition rotates the secretary generalship among geographic regions. Africa by the end of this year will have held the post for fifteen years. Asia, following normal selection procedures, is next in line.
Since U.N. secretaries general are selected from the less powerful members of the United Nations, there is no thought of running a Japanese candidate. But, early last week South Korea announced officially that incumbent South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon would stand for election. Thailand and Sri Lanka already have fielded candidates as well.
The United States unofficially, but reliably, greeted South Korea’s aspirations positively. But only if Foreign Minister Ban could persuade the ASEAN nations to support his candidacy as well. A tall order, it seems, at the moment.
Japan naturally declined to respond officially to South Korea’s candidacy for the U.N. top post. But unofficial comments reported from Foreign Ministry sources were negative, even bitter. Chief Cabinet Secretary and leading candidate to succeed Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, perhaps expressed it best when he told the Kantei Press Corps on the 15 th that it’s time for an Asian to assume the post, but that Japan hoped to decide whom to support from a more comprehensive standpoint. That is, a standpoint that would include progress toward U.N. reform. Hmmm. Could that reform include revision of membership rules for the Security Council? Maybe. Announcement of South Korea’s candidacy means China too will be facing difficult decisions in the coming weeks and months. [Return to Topics]
DPJ Member Nagata's Charge Against LDP Takebe
Let’s turn finally to a surprising domestic political issue. One that has the potential to change the course of Japanese domestic politics and even selection of Prime Minister Koizumi’s successor. IF, and that’s a big “if,” it proves to be true.
Yesterday participants and observers at the Lower House Budget Committee Meeting were shocked when DPJ Member Hisayasu Nagata announced that he had received an August 26 th 2005 e-mail in which discredited Livedoor Co. President, Takafumi Horie instructed a subordinate to transfer 30 million yen [about $250,000] to the bank account of LDP Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe’s second son.
Nagata is a controversial former Ministry of Finance official well known for producing documentary evidence of the financial misdeeds of other politicians. In July of 2002, for example, he produced a document that suggested then Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka had diverted salaries of her government-paid secretaries to pay private aides. In 2004 he was involved in accusations that senior LDP members, including former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, had received undeclared political donations from the Japan Dental Association.
Nagata's statement on Thursday stunned listeners and threw the Hearing room into immediate confusion. Charges and counter-charges were shouted. Takebe immediately denied the accusation and challenged Nagata to produce the document and identity its source. Nagata refused, saying he feared for the safety of his sources. He countered by demanding that Takebe and his son appear before the Diet as unsworn witnesses to answer questions about the charge.
After the meeting Nagata again refused to reveal the source of the e-mail, only saying he received the information through a free-lance reporter. Eventually he offered the press a copy of the print-out with the names and other identifying information blacked out.
The following day journalists were freely, if not gleefully, speculating on the significance of Nagata’s latest bombshell. Comparisons were made with the Recruit Scandal of the late 1980s that toppled Noboru Takeshita from the premiership. Foreign and domestic scholars were quoted on the severity of the problem. All agreed it was serious -- if true.
I find two or three things interesting about this latest financial impropriety fracas. The first point is related to the willingness of the Japanese press corps to take Nagata’s accusation seriously, given the limited evidence he presented. He declined to provide the press with the name of his source, or even to provide a full photocopy of the document he had obtained. Takebe, Takebe’s son, and Horie all denied the charge, though such denials might be expected, given circumstances. One Nagata critic even said Horie couldn’t have sent the e-mail at the date and time indicated because he was giving a speech before a large group of people then. That’s certainly compelling counter-evidence.
So, why was Nagata’s charge taken so seriously? Perhaps it was because of his impressive track record at obtaining documentary evidence of financial wrong-doing by senior LDP politicians, beginning with Makiko Tanaka in 2002. Perhaps it was because journalistic careers are made and enhanced on the basis of political scandals far more mundane than this one looks to be – if proven true. A Tokyo variation of the well-known Woodward/Bernstein virus that has been known to weaken the judgment of Washington journalists.
Or, perhaps it is because everyone knows that electoral politics in Japan as practiced traditionally requires huge sums of money – money that Japan’s tight election campaign laws render illegal for both recipient and source. This may enhance the credibility of even the sort of flimsy evidence DPJ Member Nagata presented on Thursday to the Lower House Budget Committee. Even some senior LDP members found the possibility believable. Asahi Shimbun ran a front-page story in this morning’s edition on Nagata’s charge. In it they quoted LDP Executive Council Chair, Fumio Kyuma, as describing the charge as too sophisticated to be a lie.
So, for me Hisayasu Nagata’s ability to ignite a political firestorm with little real evidence demonstrates that Japanese electoral politics as traditionally practiced lacks credibility. Sophisticated observers are willing to believe the worst with little or no evidence. No wonder opinion polls consistently show that the highest percentage of Japanese potential voters say they support no party at all. The situation cries out for change.
Of course, if Hisayasu Nagata is unable to prove the accuracy of the charge he has made, the reputation of the Democratic Party of Japan, Japan’s leading Opposition party, will be damaged severely over the weekend and during the following week. Nagata has stepped on a lot of senior parliamentary toes during his brief political career. It is likely some of his earlier victims will recall the treatment they received and join efforts to discredit him at this critical time. Plausibility alone will not be enough. Tune in next week to learn the outcome. [Return to Topics]
Well, that’s all the time we have for today. Indeed, we’ve run longer than intended again. Apologies for that, and thanks for listening to the end. I know, you were just waiting to hear the closing bluegrass clip. So I’ll make the wait worth your time. Listen to a few bars from the incomparable Seldom Scene’s “Blue Ridge Mountain Home.” It’s a tune that speaks to any country boy’s heart.
Clip from Seldom Scene's "Blue Ridge Mountain Home."
Goodbye all, until next week [Return to Topics]
