January 6, 2006; Volume 02, Number 01
of the
Japan Considered Podcast
[Listen to the audio file by clicking here]
Clink Links Below for Today's Topics
| Introduction |
| Relations With China |
| Concluding Comments |
Good Morning from the sunny campus of the University of South Carolina. Today is Friday, January 6th, 2006, and you are listening to Volume 2, Number 1 of the Japan Considered Podcast.
...............
This is our first program of the new year. So a special South Carolina Happy New Year to all of you, in addition to the usual thanks for tuning in, and for subscribing.
The increase in listenership since our mid-November inauguration has been heartening. But for some reason, this program has attracted a much higher percentage of sound file downloaders than regular subscribers, when compared with other podcasts. Subscriptions save you the time and attention necessary to download the files. If you’d like to try, go to the Japan Considered Project website, at www.JapanConsidered.ORG, for instructions on how to install freeware programs on your computer that will allow you to subscribe to the podcast feed. The software is free, and so simple to install that even I can do it. Of course, those files will remain available from the website, together with the program notes and links to individuals and organizations mentioned in each program.
A regular listener e-mailed late last year with a suggestion. In addition to the audio files and show notes, why not post transcripts of each program as text files. This would involve a little more work, but not a lot, if listeners would find those transcripts useful. Send me an e-mail at japanconsidered@gmail.com if you think program transcripts would be useful – or NOT useful. And, as always, continue to send your comments and suggestions for future shows to me at the same e-mail address: japanconsidered@gmail.com. I read each one and take your views into consideration when preparing future programs.
Speaking of the Japan Considered Project website, drop by and check out the interviews section. There are two additions you should find quite interesting. In addition to the interview with Washington, D.C.’s Cecil Uyehara that I mentioned last week, I just posted another with Professor Nathaniel B. Thayer, of Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. Professor Thayer, the well-known author of How the Conservatives Rule Japan, tells us how he came to study Japan, and his experiences there during the 1950s. The interview includes some interesting information about the later part of U.S. Occupation period as well. So have a read, and enjoy.
It’s been a busy news week for political and diplomatic Japan since the last program, so let’s get right into it. Well, busy in the sense that there’s a lot to talk about. Not so much real news, since much of Japan is not yet back to work from their long year-end and new year’s holidays. But in compensation, the New Years Season in Japan, as in the United States, inspires journalists and commentators – Japan’s ubiquitous hyoronka – to lean back and reflect on the significance of last year’s events. And even inspires the braver, or more foolhardy, to make predictions about how events will unfold in the coming year. I recall such pieces were called “thumb-suckers” by more cynical American journalists in years past. But they provide those of us interested in learning more about how political and diplomatic Japan actually works with additional insights, some of them useful.
So, during the next few minutes, let’s begin this new year by considering the currently troubled relationship between Japan and China. I will include several events of significance that have been given only limited coverage in the English language press, but that have been closely watched by observers in Beijing and Tokyo. Since this issue is of considerable importance to not only Japan and China, but to the rest of the world as well, it will take most of our time today.
Next week we will turn to the LDP Party Presidential Succession issue. Japan’s print and electronic media has been full of speculation on which of the LDP leaders are likely to compete to succeed Koizumi as LDP Party President, and therefore Prime Minister of Japan, who is likely to win that competition, the significance of the outcome for political and diplomatic Japan, and perhaps most interesting of all, how the race will be conducted.
After that, we will consider again the Democratic Party of Japan, or Minshuto, where discussion has turned to the battle for the party presidency that will occur in September when Party President Seiji Maehara’s term expires. Here too, I believe that attention to the competition for Party leadership will tell us something about how the Party is adapting to the changes in Japan’s political environment.
Let’s begin with recent developments in Japan’s uneasy relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Much of the English language news originating from both Tokyo and Beijing has emphasized China’s continued criticism of Prime Minister Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine Visits. He has refused to accept Beijing’s demands that he renounce the pledge he made at the beginning of his Premiership to visit Yasukuni Shrine regularly as prime minister . This, despite the undisputed fact the souls enshrined there have included since the 1970s Japanese leaders convicted as Class A War Criminals.
Koizumi’s position on this issue appears to have hardened over time, in response to continued Chinese, and South Korean, criticism. In contrast to Prime Minister Nakasone, who visited the Shrine as Prime Minister, but then bowed to Chinese demands that he desist, Koizumi flatly rejects the Chinese and Korean demands.
This Wednesday, January 4 th, Koizumi held his first press conference of the year . The event was televised in its entirety by NHK nationwide . During the Q&A, Koizumi said he would try during his remaining time in office to improve relations with both China and Korea. But , he added, he simply could not understand the position of his foreign critics. That day’s English language Kyodo Newswire quoted him as insisting that ''China and South Korea should not close the doors for talks due to this one issue,” a position that seemed to put the ball back in the Chinese court.
Kyodo further quoted Koizumi as responding to follow-up questions with, “I don't understand the stance of foreign governments to step into a matter of heart and try to make it a diplomatic issue.” He added that his door remains open to discuss this and other issues, and that he awaits the arrival of his counterparts.
This most recent response to the Yasukuni Shrine visit protests of the Chinese and South Korean governments suggests to me that Koizumi and his immediate advisers clearly recognize that China is using the Yasukuni issue to gain advantage in diplomatic negotiations with Japan. While that hardly rates as a profound insight, it further suggests to me that the Koizumi Kantei has concluded most of Japan’s attentive public now shares their assessment of Beijing’s behavior . That the Japanese public understands why Koizumi has rejected the demands. Recent Japanese opinion polls support that view. Koizumi’s overall public approval rating is rising. There is no indication in published opinion polls that Japan’s attentive public opposes Koizumi’s position on the Shrine visits.
There has been and will continue to be widespread opposition to Koizumi’s position in Japan. And that opposition is getting a lot of attention in the English language press. Most of it , comes, though, from expected sources. In addition to statements by or in support of candidates to succeed Koizumi as Japan’s prime minister, Asahi Shimbun’s editorial page continues to express their agreement with Beijing’s position.
More surprising, according to reports today in the Japanese editions of both Asahi and Sankei Shimbun, the latest edition of Gaikou Forum, [Gaikou translates “diplomacy,”] a publication supported by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, carries an article by former Ministry of Foreign Affairs administrative vice minister, and ambassador to the United States, Takakazu Kuriyama . In the article Kuriyama criticizes Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine while serving as Prime Minister. Asahi ran the story as a short straightforward clip on page 3. But the more conservatively inclined Sankei made it the focus of a longer piece suggesting that some officials of the Foreign Ministry disagree with Koizumi’s handling of relations with China . That is, tension between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office.
The Sankei article also mentioned the continuing disagreement between Beijing and Tokyo over the Shanghai Consulate Incident of May 2004. As reported last week, a Japanese weekly magazine, Shukan Bunshun, hit the stands toward the end of December with news that an official in Japan’s Consulate in Shanghai, China, had committed suicide back in May 2004. The report described the incident in some detail, even quoting from notes the official had left for his family and for the Counsel General. In these notes, the un-named official blamed his decision on pressure he was under from a Chinese government official. The Chinese official, he said, threatened to expose embarrassing personal details if he did not reveal secret information about the Consulate’s activities and Japan’s diplomacy. The note concluded that he chose to die rather than betray his country.
When asked about the incident immediately thereafter by the Kantei Press Corp, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe suggested the Chinese official actually was an intelligence officer, and that China’s government violated diplomatic protocol by not protecting Japanese diplomatic personnel.
Rather than follow the traditional pattern of refusing comment when such operations are exposed, the Chinese Foreign Ministry chose to counter the information and Japan’s complaint with a vigorous denial, with accusations that Japan had ulterior motives for revealing the information, and customary expressions of outrage. Hardly the most persuasive performance of 2005.
A few days later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman ventured even further by insisting that the Japanese side was responsible for covering up the incident. They said the Japanese side realized the man had died of over-work, and fearing negative repercussions at home, had asked the Chinese to keep the event under wraps.
Chief Cabinet Secretary and official Government of Japan Spokesman Abe continued to insist that the Consulate official had been blackmailed into suicide by a Chinese intelligence official, and to demand an explanation and apology from Beijing. The man had, after all, committed suicide. He left persuasive notes of explanation. The Shanghai Consulate was, and is, involved in sensitive diplomatic affairs. Beijing would like to know about those affairs. And, such information collection operations are not unknown in the world of foreign affairs.
Charges and counter-charges continue to fly between Beijing and Tokyo today, with no sign of change on either side. No credible explanation has been presented for how the information about the suicide reached the weekly magazine, or its source. But yesterday and today, the 5 th and the 6 th, Kyodo News and Sankei published articles on the annual New Years Day message of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs top career bureaucratic official, administrative vice minister, Shotaro Yachi. They both reported that Yachi took the unusual step of criticizing officials of his own ministry for leaking classified information outside the Ministry. He said that senior officials should stand firm against demands for such information, even when they come from POLITICIANS. Both Kyodo and Sankei speculated that Yachi’s unusual move was inspired by the leak of information about the Shanghai Consulate Incident. If true, it would be surprising to learn that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had decided not to provide such critical information to officials in the Office of the Prime Minister.
In addition to these two widely reported issues in Japan-China relations, several other developments that suggest continued tension in the relationship were reported with less fanfare. First, earlier this week, Yomiuri Shimbun reported on government-supported plans to investigate installing a thermal energy conversion system on Okinotorishima, at the very southwestern-most tip of Okinawa. The project jointly sponsored by the Saga Prefectural Institute of Ocean Energy and Japan’s National Fisheries University, involves sending a research vessel to the region to see if differences in ocean temperature could be exploited there to generate electricity. A source of power would facilitate development of the island.
While such research represents an admirable undertaking, we must note that Okinotorishima Island has been a point of intense controversy between China and Japan for decades. It is only a tiny island, 11 kilometers in circumference, so fragile that Japan for some time has been protecting it from erosion with wave breaks and concrete blocks out of fear it would disappear altogether. Why so much attention to such an insignificant point of land more than 1000 miles from Tokyo? Because a successful Japanese claim of sovereignty entitles Japan to exploit natural resources in the area surrounding the island for 200 nautical miles – an area greater than the total area of Japan itself.
China disputes Japan’s claim, not with the argument that Japan does not own the site. But by arguing that Okinotorishima is not an island at all, but just a pile of rocks, inadequate to justify Japan’s claim to natural resources, such as gas and minerals in the surrounding region of the sea. Still, Japan’s government earmarked 200 million yen in the 2005 budget just to examine potential damage to sea life from planned development projects in the region.
Concern over this and Chinese incursion on other remote Japanese islands in the Senkaku chain of Okinawa Prefecture, may explain the Japan government’s decision toward the end of the year to dispatch 125 Japanese Army personnel on January 9 th to California for joint training with the U.S. Marine Corps. There appeared to be no effort to keep the mission secret, either at home or abroad. The training will prepare the Japanese troops to defend remote island sites from military incursion, including time at the Marine Crop’s amphibious reconnaissance school and anti-submarine technology.
In addition, Foreign Minister Taro Aso has spent the past few days visiting India and Pakistan in an effort to promote closer relations between those South Asian nations and Japan. The two sides agreed to increase bilateral consultation, accelerate progress toward creation of a free trade area, and discuss the future of the recently created East Asia Community, a regional forum to which Japan had recently invited India. No official mention of concern over relations with China was made. And traditional difficulty in relations between Japan and India are well known. But nonetheless, given the geographic configuration, Beijing must be paying close attention to the announcements resulting from Aso’s meetings.
One encouraging piece of news arrived early this morning via Kyodo, which reported that Beijing and Tokyo had agreed to begin “informal” talks in Beijing on Monday on exploitation of natural resources in the East China Sea. Other issues are expected to be discussed as well. “Informal,” but still talks.
What are we to make of all this? Tension between Japan and China in Asia is inevitable, as mentioned last week. Both countries are experiencing changes that tend to inspire concern, or even suspicion, in the other. Neither is willing to allow the other again to dominate Asia. Controversies over substantive issues such as resource exploitation in the East China Sea are inevitable. Chances of resolving those substantive issues to the satisfaction of both parties within a reasonable time are reduced by introduction of non-essential irritants intended to win short-term negotiating advantage.
Japan’s national political situation has changed significantly -- and probably irreversibly -- during the past five years, or so. Since the end of World War Two, Japan’s national government, and management of diplomacy, has been characterized by a rather weak central political executive. An executive that was more effective at balancing disparate interests within Japan than it was at leading. It would be inaccurate to conclude that past prime ministers, or central political executives, NEVER were important in the conduct of Japan’s foreign affairs. But it IS true that Japan’s career, or permanent, bureaucracy has played a more determinant role, more effectively insulated from “political pressure,” than have the career bureaucracies of other countries.
That situation has changed during the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi. While the Foreign Ministry and the internationally-responsible bureaus of other Ministries, remain important, the Kantei, or Prime Minister’s Office, during Koizumi’s incumbency has exercised much more direct influence over the conduct of diplomacy than did its predecessors.
Representatives of other nations must recognize the significance of this change if they are to continue to conduct successful relations with Japan. With more effective central leadership, Japan’s government should be expected to be more sensitive to Japanese public opinion, less respectful of precedent, more nimble in its negotiating style, and less likely to be coerced into compromising on symbolic issues such as Yasukuni. The difference may be that between dealing with the same well-known seasoned professional diplomat over the years who specializes in your part of the world and speaks your language, and with an effective, politically astute elected politician who doesn’t – and who actually is in charge.
One can only hope that the representatives of China soon recognize this change and its significance, and adapt their tactics to cope most effectively with it. And that the representatives of Japan recognize that it will take some time for China to make the change.
That’s all we have time for today. Thanks for listening. I hope you join me again next week when we will consider what the battles to succeed Prime Minister Koizumi as LDP Party President, and Seiji Maehara as DPJ Party President, tell us about how the nature of national politics has changed over the past decade or so. Check the Japan Considered Project website at www.JapanConsidered.ORG for show notes and links to individuals and organizations mentioned in today’s podcast. And while you’re there, look through the resources offered on the site, including the interviews section. Drop me an e-mail at japanconsidered@gmail.com with your comments and suggestions, including whether you think transcripts of the programs should be made available on the site.
Let’s go out now with a few bars of progressive bluegrass, this time from “I Wonder Where You Are Tonight” by North Carolina’s Wind Riders.
...............
Good By All, until next time.
