February 10, 2006; Volume 02, Number 06
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Introduction |
| Imperial Succession Revision Bill |
| Defense Bid-Rigging |
| Tainted Beef Imports and Bilateral U.S.-Japan Relations |
| North Korea Bilateral Talks |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning, from the sunny but cool campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, February 10, 2006. And you are listening to Volume 02, Number 06, of the Japan Considered Podcast.
I am Robert Angel, creator and maintainer of the Japan Considered Project, and of this podcast. Thanks for dropping by again this week. Listener numbers continue to climb throughout the world. Both those of you subscribed via iTunes or through some other podcatcher, and those of you who take the extra trouble to download and listen to the programs from the website.
You can find audio files, show notes, links to individuals and organizations mentioned in this podcast, as well as a transcript of the program at www.JapanConsidered.org. Just click on the big iPod button on the main page. Also, thanks to all of you who have offered feedback on earlier shows. Please send your comments and suggestions to japanconsidered@gmail.com. I read them all, and consider your ideas while preparing future shows.
This week a lot’s been going on in Japanese politics and diplomacy. So we’d better get right to it. Today we have a number of quite controversial topics to cover. So in the next few minutes we’ll consider the fate of the imperial succession revision bill we’ve been following, the political significance of the latest defense procurement bid-rigging scandal, then the implications of the tainted beef inspection issue for U.S.-Japan relations, and finally, the failure of Japanese and North Korean representatives to reach agreement in Beijing. [Return to Topics]
Imperial Succession Revision Bill
On Tuesday, the 7 th, the Imperial Household Agency announced that Princess Kiko, wife of Prince Akishino, the Emperor’s second son, is expecting the imperial couple’s third child. The baby is due this autumn. It may be a boy , but there’s naturally no news on gender yet. This was very welcome news for all of Japan.
All commentators were careful to avoid giving the appearance of politicizing the announcement. Or of infringing upon the personal joy of the imperial family. But, in fact, the announcement is of considerable political significance. It could hardly have come at a better time for the Koizumi Administration.
Late in 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi appointed a prime ministerial advisory council to look into revision of the Imperial House Law. No male heir has been born into the imperial family since 1965 , and people were beginning to be concerned about the all-important issue of succession. Perhaps, Koizumi and his advisers thought, the problem could be solved by revising the laws of succession to allow female as well as male members of the imperial family to ascend the throne. Such a change would guarantee preservation of Japan’s imperial line. At the same time, allowing female members of the imperial family to become Japan’s emperor might well appeal to the Japanese public as a forward-looking response by the Koizumi Cabinet.
Last November 24 th, the prime ministerial advisory “Council of Experts on the Imperial House Law” recommended, as expected, revision of the succession rules that would allow female members of the imperial family to ascend the throne. As expected, the recommendation was well received by the Japanese public. Public opinion polls ran 78% in favor of the proposed change. Prime Minister Koizumi seemed wise to add revision of the Imperial House Law to his legislative agenda for the current session of the Diet. And he did.
Once announced, however, the change proved more controversial than expected. In early January, Prince Tomohito of Mikasa published an article in Bungei Shunju criticizing the proposed legislation as too hasty, and even ill-advised. The Prince is a cousin of the Emperor. His public statement seemed to galvanize conservative opposition to passage of the proposed legislation, especially within the LDP.
On January 25 th, LDP Diet Affairs Committee Chairman, Hiroyuki Hosoda, announced that the government would have a hard time finding the votes necessary to pass the imperial succession legislation during this Diet Session. Hosoda’s comment attracted attention since he is the LDP’s key legislative strategist. He should have the best handle on how the Lower House is likely to vote.
Hosoda’s caution proved well founded. On February 1, opponents of “hasty passage” of the Bill sponsored a rally near the Diet Building. The rally attracted well over 1,000 participants, including over 100 members of the Diet itself. By late last week, two members of the Koizumi Cabinet had joined the ranks of those counseling caution, and public support for the legislation had begun to decline.
By the beginning of this week, what had appeared to be a Win-Win piece of legislation for the Koizumi Cabinet had become one more topic of controversy within the LDP itself. Given the popularity of the measure with the public, it would be difficult to remove it from consideration without good reason. So the Imperial Household Agency’s announcement of the impending imperial birth must have been doubly welcome news for Koizumi and his supporters. “Politicization” of the imperial family and of an imperial birth must be avoided at all cost. Better to discuss the issue more fully before deciding. And onto the “table” it went. [Return to Topics]
Not all news this week has been positive for Prime Minister Koizumi and his supporters as they press their program of reform through the current session of the Diet. Just before Christmas last year the Defense Facilities Administration Agency announced they had been asked by the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office – you’ll remember them from our discussions of the LiveDoor/Horie problems – to provide information about electrical equipment procurement. Suspicions of bid-rigging were mentioned prominently.
This was not the first time the Defense Facilities Administration Agency had been suspected of irregularities in its management of defense-related procurement bids. In fact, current Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro Nukaga, was forced to resign the same post in 1998 over a similar scandal. By the end of January, three Agency officials had been arrested on suspicion of facilitating the rigging of bids.
This bid-rigging scandal too is related to the current Diet session and the Koizumi Cabinet’s legislative agenda. Late last year it seemed likely that Japan’s Defense Agency at long last would be promoted to full ministry status. The change would be more important symbolically than substantively. Yes, Ministries have a better relationship with the Cabinet than Agencies. But still, it’s more symbolic than substantive. The time seemed right to realize this long-cherished dream of Japan’s defense establishment. With the Socialists whittled down to 15 Diet seats total, and the DPJ conflicted on the topic, it seemed like another Win-Win issue for the Koizumi Reform Agenda. So Prime Minister Koizumi added JDA upgrade to ministerial status to his list of legislative intentions during the current Diet session.
Today, the dream of ministry status, and a relatively easy win for the Koizumi agenda, seems far less realistic. The victim of yet another DFAA scandal. As details dripped, dripped, dripped into press clubs throughout Kasumigaseki, suspicions erupted that DFAA officials manipulated bidding to enhance their chances to land cushy post-retirement jobs, or “amakudari.” That’s literally “descent from heaven.
The “amakudari” problem is well understood in Japan. Indeed, it’s one of the evils Koizumi Administration reformers are pledged to eradicate. The Amakudari link can only intensify criticism of the DFAA and the Defense Agency as a whole.
Director-General Nukaga late last week proposed disbanding the discredited DFAA and merging its activities into the Defense Agency proper. At this time, it seems unlikely that this alone will remove the problem from Diet debate. Concentrated, but intense, opposition to raising the Agency to ministerial status, combined with the natural tension of partisan parliamentary politics, is likely to keep the issue alive throughout this legislative session. Like imperial succession legislation, ministerial status for the Japan Defense Agency will have to wait for another day. [Return to Topics]
Tainted Beef Imports and Bilateral U.S.-Japan Relations
The tainted beef import issue also continues to trouble the Japanese domestic political landscape. Now it even threatens to infect the bilateral relationship with the United States. Last month, prohibited spinal column material was discovered in imported American beef. This led to immediate re-imposition of the ban on U.S. beef in the Japanese market. U.S. official apologies for the errors that led to discovery were swift and sincere. But public suspicion remained that U.S. inspection procedures were inadequate, and that implementation of those procedures was slack.
Cabinet spokesmen, including the Prime Minister himself, immediately laid blame for the foul-up at the feet of the United States. Failure of U.S. inspectors to follow procedures had caused the problem. Opposition parties, quite naturally, were eager to capitalize on the revelation in parliamentary debate. They added failure to protect the Japanese public from the dangers of tainted food imports, to their criticism of the incumbent Cabinet. According to the Opposition, responsibility didn’t end in the United States. The Cabinet, and the Japanese government it supervised, had failed to properly inspect the American inspectors. As with condominium earthquake resistance, the Koizumi Administration was again described as careless with the public’s personal safety.
Within days, the main Opposition Party, the DPJ, had dispatched an inspection mission of its own to the United States. The Mission announced it found that inspection procedures were indeed being ignored . That charge was immediately disputed by a large American meatpacker. But the mission had accomplished its purpose at home.
Not to be outdone, on Wednesday , the LDP announced dispatch of its own inspection team to the United States, this one to include senior members of the Agriculture Ministry. With competing Party-sponsored inspection teams sweeping through the American heartland, one can get a sense of just how politicized this issue has become in Japan. Cabinet members and their bureaucratic subordinates are eager to appear responsive to the issue. Opposition Party representatives are eager to exploit a weakness in the Government’s behavior, and demonstrate themselves more qualified to lead the country. Through all of this, one can only hope the public interest is served as well.
As mentioned last week, I have observed the international politics of the U.S.-Japan beef trade for many years. While some of the specifics have changed, this is hardly a new issue. In fact, several of the names in the news, on both the Japanese and the American sides, remain the same. So, the scripts are well-rehearsed.
There may be some advantages in this familiarity. But there are dangers as well. One such danger would be for individuals representing the American, exporting, side to under-estimate changes in Japan’s domestic political environment during the past 25 years, or so. And here’s how.
Strong, vocal foreign pressure, or gai-atsu, on Japan’s government has been a staple of the bilateral beef trade negotiations for many years. American beef producers and their representatives in the U.S. Congress were often called upon to make tough public statements “to get Tokyo’s attention,” to show Japan that the Americans were serious about market access there. Those statements often included threats of retaliatory trade legislation should Japan fail to comply with U.S. market access demands.
Indeed, in years past, there have been rumors that sympathetic Japanese government representatives themselves even encouraged American representatives to turn up the volume of their complaints and threats to help those officials justify to Japan’s public their decisions to comply with the U.S. demands.
All of this was understandable, and at times even productive. Thorny bilateral issues got settled. American beef producers and Japanese beef consumers enjoyed the benefits of the efforts.
But, political environments change. And I suspect that Japan’s domestic political environment has changed during the last decade or so in ways that will make hard-nosed “gai-atsu” tactics less effective than they were in the past. Japanese politics is no longer dominated by a single ruling party, as it was during the 1995 System of years past.
While Japan’s Opposition parties remain weak and fragmented, they nonetheless are capable of challenging the LDP on issues beyond the bilateral security treaty and the legality of the self defense forces. This makes national political debate more interesting to a wider audience in Japan today. Even more important, changes in Japan’s domestic political environment have altered the nature of political campaigning, changed the way political parties, both government and opposition, appeal to the potential Japanese voter.
So, the politics of the tainted beef import issue we observe today in Japan is quite different from that we saw in the 1970s or 1980s. Representatives of the U.S. beef industry would be well advised to recognize that change of environment, and to take it into consideration as they develop and implement their strategy to recover this important market. Threats of trade retaliation, minimization of the dangers of exposure to mad cow disease, and comparisons of tainted beef with defective auto parts are unlikely to accomplish anything beyond further offending the Japanese consumer and their political representatives. Far better to remain publicly concerned, cooperative, and even contrite, while working within the Japanese environment to accomplish what pounding on the door no longer will achieve. As theater it’s not as dramatic , or anywhere near as satisfying. But as politics, it will prove far more effective. [Return to Topics]
Finally today, let’s consider talks with North Korea. Last Saturday, Japanese representatives began five days of meetings with North Korean counterparts at a hotel in Beijing. The meetings were called to explore the possibility of normalizing the troubled relationship between the two countries. Little was accomplished, according to the Japanese participants. But still, the event was noteworthy for being held at all, since this was the first time negotiators from the two countries had met formally in over three years.
The official objectives of both sides were clear. North Korea hoped, and hopes, to persuade Japan to “normalize” relations. In Pyongyang this means that Japan would recognize the errors of its past and atone appropriately. Appropriate atonement here means to pay large-scale cash compensation. North Korea also hopes to persuade Japan to ask the United States to lift its economic sanctions against North Korea. Washington imposed sanctions upon discovering North Korea was involved in counterfeiting U.S. currency and money laundering schemes.
Japan, on the other hand, entered the meetings with the hope that the North Korean representatives would provide more information about eleven Japanese citizens who had been kidnapped by North Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. After years of denial, Kim Jong Ill himself quite unexpectedly confirmed the kidnappings during talks with Prime Minister Koizumi in September 2002. Confirmation of the long-rumored kidnappings has hardened Japanese public attitudes toward North Korea, limiting the discretion of Japanese negotiators in the bilateral talks. In addition to kidnap victim news, and perhaps of more strategic importance, Japan hoped to persuade North Korea to curtail its nuclear and missile development plans.
The talks proceeded along three tracks, with a day set aside for discussion of each. First, on Monday, was discussion of normalization of relations, including the amount Japan was willing to pay. The next day was reserved for discussion of the abduction issue. And the third for discussion of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs. Japanese spokesmen warned before the talks began that failure of North Korean representatives to provide information about the kidnap victims would make further progress impossible.
Well, that’s what happened. According to the Japanese participants, the only positive result of the five days of discussions was agreement that the two sides should meet again, at a date and place to be decided later. Pretty slim pickings for all of the effort involved.
Another possible benefit for Japan is evidence for Japan’s Opposition Parties and the Japanese public that Japan is doing everything possible to negotiate with the recalcitrant and unpredictable North Korea. According to a Nihon Keizai Shimbun opinion poll, 71% of the Japanese public now supports imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea, while only 18% believe Japan should rely on dialogue and humanitarian aid to improve relations. And this poll was conducted before the disappointing bilateral talks.
There is some evidence suggesting that Tokyo’s patience with Pyongyang is approaching exhaustion. Japanese political leaders and government spokesmen are responding quietly and responsibly to the disappointment. No burning of flags or shouting in the streets. But after the talks ended, Foreign Minister Taro Aso was quoted as saying Japan may have to consider other means of persuading North Korea to cooperate. While he didn’t bring up the possibility of economic sanctions, he refused in his response to a journalist’s question to rule out that course of action.
While it is not directly related to the central government’s response, it’s also interesting to note a decision of the Fukuoka High Court that local governments in Japan cannot exempt properties owned by pro-North Korean organizations from property taxes. That means these organizations throughout the country will have to begin paying property taxes to maintain their facilities. This represents another economic blow to North Korea, and a further reduction in the flow of hard currency from Japan into the hands of the North Korean leaders.
Concluding Comments & Bluegrass
Well, that’s all we have time for this week. Thanks again for listening. And don’t forget to send your comments and suggestions to japanconsidered@gmail.com. To take us out today, here’s another short clip of the incomparable Seldom Scene, this from their Pan American.
Goodbye all, until next week. [Return to Topics]
